Polanski, Mamdani, and the Others: Is it time for left-wing economic populism?

Recent elections in the United Kingdom, in New York City, and in Germany tell a story of polarization: disappointed with centrist consensus, voters are seeking alternatives to traditional politics. A focus on affordability could channel this discontent into progressive options.

For some years now, the radical right has seemed to be the only beneficiary of a strong anti-institutional and anti-politics sentiment. For voters who felt betrayed by the status quo and ignored by the political class, the far right appeared to offer a visible protest route. Or, in many cases, a lit match to ignite the political consensus.

However, winds may be changing. Under Zack Polanski's leadership, the Greens of England and Wales have skyrocketed in popularity, more than doubling their vote share in the 2024 elections. The Greens are mounting a formidable assault on the country's political consensus, riding a platform openly of the left. As of the date of this article [April 2026], the party was polling at 16 percent, tied with the Labour Party and one point below the Conservatives. Their campaign presents it as the strategic choice for those wanting to prevent the far-right Reform UK from coming to power. Until recently, the UK was considered a two-party system.

The insurgent left is finally entering the polarization game.

The 2025 German federal elections also told a story of increasing polarization. It was expected that the center-right CDU/CSU (and, to a lesser extent, the outgoing coalition of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals) would lose voters to the far-right AfD, which recorded its best result ever with 21 percent of the vote. What surprised was the late rise of Die Linke (The Left), allegedly resulting from a viral TikTok campaign with its co-leader Heidi Reichinnek. From 3 percent in polls a month before the elections, the party more than doubled its 2021 result, reaching 9 percent of the vote. Since the elections, Die Linke has continued to gain popularity and is only 2 percent behind the Social Democrats in polls.

In the United States, the election for New York City Council President provided another model for a shift toward a more marginal left-wing politics: Zohran Mamdani's victory over the Democratic establishment demonstrated the strong electoral appeal of a "services for all" platform.

The insurgent left is finally entering the polarization game. Regardless of whether one laments or not the deterioration of historic parties and institutional politics, this should be a better outcome than the far right holding an uncontested monopoly on protest politics.

Economic justice first

One powerful and, crucially, replicable aspect these campaigns share is a focus on left-wing economic populism. They refuse to center on "culture wars" and instead adopt an unwavering focus on affordability, aiming to raise class consciousness. Each campaign has outlined a clear narrative of deprivation where the victim/hero is embodied by the working people, framing large corporations and ultra-rich as the enemy. They propose economic "radical" reforms to expand the welfare state and redistribute wealth, including income reductions, raising the minimum wage, free public transportation, and heavier taxes on the wealthy.

This platform proves effective for some simple reasons. First, price affordability remains, on average, the main concern of European voters. Second, people (at least in Western democracies) more or less agree on whom to blame: the collusion of elites and poor governance. This is a story easier to tell from the left than from the right.

According to research by Mandate, the organization I work for, in August 2025,1 left-wing economic populism has the potential to be a platform of consensus.

When asked about the causes of inflation, most point the finger at the political class and its mismanagement of the economy.

The cost of living crisis has hardly followed the timeline of a typical exogenous shock. It has been present for some time. The cost of living surpassed health as the main concern of the European public after the pandemic, somewhere around 2021. This was first detected by the Eurobarometer Winter 2021, where it appeared as one of the top two concerns for 41 percent of respondents. The "crisis" had already been listed as the EU's main concern since spring of that year.

In 2025, the inability to meet basic needs remained the most pressing concern for both men and women (slightly more for women) and across all age groups except those 75 or older.2 This was not a surprising result. The cost of living has led our lists of most important issues in every country we've surveyed for years; it reappeared in our most recent survey among countries in March 2026. Nor was the growing pessimism among voters about their country's trajectory surprising. The 2025 survey showed that half of all voters believed their country was heading in the wrong direction. In some cases, this number increased substantially since we last asked this question three months earlier (up to 8 percent in France).

The difficulties are tangible, and the resentment is directed. When asked who they considered "the biggest culprits for the high inflation in recent years," a majority in six of the eight countries pointed the finger at the political class and its mismanagement of the economy.3

The data also suggest that the public does not instinctively associate low immigration with a good economic indicator.

What the numbers reveal

When Europeans are asked to define a successful economy, their view is markedly left-leaning. Far from the neoliberal consensus of the early 21st century, their priorities suggest that the marks of a prosperous society lie in community stability and the robustness of the state.

A significant percentage of 34 percent of voters define success as an economy capable of funding quality public services for all, while 33 percent prioritize secure employment. These characteristics of the post-war European social-democratic movement are consistently prioritized over neoliberal clichés; only 16 percent of voters see global leadership in technology as an economic priority, and 14 percent believe rewarding entrepreneurship is a top goal.

The data also suggest that the public does not instinctively associate low immigration with a good economic indicator, with only 18 percent rating it as a feature of a successful economy. This indicates that the far right is not succeeding as much in linking high immigration to high inflation.

The majority of the public believes that higher taxes on the wealthy will give them exactly what they want — better-funded public services.

Another clear conclusion from the survey concerns attitudes towards progressive taxation. Higher taxes on the wealthy are often countered by free-market logic, which argues that, in the face of a wealth tax, multimillionaires will move their businesses elsewhere. Most Europeans do not subscribe to this theory. When asked which statement most closely aligns with their opinion, the majority believe that higher taxes on the wealthy will give them exactly what they want — better-funded public services — rather than provoking capital flight.

There is room for the left to define a political enemy on its own terms. And there is a clear candidate for the role: the ultra-rich.

We also evaluated the various narrative frameworks that Western governments currently use to address the cost of living and housing crises. Messages ranged from the anti-immigration framing of the far right to technocratic and centrist positions ("Just build more houses!"), through right-wing capitalist arguments in favor of a minimal state, to openly populist left approaches.

The overall winner, with approval ratings above 50 percent in all countries, was the message of left-wing economic populism. This message frames the cost of living as a conflict between the working people and multimillionaires. Its political imperatives to lower food prices and reduce rents speak directly to real, material changes for workers, as well as the immediate transfer of wealth from owners and mega-corporations to the working class. These policies mirror Mamdani's style. And they are popular even when not presented by the man with dimples in person.

Voters simply are not accepting that there is a link between immigration and inflation.

A more traditional message of market liberalism about investing in businesses and reducing trade barriers is also highly competitive. While voters want systemic change, they are not necessarily "anti-business." At the other end of the spectrum, centrist triangulation that praises historic politicians as the adults in the room, responsible for promoting systemic change, receives much less universal support. The same applies to the association between green energy and long-term economic growth targets. Voters want to see real changes in the prices of their daily lives, and they want them yesterday.

It is interesting to note that not all messages attacking the elites fare well. In fact, explicitly populist messages delineate the spectrum of best and worst outcomes. While the left-wing populist proposal that explicitly presents millionaires as enemies of the working class is favored by consensus, a similar message framed in far-right populist terms — where the conspiracy of the elite involves prioritizing immigrants over natives — is the least universally popular message across all surveyed countries (except Romania, by 1 percentage point).

When discussing the cost of living, immigrants are not an effective scapegoat. Although voters care deeply about immigration — it is their second most important issue on average — they do not immediately associate high immigration with high living costs, despite messages about elites. This remains true even when messages frame immigration as aligned with elite interests. Voters simply are not accepting that there is a link between immigration and inflation. There is room on the board for the Left to define a political enemy on its own terms. And a clear candidate for the role: the ultra-rich.

The economy is a no-man's land in the current party landscape.

Openness to an insurgent Left

The data also suggest that the economy is a no-man's land and still to be claimed in the current party landscape. We asked voters to choose, from a list of themes, what they believe their country's main "progressive" party and far-right party value most. The coordination and message discipline of the far right, and the disorganization of the institutional left, are reflected in the results. While the far right has a clear and dominant thematic profile — concerned primarily with immigration, but also with security and crime reduction — the progressives are floundering. The most common response is either that the respondent does not know what their country's progressive party stands for, or that it does not defend any of the salient themes. "Social security" and "cost of living," once the bread and butter of the social-democratic movement, rank poorly in third and fourth places.

When voters believe they can be helped but choose not to be, frustration turns into anger.

According to respondents, high inflation is primarily a consequence of political incapacity, where leaders want to help but are unable to do so, and political indifference, where they have the means to act but choose not to. In each country, we find that politicians suffer more from a perception of indifference than powerlessness regarding the cost of living.

The belief that parties are trying but failing to make things more affordable is hard to overcome, but not fatal: they can blame technical limitations or shift responsibility to the private sector. But indifference is a death sentence. When voters believe they can be helped but choose not to, frustration turns into anger and, as seen in recent anti-incumbency waves, they take their vote elsewhere.

The era of right-wing radical dominance over anti-system sentiment may be reaching a structural limit.

In this climate, credibility on the cost of living would have to come from outside the system. And the biggest outsiders — the far right — are also stumbling in this important thematic space. There is a huge void in this thematic space begging to be filled, and a clear mandate from voters on what they want to see fill that gap.

Voters are clear about the kind of economy they want. They prioritize quality public services and secure employment.

Confronting the far right

The era of right-wing radical dominance over anti-system sentiment may be reaching a structural limit. The cost of living remains a persistent priority for the European electorate. And while traditional parties are paralyzed by perceptions of institutional indifference and the far right remains hyper-focused on immigration, a significant opening has emerged for an insurgent left.

Voters are clear about the kind of economy they want. They seek bold messages framing redistribution as a necessary wealth transfer to fund the social contract. They are rejecting centrist rhetoric that serves as a veil for inaction and are not willing to blame migrants.

Here lies a rare opportunity to (re)define and (re)claim a theme that truly matters to voters. Left-wing economic populism appears to be genuinely a platform of consensus, allowing left and green challenger parties to expand their base. There may be an opportunity here to challenge the dominance of the far right over voter frustration and channel anti-system sentiment to the left.