Tbilisi protests again. Every evening, for a week now, though there have been detentions and the use of gas against demonstrators. The reason for the protests in front of the Georgian parliament building is the resumption of work on the so-called Foreign Agents Law. If enacted, the media and NGOs, which receive at least 20 percent of the foreign funding, will be registered as agents of foreign influence.
Russia enacted a similar law in 2012. In the decade that followed, it helped the Kremlin government stifle independent media and NGOs. This is why the law proposed by the Georgian Dream party government is called “Russian” by protesters. The analogy is reinforced by the fact that the ruling party, along with the Russian-style Orthodox Church, have been criticizing the promotion of European values for years.
According to opinion polls, 85-90 percent. Georgians support their country’s pro-European course. The Foreign Agents Act is another gesture by the authorities against this trend. Indeed, its cautious policy toward Russia contrasts with public condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, all indications are that Georgian Dream will win again in October’s parliamentary elections.
What is this all about? I will try to clarify this with the PISM’s expert on the subject. countries of the South Caucasus, Wojciech Wojtasiewicz.
Why does the Georgian Dream need a law on foreign agents?
The ruling party already tried to introduce a similar law last March. It backed down from this after violent protests and criticism from its Western partners. Today he claims that the “radical opposition” has misled citizens, and that the law is needed to combat “pseudo-liberal values” imposed by foreigners and promote “transparency” in the activities of the media and NGOs.
– In fact, the law targets them,” comments Wojciech Wojtasiewicz of PISM. – The idea is to keep them from looking at the authorities before the fall parliamentary elections, to reduce their power to influence public opinion.
Some Georgian experts speculate that the law’s return is the result of the Kremlin’s exposition in Georgia, namely the ruling Georgian Dream and its informal leader, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Other theories claim that the Georgian Dream is playing to Russia because of its belief in Ukraine’s inevitable defeat. Wojtasiewicz approaches these hypotheses with caution. – It seems that the crusade against European values is primarily an attempt to mobilize the conservative, religious electorate, which is critical of, for example, LGBT+ rights, ahead of the October elections.
Who is protesting against the bill?
If briefly – young, educated, from a large center (outside of Tbilisi it is difficult to talk about such in Georgia). Tens of thousands of people crowded on Rustaveli Avenue are impressive, the media and cultural bubble is experiencing a sincere and rightful intensification. Most Georgians are unlikely to bother with the new law. It’s hardly surprising – the statistical Georgian’s life is getting worse, the cost of living is rising, it’s getting harder to get a job. The pandemic-war turmoil does not serve the development of tourism – the most important sector of the Georgian economy – and ideas for a new Georgia are lacking.
The protests lack a political base – Georgia’s opposition remains weak and fractured, and representatives of the third sector do not garner much political support. – The United National Movement [a party associated with former President Mikheil Saakashvili – author’s note], second in the polls, has a strong negative electorate, and the other parties are balancing on the edge of the electoral threshold,” Wojtasiewicz enumerates. – The ambitions of individual leaders matter more than pro-state thinking. As a result, for years in the polls 30 to 50 percent. Georgians say there is no one to vote for.
Is the Georgian government pursuing a pro-Russian policy?
It’s complicated. On a declarative level, the Georgian Dream has continued its policy of rapprochement with the West since coming to power in 2012. Western money is flowing into the country, Georgians have been able to travel to EU countries without a visa since 2017, and last December Georgia was granted EU candidate status – subject to conditions it has so far failed to meet.
At the same time, the party seeks to maintain correct relations with Russia. The former colonizer remains an important trading partner for the Georgian economy. It is also the business nucleus of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, once prime minister, then gray eminence, and now honorary chairman of the power party. Georgia is also avoiding harsh gestures against its “big brother” – for example, it has not joined European sanctions against Russia despite pressure from the international community.
– Georgia has been juggling between Europe and Russia, but since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has been an increasingly pro-Russian policy, Wojtasiewicz assesses. – The draft so-called. The law on foreign agents is an obstructionist measure on Georgia’s path to the European Union. This is criticized by both Brussels and Washington, and praised by Russia. If Georgia passes this law, there is no way to start accession negotiations, which were planned for the end of the year.
What does Georgian society think about this?
Generalizing, Georgians are not fond of Russia. In the collective memory, the northern neighbor is a colonizer who has stood in the way of Georgian sovereignty for centuries. Moscow supports the independence of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which from a Georgian (and international) perspective means the occupation of 20 percent. its territories.
In addition, there was a brief armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, which could have been prolonged if only Russia had wanted it. The trauma of those days outweighs the nostalgia for the USSR, typical of much of the older generation. Hence the strong solidarity with Ukraine, visible in Georgian public space at almost every turn.
However, the Georgians realize that in the event of a confrontation with Russia, no one will help them. How many soldiers they wouldn’t send on NATO missions, how many volunteers wouldn’t die on the Ukrainian front – the West wouldn’t lift a finger to ensure their safety. Therefore, the government’s conservative behavior is not very controversial, and leading politicians are scaring Georgians into war. – They claim that the EU’s condition for starting accession negotiations is joining anti-Russian sanctions, which would end up “opening a second front,” i.e. Russia’s attack on Georgia, Wojtasiewicz explains. – It’s a cleverly guided narrative, because Georgians are watching what’s happening in Ukraine and are afraid of such a scenario.
Wojtasiewicz also warns against overestimating the high support for the EU in the polls. – Like Poles in 2004, the West is associated by Georgians with a better life, more money in the wallet, and the opportunity to go abroad, the expert explains. – This does not automatically mean support for Western values in the style of respect for human rights. Therefore, a statistical Georgian can be in favor of Georgia joining the EU, while supporting the conservative and even pro-Russian policy of the Georgian government, because the vision of accession is vague, and life in the shadow of Russia is going on here and now.
What will happen next?
Wojtasiewicz sees two possible scenarios for developments. In the first, the Georgian Dream will live to see the emotions behind the protests burn out. The legislative procedure for the Foreign Agents Law is drawn out – protests erupted after the first reading, and the third and final reading is not due until May 17.
The second possible scenario is escalation, according to the expert. This could happen especially if the Georgian Dream decides to resolve the protests by force. Georgia’s recent history shows that its citizens are capable of protesting to the hilt and reacting nervously to violence by the authorities. – For such a minor or major revolution, however, a leader would be needed, Wojtasiewicz cautions. – If there are negotiations between the protesters and the authorities, who would go to those negotiations from the opposition side? This has been the biggest problem in Georgian politics for years – there is no attractive alternative to counterbalance the ruling elite.
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Wojciech Wojtasiewicz – analyst for the company. The South Caucasus at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. He covers foreign policy, domestic policy and social affairs of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Graduated in international relations from the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at Jagiellonian University. In the past, he was a government and local government official and a journalist specializing in the post-Soviet area.
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