Transformation of the KSS: Where is it actually heading?

In the history of the Velvet Revolution and its ethos, there is also the effort of some communists to de-Bolshevize the Communist Party, to transform it into a modern democratic left, to Europeanize it. However, it was not an easy task. Within the ranks of the communists, there was a multitude of prejudices, some of which were related to communist ideology: rejection of social democracy, but also the entire reform process of the "Dubček Spring"; clinging to the "normalization era"; anti-Americanism and viewing NATO as an imperialist grouping; uncritical inclination towards Russia.

At the same time, it is true that most communists were oriented Czechoslovakly, without national prejudices and anti-nationalist. This stance was not rooted in rejecting the national emancipation process – after all, most communists supported the federal model of Czechoslovakia. It was more rooted in the interpretation of the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) as resistance against clerofascism. Official communist ideology considered – almost metaphysically – their enemies to be the Hlinka guards, the People's Party. This was ultimately a constant of communist ideology from the 1930s, which, paradoxically, changed only in recent years, when today's communists or ex-communists are approaching revitalized currents of neo-nationalism.

During and after the Velvet Revolution, many communists found an affinity and more natural civic stance than members of other parties. Primarily because they had experience with real management of civic affairs in national committees at all levels. I knew dozens of members of the Communist Party who, in principle, had nothing in common with communist ideology, but were excellent lawyers, civic workers in offices or in the civil service. When I started working as an advisor to the new chairman of the Slovak National Council (SNR) Rudolf Schuster, most of the parliamentary experts joined – and this competently – the reform of the SNR itself and the entire civil service. Among many names, I will mention only Dušan Nikodým and Jaroslav Balko – lawyers without whom they would not have a chance to pass qualified laws transforming society into its democratic form. They were committed to democratic change. There was no nostalgia for communism, no prejudices, nor – as it later began to be called – "communist" mentality. And this fully applies to Schuster as well.

What about the Communist Party of Slovakia?

The transformation of the KSS should not be imagined as some ideologically driven process, in which the party leadership launched a massive educational campaign "how to be a democratic leftist." The shift from communist ideology and politics to the democratic left was not understood by KSS members as adopting the programs of the democratic left, nor as seeking well-set socio-economic market regulations. At that time, the transformation did not go beyond recognizing and adopting general principles of democratic political competition.

I only remind that in the first months after November 1989, there was also a passionate debate within VPN about what to do with the KSS. A strong current led by Jan Budaj advocated banning the communist party. At the same time, there was an alternative view, which I also supported: that the KSS should remain part of the political spectrum on the condition that it recognizes and adopts the constitutional principles of a democratic state. This approach ultimately gained a majority in the leadership of VPN, so there was no attempt to directly ban the communist party by law.

This situation was very well understood by the political circle around Peter Weiss. The Marxism-Leninism Institute of the Central Committee of the KSS, which was led for nearly a decade by the scholar Viliam Plevza, was no longer a dogmatic propaganda device in the 1980s. On the contrary, it was a center for prognostic studies and a kind of window into the world of literature and research of the "future." Thanks to this, it became a cradle for young politicians who undertook to reform the KSS. Primarily, these were Peter Weiss and Pavol Kanis. Initially, they sought accepted positions within the structure of new political parties, known as salonfähig. This required a new "political face." At the level of the membership base, however, the desire for reparation for the "unjust" transfer of crimes of the communist regime onto ordinary communists, who ultimately always "meant well," prevailed. And, of course, the desire for personal acceptance, social reintegration, and recognition.

This process was most visible and successful during the elections of mayors and city councilors, but also at other levels of public administration. An independent chapter was the economy. During normalization, there was a process of intensive industrialization and urbanization of Slovakia. This produced a generation of educated managers who, in order to succeed within the nomenclature system, entered the KSČ. The fact is that they were not in any way connected to communist ideology: neither to the Soviet-Stalinist version of the 1950s, nor to the reformist communism of the 1960s. Simply, technocrats. It was these technocrats who later succeeded in processes of poorly or foolishly managed privatization. Anti-communists were driven into fury and depression that "their" Velvet Revolution opened space precisely for the communists!

In the initial process of transforming the KSS, even the new leadership of the party rejected social democracy. To their ears, it still sounded like betrayal – ultimately, they did not accept even the Osemšesťdesiatnici (the 68ers), found no strength to apologize for normalization or rehabilitate the Dubčekists. Let us not forget that the party adopted the twin name KSS-SDĽ. The first part expressed continuity with the communist current, the second part only the determination to reform itself. Only sometime in early 1991 did the party drop the abbreviation KSS. Ideologically, it aimed to imitate more the transformation path of Italian communists towards the "new left." And only much later – similar to some Italian communists – more experienced party members arrived at social democracy.

The failed marriage of social democrats with SDĽ

The group around Peter Weiss was aware of these limitations. They wanted to overcome not only external isolation but also internal barriers and prejudices against social democracy. One of the ways was closer cooperation with SDSS, which by the end of 1991 resulted in a decision to create a electoral coalition. From the perspective of SDĽ, it would be a symbol of ending its transformation and a definitive release from the communist-normalization legacy. As the chairman of SDSS, I appreciated this political "selflessness," under the influence of which the leadership of SDĽ decided to enter the electoral coalition. The selflessness because, in percentage terms, this coalition did not promise electoral gains for SDĽ. For SDSS, however, it was an opportunity to enter parliament.

Personally, I also saw it as a gesture – to give a chance to all those who understood that the Soviet variant of socialism was a dead end, a kind of return of the lost son. At the same time, I already registered the limits of transformation that the communist party was unable to overcome. Primarily, to rid itself of normalization prejudices and, in new conditions, creatively build on the unique process of the 1960s: culturally, on the creative successes of the entire 60s, and politically, on the short creative workshop of the "Spring and Summer of reform." This barrier was not overcome within the party either personnel-wise – reformists from 1968 were actually never accepted.

As chairman of SDSS, besides absorbing small "Dubčekist" parties, I set myself the task of also bringing Alexander Dubček into the party. I had been striving for this since January 1990. Dubček initially believed that VPN would gradually transform into a social-democratic party. After the VPN leadership moved closer to the Czech right and later the VPN disintegrated, Dubček faced a decision. Despite involving Willy Brandt, then chairman of the Socialist International, in the "courtship," Dubček kept postponing this step. In early January 1992, he told me that his entry into HZDS was out of the question. Shortly thereafter, in March 1992, he finally accepted the offer to join SDSS. Under a condition that surprised and shocked me: the cancellation of the preliminary agreement on the electoral coalition with SDĽ before the 1992 elections. An agreement officially approved by the bodies of SDSS and SDĽ, which we were to jointly present at a press conference already announced. In Slovakia, this double coalition led by Dubček and then-popular Peter Weiss would have been successful and undoubtedly would have changed the balance of power on the domestic political scene. However, Dubček was not at all "reconciled" with SDĽ and maintained a "centrist" position overall. He refused the coalition with SDĽ mainly with regard to the Czech political scene.

For Czech political forces, SDĽ was unacceptable. They still saw it as a party of the communists, who only change their coat. In the case of a coalition with SDĽ, Dubček would have lost support from Czech political forces in the Federal Assembly – and thus also the support for the presidency or other significant positions after the 1992 elections. I did not want to cancel the coalition with SDĽ. I believed in the efforts of the team around Peter Weiss, Milan Ftáčnik, and Pavol Kanis to move SDĽ towards social-democratic positions. I also assumed that international acceptance would further strengthen this effort. And I realistically knew that SDSS would not gain the strong regional anchoring that SDĽ had. However, I fundamentally wanted Alexander Dubček – precisely as a symbol of the renewal process of 1968, but also as a living symbol that social democracy – not Bolshevism – was the right and successful banner of progress. Dubček, however, insisted on his position, and thus the leadership of SDSS canceled the coalition with SDĽ. The engagement was not realized.

I believe that even this event actually halted the enthusiasm and creative drive to work on new content of leftist politics. Post-communists (KSS-SDĽ) simply did not seek an alternative to Klaus's transformation and, even more so, not a socio-economic alternative to capitalism, but the revitalization of their own social status and societal position. I vividly remember the coalition "Spoločná voľba" from 1994, which I co-created the electoral program for. I was overwhelmed by the complete absence of leftist content and thinking, a literal capitulation to the left. The only one striving for a concept, a programmatic economic leftist alternative, was Ivan Okáli, which I managed to push through also. When Jozef Migaš uttered the much-criticized and ridiculed phrase about the need to take Marx out of the pantry, he symbolically only expressed the need to overcome the ideological emptiness that reigned in SDĽ. And finally, intuitively and in his own way, "kitchen-style," Jano Ľupták did it – he did, not just said – when he tried to give the left at least a workers' content. Because "his heart was very heavy" when a wave of wild privatization swept through Slovakia, which he unsuccessfully tried to slow down – at least as far as strategic enterprises were concerned.

But about that and everything else, until next time – after the emergence of Smer.