Russian web. About a network of saboteurs in Moldova and neighboring countries

In October 2024, as a freelancer, I reported on the presidential elections and the EU referendum in Moldova, describing, among others, for Oko.press and "Gazeta Wyborcza," Russia's interference in the electoral process. One of the strangest—and at the same time most significant—pieces of information in this context was released by Moldovan police, services, and politicians a few days before the elections. They claimed that professional saboteurs, trained by Wagner Group, had infiltrated Moldova, allegedly prepared by Moscow. Some of them were reportedly detained by Moldovan security forces. Initial reports were contradictory: talking about dozens, hundreds, or even three hundred operators, described as persons trained by or belonging to Wagner Group.

Two days before the elections, I discussed this with Dima, the owner of a Moldovan political marketing company. He had handled campaigns for many candidates in recent years, from the center-right, pro-European PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity), to pro-Russian or liberal candidates. He himself voted for the former, though with great disgust caused by a series of corruption scandals and unclear management of public funds.

– You are a reasonable person – Dima told me, lighting a cigarette. – You know this is an exaggeration, justifying special measures in the election campaign. Sure, Russia interferes in elections, but not to that extent. If there were three hundred Wagner-trained operatives in such a tiny country as Moldova, it wouldn’t help us at all. This whole story is a hoax.

Today, we know he was wrong.

Wagnerian monsters

Dima, like most Moldovans, has repeatedly heard about Wagner operatives trying to interfere in the country's internal politics since PAS came to power, but almost always these stories end with the attackers being stopped.

During anti-government protests in March 2023, organized by pro-Russian circles, a Wagner Group member was detained at Chisinau airport—covered in threatening tattoos with skulls and neo-Nazi symbols. He was supposed to be part of a broader conspiracy aimed at the PAS government, distancing Moldova from Russia.

In the same month, Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu revealed that between fifty and one hundred people were involved in the conspiracy, each receiving up to $10,000 for participating in demonstrations. Moldovan police reported that a government agent infiltrated the group, resulting in the detention of seven individuals and neutralization of the threat.

In 2023, President Maia Sandu announced that Wagner Group, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, planned to seize power in Moldova. Wagner operatives were supposed to organize brutal riots and, with the support of forces from Transnistria, carry out a coup, capture the president, and overthrow the pro-Western government. Sandu made this information public after Prigozhin’s death; it was never directly verified, but the existence of the plan was confirmed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who said that the plan was intercepted by his intelligence services.

In 2025, Europol reported over 650 suspects involved in paramilitary operations within Wagner and Redut, as well as committing war crimes. Moldova is one of the most frequently mentioned countries of their origin, alongside Ukraine. During election campaigns in 2024 and 2025, persons suspected of ties to the broader Russian influence network and directly to Wagner Group were regularly detained. Arrests were often coordinated with Ukrainian authorities, whose services conducted similar purges. In October 2025 alone, about 70 locations in Moldova and Ukraine linked to Russian recruits were searched.

In November 2025, in cooperation with Europol, 11 Ukrainians and 16 Moldovans accused of membership in Russian mercenary groups fighting in Ukraine and beyond Europe (mainly Wagner and Redut) or training saboteurs in Moldova were detained or prosecuted. In another joint operation in February 2026, several individuals, mostly Moldovans, involved in a group of hired killers, were arrested; Moscow allegedly assigned targets in Ukraine to them.

In Moldova, the threat from Russia, pro-Russian saboteurs, and influence groups is real. The country is deeply infiltrated, as evidenced by the case of Alexandru Bălan, a former deputy head of Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service. Detained in Romania in 2025, he was sentenced in Moldova in April 2026 for revealing state secrets, and after being pardoned, handed over to Belarus as part of a prisoner exchange. In June 2026, Maia Sandu stripped him of Moldovan citizenship.

At the same time, Wagner Group has become a kind of recurring boogeyman in Moldova, repeatedly pulled out of the closet by media and authorities to justify new special measures, confiscation of property, restrictions on citizens’ electoral freedoms (e.g., from pro-Russian Transnistria, which drew criticism from international observers).

The Wagner monster has become so familiar to some of the public that even when the threat is real, some Moldovans see it as part of the ruling PAS narrative. Many feel that the government is trying to divert attention from other issues and its own neglect and mistakes. There are doubts whether all those detained or prosecuted under the pretext of fighting Russia actually have anything to do with it. There are even jokes on this theme, similar to Polish ones: e.g., a picture of a dog sitting in the middle of a destroyed room full of chewed furniture with the caption: “You won’t believe what the Russians did in the bedroom.” Perhaps the fact that—if we believe the government narratives from Chișinău—most “large sabotage attempts” have been prevented (though not many small incidents, cyberattacks, or provocations) causes some Moldovans not to take the matter seriously.

Training camps for pro-Russian saboteurs

The most significant event at the turn of 2025 and 2026 was the leak concerning the proceedings related to sabotage training, which I discussed with Dima a year earlier. It was not about three hundred Wagner operatives, but about large groups of saboteurs and provocateurs trained in foreign camps under the supervision of instructors linked to the Kremlin. Some of these instructors indeed had connections with Wagner Group.

According to authorities in Chișinău, Russian networks have been recruiting and training people for protests, riots, disinformation campaigns, and other influence operations in Moldova, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in countries like France and Germany, for at least three years. Training was offered for several hundred dollars and a two-week trip to camps in Bosnia and Serbia. Investigators claim that participants were trained in street tactics, drone use, actions during clashes with police cordons, explosive materials, first aid, and surveillance of strategic sites.

Court documents and journalistic investigations by outlets such as Politico and BIRN provide more detailed information.

According to court records, participants in pre-presidential election camps in 2024 were told that if Maia Sandu won, “a war would break out in the country, just like in Ukraine,” and their destabilization activities would ensure peace. Those trying to withdraw from participation were reportedly intimidated and beaten.

One witness described a multi-day training held in a camp consisting of four tents set up over a river. According to Moldovan intelligence, the instructors belonged to an international network linked to Wagner Group. Participants were then sent for practical exercises in cities like Banja Luka, where they were required to discreetly document locations and plans of administrative and government buildings, as well as identify potential drone launch sites. Among recent incidents—vandalism, threats, or posting disinformation posters—at least some were the work of camp graduates.

Recruited for actions in Western Europe

Key figures in the entire network were recruiters targeting mainly young Moldovan men, preferably holding EU (most often Romanian or Bulgarian) citizenship, often dissatisfied with their jobs and lives, lured by promises of easy money and exciting activities. Some women, mainly from the Russian-speaking minority, such as Aliona Gotko or Ludmila Kostenko, also joined.

One of the alleged recruiters is Anatoli Prizenco, a Moldovan businessman linked to Russia, known in Moldova for organizing financial pyramids, and sanctioned by the EU in 2024 for orchestrating destabilization operations for Moscow. Prizenco is prosecuted in Chișinău but has not yet received a verdict. His network is believed to have trained dozens of people as executors of Russian influence and destabilization operations in Moldova and third countries for years.

French authorities, in cooperation with Moldova, are investigating Prizenco’s role in organizing a group of Moldovan citizens who, after the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, painted Star of David symbols on Parisian walls. Similar provocations by Prizenco’s saboteurs are suspected in Germany. The polarization and escalation of social divisions are Russian modus operandi. Playing on anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and instrumentalizing the genocide in Gaza serve Moscow’s interests.

Another accused person admitted in court that in 2024 he traveled to Düsseldorf for the European Championship match between Slovakia and Ukraine, where he was instructed to wave the Ukrainian flag. He was allegedly recruited by Prizenco.

The man testified that he refused to follow the order, but during the match, a Ukrainian flag with the inscription “Give us back the elections” was unfurled. Moscow quickly used this incident as an argument that Ukraine should hold elections and replace the current president, and the narrative of Zelensky as a “dictator” is driven from the grassroots by Ukrainians themselves.

Such orders are reportedly offered to trained saboteurs from time to time as side jobs for a small fee. The same accused person, who went to Düsseldorf, said that one of the camp instructors proposed him a trip to Paris during the 2024 Olympics to carry out destabilization activities.

The ignored threat does not disappear

In early 2026, the Chișinău city court sentenced five Moldovan citizens to prison terms ranging from four to over five years for participating in the aforementioned training camps. In spring 2026, proceedings were ongoing against another 80 people, with over 20 facing formal charges. In June 2026, the European Union added more individuals accused of destabilizing Moldova to its sanctions list. The justification pointed to networks linked to Ilan Șor and the Russian organization Evrazia, used for recruitment, training, propaganda, and building ground structures.

Moldovan services promise further arrests and indictments. Moldova, like many European countries with a large Russian-speaking minority, is an ideal recruitment ground for Russian services, which over time extend beyond this group, often targeting individuals who, for various reasons, feel excluded or discriminated against by society and seek to retaliate or reorganize it, hoping to improve their own situation. It is worth recalling the recent case of a group of Russian-speaking anti-fascists from the Baltic states, who turned out to be Kremlin agents.

Many stories about the Russian threat, which we have dismissed for years as fairy tales or exaggerations, contain some truth, big or small. From this seed, a threat grows that extends beyond Eastern and Central Europe.

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