It is not the time to talk to Russia

Many Europeans fear that their own security interests could be sidelined in the process. Others argue that Russia has been showing signs of weakness and that Moscow may now be prepared not only to end the war, but also to negotiate a new modus vivendi capable of restoring long-term stability to Europe. Such hopes rest on several fundamental misjudgements.

The first is the belief that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is merely a local territorial conflict driven by historical grievances – and that ending the fighting could therefore restore lasting peace in Europe. In reality, Russia’s war against Ukraine is far more than a dispute over borders. Moscow seeks not only to subjugate Ukraine, which the Kremlin considers central to its self-defined sphere of influence, but also to wage a broader systemic confrontation with the West. The strategic objective is to dismantle the existing European security order by reasserting Russian dominance over the former territories of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, establishing a de facto buffer zone along NATO’s Eastern Flank, and pushing the United States out of Europe. Ultimately, this strategy aims at weakening the EU, destroying NATO, and reopening Europe to Russian penetration.

The second misconception is that the Russian regime is primarily motivated by security concerns, which – if properly addressed through western concessions – could produce long-term stability. In fact, the driving force behind Russia’s ruling elite is not insecurity, but revanchism. The Kremlin leadership, composed largely of former Soviet security service officials who have been shaped by deep anti-western resentments, remains convinced that the West orchestrated both the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR itself.

Their reference point is the height of Soviet power, and their ambition is to restore as much of Russia’s former geopolitical influence as possible. The only limits to these ambitions are Russia’s material capabilities and the Kremlin’s assessment of western weakness and institutional decay. For that reason, even a negotiated freeze of the war in Ukraine would not bring stability. On the contrary, it would likely intensify Russia’s hybrid warfare against both Ukraine and Europe, enabling Moscow to destabilize its adversaries while rebuilding its own strength.

The third illusion is that reassuring Russia of Europe’s desire for de-escalation and compromise would strengthen Europe’s standing in Moscow as an independent geopolitical actor, distinct from the US. The opposite is true. The Kremlin would interpret such overtures as evidence of weakness, fear, and strategic desperation among European elites scrambling to adapt to shifts in Washington’s policy under Donald Trump. Far from demonstrating independence, such moves would merely confirm – in Moscow’s eyes – Europe’s continued dependence on the US.

This comes at a time when Russia itself is displaying mounting signs of internal weakness. Despite staggering casualties – estimated at 1.3 million dead and wounded – and the enormous financial burden of war, with military expenditures consuming roughly half of the federal budget, Russian forces remain unable, even in the fifth year of full-scale war, to occupy the entirety of Ukraine’s Donbas region. The Russian economy is stagnating, if not sliding into crisis, while discontent among both elites and society is becoming increasingly visible.

Under these circumstances, the Kremlin’s priority is to reduce western pressure. Its strategy is clear: increase the human cost of the war for Ukraine, present the appearance of peace for the benefit of the Trump administration, and entice Washington into a broader normalization of relations and restoration of economic ties. Towards Europe, Moscow is pursuing a dual-track strategy. First, it seeks to intimidate European societies through escalating hybrid attacks, hoping to convince governments that continued support for Ukraine – especially in the field of military affairs – risks direct confrontation with Russia. It stems from the fact, that – in the Kremlin’s assessment – European aid to Kyiv remains the principal obstacle to Russian victory.

Second, Moscow seeks to cultivate the illusion that dialogue with Russia, combined with restraint in applying further pressure, offers Europe the only path towards stability and potential economic gains through renewed cooperation. The ultimate goal is transparent: weaken European resolve, collapse the sanctions regime, and leave Ukraine exposed to renewed Russian domination.

In this situation, re-establishing high-level political dialogue with Russia would play directly into the Kremlin’s hands. It would strengthen Vladimir Putin’s standing within the Russian elite while diminishing the credibility of European states and institutions in Moscow’s eyes. Worse still, European leaders, eager to pursue “peace initiatives”, could easily find themselves manipulated and humiliated by the Kremlin. Europe would not merely be offering Russia political and economic breathing space. It would also encourage further Russian escalation, accelerating the deterioration of Europe’s security environment.

A different course is required. Europe must demonstrate agency, strength, and strategic independence by refusing to endorse American initiatives towards Russia and Ukraine that undermine European security interests. Three lines of action are essential in this context. First, Europe should increase support for Ukraine, including strengthening Kyiv’s capacity to conduct deep strikes against targets inside Russia, thereby raising the cost of war for Moscow. Second, Europe must intensify sanctions and economic pressure, particularly by targeting Russia’s core source of revenue: energy exports. Third, Europe should respond to Russia’s hybrid warfare with both symmetrical and asymmetrical measures of its own. A crucial element of this strategy should involve offensive operations in the cognitive sphere, including efforts to penetrate Russia’s information space while exploiting the regime’s growing internal vulnerabilities.

Such policies, if pursued consistently over the longer term, would weaken Russia’s capacity for aggression and erode the foundations of its neo-totalitarian system. The eventual collapse of that system remains a necessary precondition for a durable peace in Europe. The reason is straightforward: Putin and his inner circle have become, in effect, hostages of the conflict with Ukraine and the West. In their view, victory is inseparable from the regime’s survival. Consequently, the Russian leadership is unlikely to abandon its aggressive objectives voluntarily. Only a tangible inability to pursue them further may, in the interim period, force the Kremlin to seek a temporary freeze of the conflict on terms considerably more favourable to Ukraine and Europe.

Only then should Europe discuss internally whether to respond to Moscow’s calls for negotiations, while setting its own conditions and demands, including the de-occupation of Ukrainian territory. It may do this for the sake of saving the Ukrainian people from suffering and avoiding further economic destruction. At the same time, it must be understood that this would bring only a temporary pause that will not stop Russia’s war by other, “hybrid”, means and would allow Moscow to prepare for further conflict. 

In essence, Europe’s – and the wider West’s – strategy towards Russia should consist of three stages. First, it must prevent Moscow from advancing further in Ukraine and escalating its “hybrid” warfare against the West. Second, it should seek to weaken Putin’s Russia systematically and reduce its capacity to threaten European security. Third, it must aim to defeat Moscow in a broader systemic confrontation, thereby paving the way for regime change in Russia. If such a transformation were to produce a weaker and more pragmatic leadership in Moscow, Europe could then begin to consider the foundations of a long-term modus vivendi with Russia. The choice is ours. Wrong decisions will carry grave consequences. Delaying the right ones will only raise the price Europe must eventually pay.

 

Marek Menkiszak is the head of the Russian department at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw.