"Russia is not keeping up"

After reporting from the frontlines stretching from southern Donetsk Oblast through Sloviansk to the Kharkiv region – where we met several Ukrainian brigades and spoke with dozens of soldiers – we returned to Kyiv at a moment of mounting political tension. The capital had just witnessed protests against the dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, demonstrations reminiscent of last year's "cardboard revolution."

Straight from the first day of the protests, we sat down with Mykola Bielieskov, one of Ukraine's leading military analysts, a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and an analyst with the Come Back Alive Foundation. He explains why the reshuffle at the Ministry of Defence matters, assesses the state of the battlefield, examines Ukraine's growing technological edge, and discusses whether Kyiv's new model of defence can ultimately deny Russia victory.

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ALEKSANDER PALIKOT AND JERZY SOBOTTA: We are meeting at a particularly tense political moment. How could the replacement of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov affect Ukraine’s war effort?

MYKOLA BIELIESKOV: For a country fighting an existential war, replacing the defence minister every six months is highly unusual. As the reshuffle goes ahead, Ukraine will have had three ministers in a single year.

Every new minister needs time to understand the institution, appoint a team and establish effective relationships. Ukraine does not have that time, and constant turnover inevitably disrupts the work of its most important wartime ministry.

It is questionable whether a successor can match the standard set by Fedorov. He developed a coherent vision for preventing a Russian victory and communicated it effectively to Ukrainian society and NATO partners.

Any next minister must understand the technological transformation of warfare. Robotic systems now underpin frontline combat, air defence, long-range strikes and logistics. That is why the ministry’s leadership matters so much.

Fedorov published a post listing 22 achievements and three things he did not accomplish. How do you assess his six months in office?

He had much success with an ambitious agenda and limited time.

Most of the technologies associated with Fedorov were already in development before January 2026 but his main achievement was scaling up their procurement.

The ministry redirected resources towards medium-range strike UAVs, which have become central to attacks on Russian logistics and rear areas. It also secured Ukraine’s continued access to Starlink, an important asymmetric advantage for advanced drone operations.

Fedorov began introducing competitive tenders, although procurement reform has yet to be fully implemented for major defence contracts. He also tried to restart personnel reform, perhaps the ministry’s most difficult challenge.

Also, Russian troops were cut off from Starlink. Was this Fedorov’s personal achievement through his good relationship with Elon Musk?

The public story is that Fedorov contacted Musk directly and persuaded him to support Ukraine. That undoubtedly mattered, although the United States and European governments probably also exerted influence.

Starlink gives Ukraine an important asymmetric advantage for advanced drone operations. It allows operators to adjust a drone’s flight path in real time. It is inexpensive, precise and highly resistant to electronic warfare.

But there is a caveat: Ukraine’s access is limited to operations on its sovereign territory; it cannot use Starlink to guide long-range drones deep inside Russia. For those strikes, Ukraine still relies mainly on inertial and GPS guidance.

One explanation for Fedorov’s dismissal is tension with the General Staff. Anti-corruption activists argue that parts of the military establishment resisted reforms because they threatened entrenched interests. Do you share that judgement?

The tensions go beyond the relationship between the minister and the Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Ukraine has struggled since independence to define the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.

Some senior officers still resist meaningful civilian oversight, believing the ministry should focus on procurement while leaving strategic decisions to the military. Fedorov challenged that approach by questioning whether procurement priorities reflected Ukraine’s strategic needs.

Reform also threatened vested interests. The ministry controls hundreds of billions of hryvnias, and greater transparency and competition inevitably deprive some people of lucrative contracts.

If Interior Minister Ihor Klimenko becomes the next defence minister, what kind of minister would he be?

Klimenko is an experienced administrator. As head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – one of Ukraine's largest institutions – he has managed complex organizations including the National Police, National Guard and Border Guard Service.

The challenge is not whether he would be a better or worse minister than Fedorov, but rather that he would bring different experience. Fedorov built close relationships with Ukraine's private defence industry and NATO counterparts. Coming from a policing background, Klimenko would need time to develop those ties and gain a deep understanding of the defence sector.

The former commander of the 155th Brigade, Stanislav Luchanov, is accused of ordering soldiers to abduct and murder two civilians following an alleged personal dispute. That has triggered a public outcry. Does this (if proven) reveal a wider problem of weak oversight and lawlessness within parts of the armed forces?

This incident is a by-product of the kind of war Ukraine is fighting. Five years of attrition inevitably degrade institutions. Procedures deteriorate, oversight weakens and standards decline.

Prolonged mobilization has brought some less suitable individuals into the armed forces, increasing the risk that people entrusted with weapons and authority will commit crimes.

That is why democratic civilian oversight remains essential. This case should be seen as a warning: unless oversight is strengthened and personnel are monitored more effectively, similar incidents are likely to recur.

In Lviv there has been a violent clash between some 200 civilians and a team of mobilization officers. The incident has become a symbol of the growing tensions surrounding conscription. How big is Ukraine’s problem with the mobilization system?

Ukraine is conducting an unprecedented experiment: it tries to reconcile mass mobilization with a postmodern liberal democracy. Forced mobilization inevitably generates resentment, yet a purely voluntary system cannot meet the army's needs. Even Ukraine's most respected units, such as Khartiia and Azov, cannot recruit enough volunteers.

Ukraine has yet to find a sustainable balance between compulsory service and voluntary recruitment. You need both a push and pull mechanism in place. The challenge is to build a mobilization system that is both effective and perceived as legitimate.

Fedorov has recently introduced higher salaries and new contracts that foresee fixed terms of service. Can these reforms make mobilization more incentive-based and less reliant on coercion?

Better pay matters – before these reforms, a soldier's basic salary was around 500 euros a month – but so do better training and command. Ukraine struggles to finance all of this alone, while European partners have generally been reluctant to fund military salaries.

Successful mobilization also depends on trust in that the system is administered fairly and competently. A massive voluntary recruitment as in 2022 is unlikely to return and incentives alone are not enough at this stage of the war. This touches the very depths of relations within the state, the very depths of the problem of social contract.

A special recruitment programme for 18-to-24-year-olds is aimed at drafting young people into the army. It offers higher pay and fixed-term contracts. How successful has it been?

The programme is sensible and several brigades have recruited hundreds of highly motivated volunteers through these contracts. But it cannot solve Ukraine's manpower shortage on its own. Rather than enlisting, many young people chose to leave the country, when restrictions on foreign travel for 18-to-22-year-olds were relaxed. And the demographic collapse of the 1990s left relatively few people under thirty. Even before the full-scale invasion, the median age was around 38. This shows the limits of the program.

It has become common to describe the frontline as a "kill zone," with drones now responsible for most deaths and injuries. A year ago, Ukraine spoke about creating a "wall of drones" to halt Russian advances. Does that mean the front is gradually freezing?

The pace of Russian advances has slowed significantly, compared with a year – or especially two years – ago. Recent developments have fundamentally undermined the traditional concept of manoeuvre warfare. Ukraine's strategy has been to deny Russia victory by slowing its offensive, and there are clear signs that this is working.

That achievement is about much more than attack drones. Ukraine has developed an integrated robotic ecosystem: FPV drones, medium-range strike UAVs, interceptor drones and unmanned ground vehicles supporting logistics, resupply and casualty evacuation. Without this robotics revolution, Ukraine could not have slowed Russia's offensive through artillery, HIMARS or conventional air-defence systems alone.

Ukraine has largely found an answer to Russia's dispersed infantry tactics and numerical superiority. At the same time, it has adapted Russian innovations, developing domestic versions of systems such as Molniya and Lancet, in some cases improving on them, while gaining a significant advantage in drone-based air defence. As a result, Ukraine is now better able both to strike Russian forces and defend itself against Russian drone attacks.

Does that mean Ukraine is now winning the technological race?

In several important areas, yes.

Ukraine has often innovated because it had no alternative. We developed unmanned ground vehicles because we lacked manpower and pioneered drone-based air defence because we did not have enough conventional surface-to-air missile systems. Continuous Shahed attacks forced us to find cheaper and more scalable solutions. The same applies to medium-range strike drones.

That does not mean Russia has fallen behind everywhere. It retains significant advantages in areas such as glide bombs, which remain extremely difficult to counter.

Ukraine's greatest advantage, however, is competition. Its defence industry consists of dozens, often hundreds, of companies competing in the same technological niches. Combined with rapid battlefield feedback and close cooperation between the military and industry, that allows Ukraine to innovate faster than Russia in many areas.

In some fields Ukraine has closed the technological gap. In others, particularly drone-based air defence, it has moved ahead.

Ukraine has stepped up strikes on Russian fuel depots and refineries, while Russia has responded by attacking petrol stations across Ukraine. Soldiers told us the military relies on a separate fuel logistics system, meaning these attacks mostly affect civilians. Which side is actually more vulnerable when it comes to disrupting military fuel supplies?

Russia can largely only strike static infrastructure, whereas Ukraine increasingly targets not only depots but also the vehicles transporting the fuel.

Russian attacks on petrol stations mainly affect civilians because Ukraine's armed forces rely on dedicated military logistics networks. Ukraine, by contrast, is increasingly disrupting Russia's military fuel supply chain.

Let's turn to the battlefield itself. We were recently in Sloviansk, where the situation had noticeably deteriorated over the past few weeks. Is Russia getting closer to its aim of subjugating the Donbas region in its entirety?

Russia continues to make slow but steady gains. Conditions around Kostiantynivka have deteriorated, pressure near Lyman is increasing, and Russian forces are also advancing east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk following the loss of Siversk.

It is important to remember, however, that conditions vary considerably along the front. While Donetsk Oblast remains under pressure, Ukraine has had considerable success disrupting Russian logistics in the south. One reason is geography. In southern Ukraine, Russia depends on a relatively small number of roads, making logistics easier to disrupt. In Donetsk Oblast, it can rely on a much denser road and rail network, making interdiction considerably more difficult.

As a result, the situation is worsening there, although much more slowly than Russia would like. The campaign remains one of grinding attrition rather than a return to manoeuvre warfare. The last major urban agglomeration under Ukrainian control in Donetsk Oblast now lies within range of glide bombs, multiple-launch rocket systems and fibre-optic drones, making civilian life increasingly difficult.

Strategically, however, these gains do not bring Russia much closer to its political objectives. At the current pace, it would likely take well into next year to occupy the remaining Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast. As long as Ukraine continues fighting and receives international support, incremental territorial gains alone will not win a war of attrition.

Continued western support is essential if Ukraine is to keep denying Russia victory. In the past weeks we've seen a new air-defence initiative in Europe, expanded defence cooperation and President Trump announcing future Patriot production in Ukraine. Has western support stabilized and can Ukraine rely on it?

I think we are now operating under a new model of support, first tested last year and since refined. Europe has become Ukraine's principal backer, while the United States serves as an indispensable enabler, providing intelligence and several critical niche capabilities. Today, the backbone of Ukraine's defence is Ukrainian-produced technology financed by European money, supplemented by western weapons deliveries. The United States complements that system rather than leading it.

The model's long-term viability depends largely on European politics. Germany, together with the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, forms the core of military and financial support, while France and the United Kingdom play a leading diplomatic role through the Coalition of the Willing. Poland is also strategically important because it is the main logistical hub through which military aid reaches Ukraine.

Putin believes this coalition will eventually weaken. He is betting that populist forces will gain ground across Europe and undermine support for Ukraine. That expectation helps explain why he remains unwilling to end the war despite Russia's growing military and economic difficulties.

If Europe and Ukraine continue cooperating effectively, expanding defence production and slowing Russia on the battlefield, I believe the United States will remain willing to provide key capabilities such as intelligence and Patriot systems. There will never be enough Patriot interceptors to satisfy global demand, but the decisive long-term relationship is the one between Ukraine and Europe.

You mentioned Poland's importance as a logistics hub. Taking the current political disputes between Warsaw and Kyiv into account, how do you assess Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation today?

Poland is no longer Ukraine's largest military supporter. Most major weapons deliveries took place in 2022 and 2023.

The principal exception is Starlink. Poland continues to finance what are probably tens of thousands of terminals that remain critical to Ukraine's armed forces.

Beyond that, bilateral defence cooperation is relatively limited. Unlike Germany or the Nordic countries, Poland has not launched major programmes to finance Ukrainian defence production or establish large industrial partnerships.

The next important test will be the EU's SAFE defence financing mechanism. A key question is whether Ukrainian defence companies will be able to participate in Polish-led projects. That will depend partly on the broader political relationship between the two countries.

For now, however, no major joint defence programmes are directly threatened by the current political tensions.

Many people argue that the tide of the war is turning in Ukraine's favour. Even Ursula von der Leyen recently made that claim. At the same time, former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has warned against excessive optimism. What indicators should we actually be looking at when assessing the strategic balance of the war?

The most important development is that Ukraine has largely found an answer to Russia's current battlefield strategy.

Russia's offensive model is no longer delivering the results it achieved in 2024 and 2025. Russian advances continue, but they no longer generate the operational momentum or political impression of inevitable victory.

That leaves Putin with limited options. Russia can develop new technologies or copy Ukrainian innovations, but that takes time. It can mobilize more troops, yet manpower alone no longer solves its fundamental military problem. Modern warfare increasingly depends on robotic systems and skilled operators rather than sheer numbers.

At the same time, we should avoid swinging from excessive pessimism to excessive optimism. Ukraine still faces serious constraints, particularly mobilization. Another difficult winter lies ahead, and the country remains vulnerable to attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Ukraine currently enjoys a window of opportunity because Russia has not yet adapted to its innovations. But it also faces a window of vulnerability. That is why it is still too early to declare success.

What would success or victory ultimately look like?

Success should not be measured by the number of fuel depots destroyed or the damage inflicted on Russia's oil industry. Those achievements matter, but they are only instruments. The real measure of success is a political settlement.

Ukraine has already shown considerable flexibility. It is prepared to negotiate without insisting on the immediate recovery of every occupied territory, provided it is not forced to abandon its NATO ambitions, accept limits on its sovereignty or armed forces, or cede territory Russia has failed to conquer militarily.

The greater obstacle remains Putin. He continues to insist on maximalist demands despite growing evidence that Russia's military strategy is no longer producing decisive results. In many respects, he behaves like a gambler who never knows when to stop.

Ukraine should avoid making the same mistake. It must recognise the right moment for compromise while safeguarding its core national interests.

Everything else – the technological innovations, strikes deep inside Russia and improvements on the battlefield – is part of creating the conditions for that political outcome, not the outcome itself.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Mykola Bielieskov has an MA in International Relations from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. From 2016 to 2019 he worked at the Institute of World Policy, a Ukrainian NGO. Since October 2019, he has worked at the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the Ukrainian President (Department of Defence Policy). Since August 2022, he has also worked for the Ukrainian charity Come Back Alive as a senior analyst.

Aleksander Palikot is a Kyiv-based reporter and correspondent covering politics, history and culture in Central and Eastern Europe.

Jerzy Sobotta is a journalist with German public broadcast Bayerischer Rundfunk. His coverage of the ongoing war in Ukraine has been published in Zeit and Welt, among others.