Spain’s delicate balance in its foreign policy

While Spain is a fully integrated member of the EU and NATO, its reluctance to comply with NATO’s 5 per cent GDP defence target, its apparent limited support for Ukraine, and calls for restraint and respect to international law in the cases of Gaza and Iran (including refusing to let the US use its Spanish bases for strikes in Iran) have sparked heavy criticism from NATO allies and the US administration. Washington has even threatened a trade embargo as a result of these developments.

 

At a time when Europe is walking on eggshells and needs deterrence, strategic autonomy, and a societal and civilizational model worth defending, what can be inferred from Spain’s position? As a country with an increasingly multi-vector foreign policy yet one also based on national interests, Spain’s position reflects the present geopolitical complexities that Europe faces, the debate on the country’s geographic and geopolitical stance within the bloc, and the connection between the country’s domestic politics and foreign policy preferences.

 

The impact of geography and the weight of history

 

While geography does not determine outcomes by itself, it does create the conditions. Spain is located in the Iberian Peninsula and is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the north and west. Its Iberian neighbour, Portugal, is smaller in land and population, while the border with France in the north is marked by the Pyrenees mountain range. The Strait of Gibraltar also separates Spain and Africa. This makes the country easy to defend from external threats when compared to the countries located on the European plains, from northern France to Russia. Likewise, the geographical boundaries and connections to the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean prove an easier comparison with the Portuguese and British thalassocratic empires than the Central European land-based empires.

 

Nonetheless, integrating and forming a cohesive collective identity has proved difficult across history. Spain is the second-most mountainous country in Europe after Switzerland, which historically made communications difficult and maintained local identities. Most recently, the main threat to Spain’s territorial integrity was not an external foe, but inner cultural and developmental differences resulting in various civil wars. There are also various nationalist and separatist movements, such as in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country.

 

As Spain integrated into western structures with the transition to a constitutional monarchy following General Franco’s dictatorship, it started to leverage its position as a foreign policy actor in its vicinity and in Latin America, which has been traditionally relevant for the Spanish collective imaginary owing to linguistic and cultural ties with the former colonies.

 

Apart from looking to Europe and advancing on European integration, Spain’s foreign policy naturally focuses on the EU’s south-western flank. This is the result of the country’s geographical position, as the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are located on the African continent. Moreover, Ceuta and Melilla's inclusion in NATO's Article 5, which provides for mutual assistance in the event of an attack, is unclear.

 

The Southern Flank

 

Morocco’s assertive policy constitutes a potential threat to Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. The illegal annexation of the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara, the weaponization of migration flows for political gains, ambivalent recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, and the country's latest purchases of US and Israeli military hardware are viewed with concern in Madrid. On that note, Morocco’s “Cold War” and arms race with its neighbour Algeria carries risk for Europe’s Southern Flank.

 

As a country with important natural resources and a strong military, Algeria should not be overlooked. In 2022, Spain fundamentally changed its traditional foreign policy towards the Western Sahara question. While self-determination, as per the UN resolutions, was favoured in the past, Madrid changed its position to support Saharan autonomy within Morocco. This jeopardized relations with Algeria, which suspended its friendship treaty with Spain. Nonetheless, over the last year, relations have improved, and both countries are planning to increase gas supplies to Spain via the Medgaz pipeline by ten per cent, partially owing to the increase in energy prices provoked by the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, Algeria and Russia are strategic partners and particularly on military matters. Not only is most of Algeria’s military hardware Russian-made, but the African nation recently purchased Russia’s fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter. It is currently the only country besides Russia operating this aircraft. 

 

Cultivating both deterrence and healthy relations with Morocco and Algeria helps maintain stability in the region, especially in the case of Algeria. As a country rich in natural resources that Europe needs but is geopolitically pulled towards Russia, diplomatic, economic and security engagement carries the benefits of decreasing resource dependence on third parties and increased European leverage vis-a-vis Russia.

 

The Sahel: threats and opportunities

 

Another contested and volatile region important for Spanish interests and the EU’s Southern Flank is the Sahel. The region’s countries consist mostly of former French colonies, which still use the CFA franc, the currency established during French colonial rule. A combination of factors, such as underdevelopment, economic inequality, and environmental emergency, as well as ethnic tensions, led to the rise of various jihadist and separatist groups in the region. This is coupled with anti-French sentiments emanating from the failure of France’s support for jihadist containment and the colonial past. As a result, this prompted the rise of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the expulsion of French troops, and the presence of Russia in the region.

 

It is noteworthy that Russia’s military support for the juntas through the recycling of the Wagner Group into the new Africa Corps has not proven a success. Unrestrained warfare and human rights violations have fuelled more resentment and alienation among locals, and due to the war in Ukraine, Russia does not have enough troops in the region to contain insurgents effectively.

 

The increase in insurgent activity only further fuels migration flows to Spain and Europe via Morocco and Libya, facilitating migration crises. Likewise, despite Russia’s present lack of capacity, its presence in the region is a clear threat to Spain and Europe’s interests. While Spain also had colonies in Africa and experiences of colonial warfare (Western Sahara, northern Morocco, Equatorial Guinea), it was not as involved as France in the Sahel. Thus, the image of Spain among the countries in the region is not as bad as France. It is in the interest of Spain and the EU to engage with the region in balanced terms for the promotion of stability, and economic growth and long-term development opportunities in order to counter uncontrolled migration, the jihadist menace, and the Russian presence.

 

Spain in Eastern Europe and its connection to domestic politics

 

Spanish policy in Eastern Europe is mainly conditioned by the geographical distance between Spain and the region, the previously comparatively lower relevance of the region, and Spanish history and domestic politics. Due to its geographic position and history, Spain’s traditional axis has focused on the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and North Africa, with France and Britain its traditional enemies. 

 

During the last century, however, the Nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War brought an initial alignment with Axis powers that culminated in the formation of a Spanish volunteer division fighting the Soviets on the Eastern Front. After the Axis defeat and the emergence of the Cold War, the regime’s anti-communism helped to coordinate relations with NATO countries owing to similar ideological goals. The collapse of the regime and the victory of the Socialist Party in the subsequent elections were the initial phases of democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration for the country. During the 1986 referendum on NATO accession, the “yes” option, favoured by the government, won in each region except in the Canary Islands, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Navarre, showcasing how nationalist sentiments link with differences in foreign policy preferences.

 

The completion of Euro-Atlantic integration and the fall of the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia prompted increased involvement in Eastern European affairs. However, this was always done with national interests in mind. The basis of Spanish foreign policy is its rigid stance on the principle of territorial integrity, not only as a general principle for normalized inter-state relations, but as a consequence of the domestic pressures of peripheral nationalistic sentiments inside Spain. This is the reason why Spain refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence and will probably only do so if Serbia fundamentally changes its position towards Kosovo’s recognition. The domestic mirroring of foreign conflicts can be seen through the curious cases of the Basque parliament’s recognition of the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh, including visits to the Basque Country from officials of the former breakaway republic. At the same time, Spanish policy supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Moreover, the Catalan nationalist party “Together for Catalonia” proposed an initiative for Kosovo’s recognition that the Spanish parliament overwhelmingly rejected. The principle likewise is upheld in the cases of Cyprus and Ukraine. 

 

On military matters, Spain has traditionally been one of the NATO allies investing the least when it comes to GDP. This is likely the result of its geographical position and the country's past. As such, even though it increased its military spending from 1,3 to two per cent of GDP, it has opposed the target of five per cent spending set by NATO. This has sparked criticism among allies for a lack of support for Ukraine and Eastern Europe’s security.

 

However, Spain's contribution is often overlooked. Spain supports Ukraine’s EU accession and a system of qualified majority voting for foreign policy decisions. This would be used in the process of accepting candidates including Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan countries, whose EU accession Spain also supports. On the Eastern Flank, Spanish US-made Patriot air defence systems operate at the Incirlik air base in Turkey. The Spanish Air Force participates in the rotations of the Baltic Air Police and the Black Sea with the deployment of eight Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets in Lithuania and three more in Romania. It is also worth noting the deployment of up to 3,000 soldiers in the Eastern Flank, including NASAMS air defence systems. Rather than a flamboyant approach to supporting Ukraine with declarations and initiatives large in scale (and often unrealistic), Spain has chosen the path of small-scale but reliable support.

 

While Spain is far from Russia's borders, the threat of sabotage to Spain’s energy grid and other strategic sectors, as well as hybrid warfare or missile attacks, should not be understated. Likewise, Russia could escalate confrontation indirectly through third parties with its involvement in the Sahel and through its close ties to Algeria. The full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine notably changed the Spanish perspective on the matter, surpassing Morocco as a threat.

 

Conclusion

 

Geography makes an impact regarding collective imagination, threat perception, and empathy, which in turn shape each country’s policy priorities. Nonetheless, the international system is composed of many actors that engage with one another. As in any complex system, a behavioural change in one of the actors provokes reactions that encourage change in the rest of the actors to adapt to the new situation.

 

That interconnectedness of the international system shows up with Algeria’s purchase of the Russian fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet, or with the presence of former Wagner mercenaries in the countries of the Sahel region through the Russian Africa Corps. While the Central and Eastern European steppes are far from Spain geographically, and feel far from the country in its collective imagination, offering a perception of relative safety, the domino effect of Russian aggression would eventually affect all of Europe. Likewise, despite the distance between the Mediterranean and the Baltic capitals, an unstable Southern Flank diverts resources that could otherwise boost the Eastern Flank.

 

Hence, for Spain and the European Union, a secure Southern Flank is of strategic importance. Maintaining security regarding piracy and terrorism, stabilizing migration flows coming from Africa, securing the supply of energy resources, and countering Russia's influence in the region are relevant objectives that may not look as relevant in the short term as defending the Baltic states from Russian drone incursions or helping Ukraine maintain its defensive positions from the Eastern European perspective. However, owing to the interconnectedness of these scenarios, the compound effect of a failure to achieve security, stability, and reliable energy supplies from the south would weaken Europe as a whole, both in the face of its neighbours and the great powers alike. 

 

Likewise, stable domestic politics help carry stable, long-term foreign policy initiatives. In a country where inner nationalistic tensions are part of political life and often correlate with diverging foreign policy preferences, a multi-vector approach and attempts to aggregate interests potentially offers flexibility in foreign policy and domestic approval. Cultivating economic and diplomatic ties with China despite disagreements, supporting the recently signed (and still contentious) trade agreements with Mercosur and India, implementing the country’s Africa Strategy, and countering US positions in Palestine and Iran while avoiding a further souring of bilateral relations, is how it looks like in practice. 

 

Adrian Santano holds a BA degree in Political Science from the University of the Basque Country, and an MA degree in European Studies from the University of Wrocław. Having lived in Spain, Poland, Turkey and Finland, his interests include European political economy and the geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe.