Dubious victories: Who really believes in the German far-right party AfD?
Kapitál
With the upcoming elections in two eastern federal states, Germany is once again concerned about the possibility that a far-right government could come to power for the first time. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is already declaring itself the winner, with its optimism reinforced by the latest record-breaking public opinion poll results. However, polls are not elections – as the election results of AfD have proven for over ten years.
With the upcoming elections in two eastern federal states, Germany is once again concerned about the possibility that a far-right government could come to power for the first time. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party already declares itself the winner, with its optimism reinforced by the latest record-breaking results in public opinion polls. However, polls are not elections – which the AfD's election results have proven for over ten years.
Russian will become a compulsory subject in schools, rainbow flags in front of school buildings will be replaced by the national flag, and the Holocaust remembrance in history classes will be replaced with an emphasis on the "successful story" of the German state. The current compulsory schooling will also give way to education that can be completed online or at home.
This is just a few of the latest and most significant announcements of the German far-right party AfD, which confidently enters the next election cycle. In September 2026, three eastern German federal states will elect new parliaments: Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern two weeks later, and finally the city-state of Berlin.
Education is one of the areas in which German federal states differ. Another is internal security, especially police activity. Since the governments of the federal states hold significant authority in these areas, AfD has made cultural conflict in education a central theme of its campaign. At the same time, it advocates the concept of "remigration" aimed at restricting migration and "Germanization" of society. In the area of internal security, it plans to establish a "volunteer civil unit" alongside regular police, thereby questioning the state's monopoly on the use of force.
Party representatives act very confidently; their regional leaders are already talking about a "first regional government in Germany led by AfD." Instead of a traditional electoral strategy, the regional branch in Saxony-Anhalt has presented an "action plan of the government." The media call it Machtübernahme (power takeover), a direct reference to how Adolf Hitler became Chancellor in 1933 – also through democratic elections.
Forty percent in the East, twenty percent in the West
Latest public opinion polls from mid-May confirm the party's optimism: according to them, AfD should become the strongest party – with 42% in Saxony-Anhalt and 36% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. These numbers seem to continue growing. A poll from mid-June shows that even at the federal level, AfD could soon surpass all its competitors. With 29%, it has a significant lead over the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, 22%), Social Democratic Party (SPD, 13%), Greens (14%), and The Left (10%). Liberals and other parties would not even reach the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament.
The second poll refutes the widespread cliché that AfD is exclusively an East German phenomenon driven by frustration and disillusionment with the capitalist transformation after the former socialist GDR was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany.
Although this historical context is not unfounded, the rise of AfD differs, for example, from the temporary success of the extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) in the first decade of the 21st century. In Saxony, NPD was elected to the state parliament in 2004 and remained there – but only there – until 2014. Founded in 2013, AfD initially weakened the radical NPD with its then-moderate conservative stance and focus on the economy.
It was only during and after the migration crisis in Europe in 2015/16 that AfD moved even further to the right, adopting xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric from anti-migration movements like Dresden's Pegida, and pushed out less radical politicians from the party.
Exploiting crises and wars for political capital
This has essentially become their main – and highly successful – approach to several subsequent crises. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, AfD leaders criticized the government for not doing enough to protect society from the virus. After a few months, when the first lockdowns and chaotic regional rules caused public frustration, AfD noticed the growing protest movement against pandemic safety measures and vaccination. It quickly shifted course and joined the COVID skeptics.
Even after the extensive Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it took the party several months to determine which stance would most effectively mobilize voters. Ultimately, it aligned with pro-Russian and anti-NATO movements and deepened its ties with Russia, for example, by participating in economic forums in St. Petersburg.
Regarding wars in the Middle East, the party speaks on this topic very rarely, due to internal conflicts between expressing support for Israel and antisemitic tendencies and obvious Islamophobia among its politicians.
Nevertheless, each of these crises has helped the party achieve new electoral success. And yes, AfD has always been more popular in eastern Germany – and still is, with recent state and municipal elections averaging 30 to 40%. However, it continues to gain supporters in the West as well, surpassing the 20% mark. AfD is already represented in 15 out of 16 German state parliaments (the only exception is Schleswig-Holstein in the north).
Since March, the new state parliament in Baden-Württemberg in the southwest consists of 56 conservative CDU and Green Party members, 35 AfD members, and 10 SPD members. In the western state of Rhineland-Palatinate, CDU secured 39 seats, SPD 32, AfD 24, and Greens 10. In both regions, AfD garnered about 19% of the votes, making it the third strongest force.
When Björn Höcke, ideological leader of AfD in Thuringia (although born and raised in western Germany), recently stated in a Swiss podcast that "In the western part of the country, German-speaking Americans live; in the eastern part, German-speaking Germans. In the East, people are still Germans," he faced sharp criticism from the party's federal leadership. They feared he could easily damage their recent successes in the West.
AfD is gaining increasing popularity among young people, both in the West and the East. Journalists and experts explain this trend with the same factors as for the adult population: disappointment with established political parties, a feeling that society has forgotten them – especially in rural areas – as well as opposition to the dominant Green and progressive values that have shaped public discourse in recent years.
The pandemic, energy crises, and escalating wars have strengthened ideological searches for simple answers. These topics, along with fears about the future and the possible need to sacrifice living standards, are widely exploited in propaganda campaigns not only by AfD but also by more extremist parties like Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons) or Die Heimat (The Homeland, former NPD). Moreover, anti-democratic and anti-system movements across Europe actively establish contacts – as do authoritarian regimes like Russia and individuals close to the Trump administration in the USA.
In this light, the German debate on how to prevent AfD from governing appears outdated and too limited, as it continues to focus mainly on the differences between East and West. Classifying several regional AfD organizations as far-right and extremist by the domestic intelligence agency (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), along with extensive media coverage of this topic, ultimately gave the party more publicity than warnings about the threat to the country's democratic system.
Public demands for maintaining the so-called Brandmauer (protective wall in the form of political consensus not to cooperate with AfD representatives) no longer work. AfD has been represented for years in state and local parliaments. Its influence manifests in restricting financial support for civil society initiatives and implementing stricter rules for asylum seekers and other migrants.
Furthermore, other parties – especially the conservative CDU – out of fear of losing votes to AfD, regularly adopt elements of its program. This has essentially led to the reintroduction of border controls within the European Schengen Area, the implementation of payment cards for asylum applicants, and restrictions on language courses for migrants in Germany.
Self-sabotage
The weaknesses of AfD in genuine political governance, however, should be more apparent. Although its main slogan – inspired by the American MAGA movement – is Unser Land zuerst (Our country first), it struggles with real crisis situations. It mobilizes people through fear. When the party is forced to make decisions or participate in legislative processes, accusations against "established parties" no longer help it.
A good example is the possible reintroduction of mandatory military service. AfD generally supports its reinstatement. However, among its ranks are so many pro-Russian politicians who reject any possibility of a Russian attack on NATO member states or Germany itself that the party still lacks a coherent stance on this urgent issue. If you say "Our country first," you must be able to defend it – and on this point, AfD's positions remain very vague.
At the same time, members at the district and local levels are known for sabotaging parliamentary processes by submitting a flood of proposals that ultimately fail due to formal or procedural errors. It seems they are trying to fulfill their own prophecy of a "dysfunctional democratic system."
But in doing so, they also harm themselves. In the last municipal elections in 2026, AfD lost far more mayoral races in eastern Germany (25 defeats) than it managed to win (only two, in Zehdenick in Brandenburg and Altenberg in Saxony). It even lost in Görlitz (Saxony, on the Polish border) – right in the heart of the district where AfD is the strongest party with 36%, and where its direct candidate, Tino Chrupalla, is co-chair of the federal party. As the left-leaning newspaper taz reports, voters in municipal elections tend to prefer experience and personal contacts over radical rhetoric of lesser-known, new politicians.
It is precisely here that it becomes clear that pre-election polls are not elections: polls can alarm the population and motivate them to vote differently. Although the current democratic mainstream may have to accept AfD's parliamentary presence as a far-right, xenophobic, and economically liberal party, it seems most voters still do not trust it enough to entrust it with real governing responsibility. We will see whom voters in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will trust this fall.
The text is part of the PERSPECTIVES project – a new brand for independent, constructive, and multiperspective journalism. The project is funded by the European Union. The expressed opinions and positions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). The European Union or EACEA do not assume any responsibility for them.