Kaja Puto: Is there a war going on in the Baltic?
Aleksandra Kuczynska-Zonik: In the narrow sense of the word – no. There are no shots fired there, no soldiers. However, it can be said that a hybrid war is being waged in the Baltic region. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been an increase in provocative actions there, primarily by Russia. Its dynamics have also been affected by Finland’s accession to NATO.
Russia does not have much military capability in the Baltic Sea area. The equipment located there is outdated, and most of the forces have been redeployed toward Ukraine. That is why it is using alternative instruments on an unprecedented scale – such as jamming satellite transmissions and acts of cyber-terrorism. Unfortunately, she gets away with it a little. It surprises us and makes us feel threatened.
At the end of 2023, GPS was disrupted in the Baltic region. It is known that this is the work of Russia? And is it a serious threat?
According to the findings of experts representing Sweden’s Defense University or the European Center of Excellence for Defence. According to the Finnish Hybrid Threat Reduction Agency, the devices that led to the interference with satellite transmissions were most likely located in Kaliningrad or on ships sailing in the Baltic Sea. The December disturbances lasted several days and were felt not only in the Baltic Sea, but also in the territory of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Poland and the Baltic States. I wouldn’t call it a threat, perhaps more of a challenge that we should fear. Both shipping and aviation can temporarily do without a GPS signal, but this makes traffic control more difficult, as well as the lives of ordinary citizens on land. Even more challenging are acts of maritime terrorism.
What does it mean?
For example, attacks on ships, port facilities or underwater infrastructure – cables, gas pipelines, pipelines. The most spectacular examples are the attack on Nord Stream 1 and 2, the pipeline connecting Russia to Germany, and the Balticconnector, the pipeline connecting Estonia to Finland. They are spectacular not only because of the damage they have caused, but also the consequences for citizens, as it suddenly became clear that we were not safe at all. Meanwhile, the risk of terrorist attacks at sea is greater than on land.
Why?
Infrastructure at sea is less protected. It is usually located at a considerable distance from the shoreline, which increases the response time of the services, and the news of the incident reaches us with a delay. Many elements of the underwater strategic infrastructure were built at a time when aggression from other actors was not considered. In addition, we do not have enough ships and aircraft to patrol the Baltic Sea. The two pipelines are still under investigation, with investigations ongoing in many countries. And still not much is known.
And do we know that it is Russia?
In the case of Nord Stream 1 and 2, this is one hypothesis, in my view the most likely. There were also Polish and Ukrainian themes in the German investigations. This is not confirmed by Danish or Swedish investigations. In contrast, the Balticconnector case is being investigated by Finland and Estonia. There was damage to a gas pipeline there, as well as a communication cable. We know that the latter damage resulted from the anchor of the Hong Kong-flagged ship dragging for a long moment. There are doubts as to why that ship was going there and why it slowed down at a certain point. Meanwhile, China is reluctant to cooperate with the investigation. Again, the Russian thread cannot be ruled out so far.
At the bottom of the Baltic Sea lie warfare and poisonous agents from the Second World War. Can they be used against Europe?
By all means, an attack on such facilities could be calculated to cause some sort of environmental disaster. So far, no such incidents have been reported, while the attack on Nord Stream could end up that way. The explosions took place near the Danish island of Bornholm, where chemical weapons from World War II are stockpiled. There was concern that it had been damaged in some way by the explosion.
Another hybrid threat in the Baltic is cyberterrorism.
In recent months, there have been several attacks on systems that manage offshore wind farms in Germany. Again, it was difficult to diagnose the problem quickly – the operators of these systems are, after all, sitting in some office, and the farms are offshore. After the attack, it was necessary to turn them off, swim up to them, perhaps replace something in them, and so on. We presume that Russia had its fingers in it.
As a direct consequence of this attack, there was an increase in uncertainty in the energy market and a corresponding increase in commodity prices. In addition, Germany has become concerned about its energy security. Indeed, green energy is there to replace traditional energy sources sourced from Russia.
Germany generates 8.5 gigawatts of energy with the help of offshore wind farms, by 2030 this is expected to quadruple. Poland also has extensive plans in this regard. Are there any lessons to be learned from these attacks, to protect against future attacks?
For example, such that you need to protect these facilities with several parallel systems to prevent the risk of disabling the equipment as a result of an attack. However, it is important to remember that no infrastructure of this kind is free of risks. The more such systems are developed, the more dependent we are on them, and the more vulnerable we are to cyber attacks. On the other hand, even the largest wind farm is not a facility as important to energy security as, say, a power plant. An attack on the power plant would have more serious consequences for energy consumers.
What else could be attacked in this way? Port of Gdansk, through which a lot of Ukrainian goods flow? Swinoujscie and German gas ports to buy gas from outside Russia?
Certainly. Any object that is supported by some data management system. I imagine, for example, that a port could suddenly lose access to the data it needs to function. But cyberterrorism threatens more than just infrastructure. Sensitive information, such as customer data, such as Ukrainian customer data, could also be leaked. We can expect such attacks not only from Russia, but also from China, which is increasingly mentioned in security reports of countries in the Baltic Sea region.
Also new to the Baltic is the Russian “shadow fleet.” What does it actually mean?
It’s a term used to describe a fleet of vessels, usually oil tankers, that operate in violation of maritime law or other regulations. They are not easy to detect, as they usually sail with their AIS, or Automatic Identification System transponder, turned off [for those interested in tracking ships, I recommend Marinetraffic – author’s note]. They usually sail under different flags, and the structure of their ownership is unclear.
This phenomenon has been common in maritime waters for not long, but it has only appeared in the Baltic Sea in the last two years. There are many indications that Russia is thus circumventing sanctions imposed by European Union countries. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Russian oil flowed to India and China via the Baltic Sea and was transshipped in EU countries. Today, it sails along the same route, but in shanty ships, and is transshipped in international maritime waters, usually near Spanish enclaves in Africa or the Strait of Gibraltar. Evading sanctions is one thing, but the “shadow fleet” also poses environmental risks. It usually consists of old, emergency ships.
Russia’s shadow fleet can sail around with AIS turned off, but after all, the Baltic is a small, crowded sea. It is not easy to sneak through them unnoticed. So why not curb this practice?
Mainly because of the complex ownership structure, often consisting of multiple subsidiaries. In addition, ships and crews are registered in different countries. It is difficult to reach the right shipowner and hold him accountable for breaking the law or the environmental damage caused.
And can the shadow fleet be used for espionage activities?
As much as possible, it could be used for monitoring or mapping. In contrast, the most evidence we have is that Russia is using research vessels for this purpose, that is, conducting espionage activities under the guise of scientific research. An example is the oceanographic ship Admiral Vladimirovskiy, which has been dubbed a spy ship by the media since 2022.
What measures have the Baltic Sea states taken to protect themselves from all these threats?
First and foremost, this is being addressed by NATO, which is enhancing its ability to monitor the basin and working to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. For example, in response to the Balticconnector debacle, a special patrol called the Combined Expeditionary Force went to the Baltic Sea late last year. However, the media has criticized the venture, arguing that these twenty warships are a drop in the ocean of needs.
Individual countries are also taking action. For example, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs has proposed closing shipping to Russian vessels. However, this would be difficult to implement, if only because it would be necessary to prove to Russia that its authorities were behind the damage to our critical infrastructure. Estonia, on the other hand, has proposed increasing the powers of states in the maritime area. The idea, for example, is for the country’s services to have greater ability to inspect ships passing in their vicinity.
And what does it look like in Poland? At the end of 2023, the Supreme Audit Office published a report showing that Poland is not ready for hybrid threats.
I do not study Poland from this angle, so it is difficult for me to comment on this. On the other hand, it seems to me that none of the countries are really well prepared for them, perhaps only Finland and Sweden stand out on the plus side. At the same time, they too have taken action in this regard relatively recently, after the annexation of Crimea. We didn’t assume major threats, so we didn’t create the right tools for that. In addition, we neglected the fleet.
And could Russia attack the Baltic militarily?
Currently, I don’t see such a possibility. Russia also does not have an adequate navy or, as we said, significant military potential. Which, of course, does not mean that in a few years this potential will not be rebuilt. An Estonian intelligence report proves that this is already happening in northwest Russia. In it, we read about the recent reorganization of the Russian army and the creation of the Leningrad Military District. According to its creators, Russia plans to increase its armed forces along its borders with the Baltic states, as well as Finland.
So far, however, we are threatened primarily by Russia’s non-military repertoire. We have always viewed Kaliningrad as a militarized area, and perhaps today it is a center of hybrid influence. It will soon be Russia’s last bastion in the Baltic region.
Well, just what could Sweden’s entry into NATO change? Russia will be left with a very small piece of the Baltic plus Kaliningrad.
This will certainly enhance the security of NATO’s eastern flank – Sweden’s defense stands at a high level. On the other hand, we can expect an increase in hybrid attacks from Russia. Violations of border lines by ships and aircraft or interference with data transmission are more likely to occur. We may also be concerned about environmental threats, such as with the chemical weapons mentioned earlier.
It is difficult to predict what else might happen. A few days ago, we learned that Russia has put dozens of politicians from Eastern European countries on its wanted list. If they go to a country friendly to Moscow, they could be arrested. So even if we manage to strengthen our defenses, Russia may surprise us with something. This is because he is inventing ever newer instruments of influence over Europe.
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