The wolf says he’s vegetarian – can Moldova trust its would-be pro-Europeans?
New Eastern Europe
An opposition capable of replacing the ruling PAS party without abandoning European integration would give Moldovan voters a choice they need. Its credibility will depend on more than a promise of membership.
The wolf appeared towards the end of my conversation with Fernando Casal Bértoa. We were discussing political parties and foreign interference when the associate professor at the University of Nottingham reached for an analogy. Entrusting the defence of democracy to a party dependent on a foreign authoritarian government, he suggested, was like putting a wolf in charge of sheep.
“The wolf says it is vegetarian,” I replied.
“Exactly.”
For Moldovan voters dissatisfied with the governing Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), the difficulty is deciding whom to trust with the European future it has promised. A rival may support EU membership while differing sharply over the reforms, alliances and rules that would take the country there.
When I asked the professor how such voters could replace their government, he began with what should have been an unremarkable answer. In a normal country, they would vote for another party. Moldova, he argued, has “a dysfunctional party system”.
Several opposition parties also claim to support EU accession, and some have backed it at the ballot box and in parliament. Their records deserve separate scrutiny. Support for accession, independence from foreign sponsors, and respect for electoral rules are different measures of political credibility.
Who earns the European label?
Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău and leader of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) offers one of the clearest examples of political conversion. In July 2014, as a Socialist MP, he voted against ratifying Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU. He also protested against the agreement in Brussels and advocated for the Russia-led Customs Union. A party publication of the period recorded his position approvingly.
A decade later, MAN registered to campaign for a Yes vote in the constitutional referendum on European integration. Ziarul de Gardă reported that Ceban had not encouraged a Yes vote on his social media pages during the campaign. Ceban disputed the report, saying MAN activists had distributed campaign materials and promoted the referendum across the country.
In October 2022, the US Treasury said a team led by the Russian influence operative Yuriy Gudilin had offered support to MAN as Moscow sought to recover the influence lost by Moldova’s older pro-Russian political elite. The statement did not sanction MAN or Ceban, and an offer of support does not by itself establish that the recipient accepted it. Ceban challenged the allegations surrounding the announcement and sought explanations from the US embassy.
Romania subsequently imposed an entry ban on him in July 2025. Bucharest’s Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu cited documented links with Russian representatives, while Ceban denied those links and described the decision as political in nature. The public explanation did not disclose the underlying dossier.
In April 2026, Ceban announced MAN’s departure from the Alternativa bloc of parties. Its MPs would remain in the parliamentary faction, he said, but MAN would distance itself from statements and actions contrary to European integration.
Ion Chicu’s Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), presents a different case. Its September 2024 campaign announcement affirmed European integration and proposed a referendum after accession negotiations. That same month, Chicu publicly explained how a boycott could deny the impending constitutional referendum the turnout needed for validation, even if an overwhelming majority of those voting supported it.
Chicu argued that Sandu was using the vote for electoral advantage. He declared support for accession while campaigning to invalidate the referendum intended to anchor it in the constitution.
Democracy at Home, which is led by Vasile Costiuc, supported a Yes vote in 2024. Its six MPs also backed the first-reading vote to close the Russian Cultural Centre in November 2025, a measure opposed by several other opposition factions. These votes make it harder to treat Moldova’s opposition as a single political camp. The party’s recruitment and campaign financing raise separate questions about how it competes.
What survives a party ban
Professor Casal Bértoa believes banning a party should be a last resort. “No party should be banned unless banning it is the only way to defend democracy,” he says. This is also the approach of the European Court of Human Rights.
He supports sanctions where organizations use illicit funding or try to evade restrictions through successor parties. What matters is whether the leadership, organization and money remain the same. A new name does little to change a political operation run by the same people with the same resources.
In 2026, Democracy at Home nominated Victor Perțu for mayor of Orhei. Following a complaint from his PAS rival, Sergiu Stanciu, the electoral commission cancelled Perțu’s registration, citing continuing links with the outlawed Șor party’s network and indications of a concealed electoral bloc. After conflicting lower court rulings, the Supreme Court declared Perțu’s own appeal inadmissible on May 16th. Costiuc disputed the evidence and called the exclusion political.
The decision concerned a particular candidacy and its campaign network. It did not establish that Democracy at Home as a whole was a successor to Șor, a distinction that matters when assessing whether a sanction should target a candidate or an organization.
To explain the advantage illicit funding gives a party, the professor turns to football. A team fielding a twelfth player gains an advantage over competitors who respect the rules. “Democracy is not only about elections or voting,” he says. “It is voting and the rule of law.”
Excluding a party requires evidence, a proportionate sanction, and a meaningful opportunity to appeal. It also removes a choice from voters who may have played no part in the violation.
The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) final assessment of the 2025 parliamentary election described a competitive contest undermined by foreign interference, illicit financing, cyber-attacks and disinformation. It also found that the exclusion of two parties in the last two days before voting limited their right to an effective remedy. Among its recommendations were clear, solid evidence concerning de-registration and effective opportunities to contest restrictions. Dissolution, suspension and exclusion from an election also have distinct consequences for members and voters.
The professor favours clearer legal provisions on the burden of proof in successor party cases and the effect of appeals, as noted by the Venice Commission itself. He places weight on the successive checks carried out by electoral authorities and courts. Those safeguards are meaningful only if a contestant can answer the case against it, particularly when evidence is classified.
Who can afford to compete?
In October 2025, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the withdrawal of Democracy at Home’s public allocations for 12 months over repeated campaign finance violations. The party argued that its online reach was organic and that it had neither requested nor authorized foreign citizens’ support.
The Constitutional Court recorded the electoral commission’s findings concerning foreign involvement, digital promotion and undeclared expenses, but concluded that the violations, considered separately, were not sufficient to affect the election result. It validated the parliamentary mandates. The party could take its seats while losing public money.
That money matters between elections, when parties must pay staff, maintain branches and persuade members to remain after a defeat.
Professor Casal Bértoa initially describes Moldova as “too generous” in funding parties. When I ask whether public funding should be cut, he rejects the idea. Reducing the overall subsidy could leave organizations more dependent on oligarchs or sources abroad.
“You do not cut public funding,” he says. “You may even need to increase it.”
He wants fewer beneficiaries. Parties that attract negligible support should not, in his view, be kept alive indefinitely at public expense.
His proposed threshold is between two and three per cent of the vote, concentrating resources on parties that have demonstrated electoral support. Newcomers without an established organization or wealthy backer would still have to finance the campaign that determines whether they qualify.
The reform package presented by the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT) in July 2026 proposed a two per cent threshold at parliamentary or local elections and a link between part of the public allocation and membership fees. ADEPT reported that the 2026 allocation exceeded 66.6 million lei (3.3 million euros), with 44 parties receiving funding.
Linking funds to membership could encourage parties to build support beyond their principal donors, provided the contributions are genuine. A threshold, however, would also have consequences for newcomers struggling to establish themselves.
Asked what would demonstrate success after a single electoral cycle, the political scientist challenges the timetable. “Institutions require time,” he says. His interest is in organizations that develop over several elections, rather than reforms whose effects can be declared after the first result.
An alternative from within?
Durable political competition also requires parties capable of surviving their leaders. Fernando Casal Bértoa identifies three possible routes to a credible pro-European alternative: a new party, a change in the existing opposition or a split within PAS. He considers the third the most plausible, describing a scenario rather than an outcome he advocates.
Sandu stepped down as PAS leader and resigned her party membership in December 2020. Bértoa’s argument concerns the political influence she continues to exert, not a formal position in the organization. Once that unifying influence recedes, he suggests, PAS may struggle to hold together. A split could produce competing pro-European formations or help the existing opposition win power.
He identifies neither a timetable nor a specific internal dispute that would trigger a split. Whether any resulting parties could cooperate while competing for government remains an open question.
The institutions a successor inherits
An eventual change of government would also test the institutions PAS leaves behind. The professor argues that the independence of public television must survive the party’s departure from office. Its board and management need protections that endure when the parliamentary majority changes.
His argument draws on the idea of institutional forbearance, the restraint politicians exercise even when the law gives them room to act. “You may have the power to appoint the television director, but you should not appoint your brother,” he says.
The example is a warning about the exercise of political power, not evidence that a particular appointment in Moldova was improper. The independence of public broadcasting depends in part on how its managers are appointed, the grounds for their dismissal, and the security of its funding.
Moldova’s accession negotiations formally opened in June 2024, beginning work that will outlast individual administrations. Sustaining it will require political organizations able to compete over how the country is governed while accepting the institutional limits membership entails.
Opposition parties must demonstrate their commitments through their finances, partners and conduct, including when they lose. PAS must accept that support for accession does not give it a permanent claim to power. Voters can support accession and still want someone else to run the government.
Ana Pisarenco is a journalist based in Moldova. She runs the independent media project eurOpinii.