Re-equilibration, moderation or escalation?

Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has rapidly expanded its long-range strike campaign, with drones hitting targets ever deeper in Russia’s hinterland and with more impact on Russian industry and the military. Kyiv’s new strategy is changing the character of the Russo-Ukrainian War: rather than seeking stabilization or breakthrough at the front, Kyiv aims to degrade the economic, logistic and social systems that sustain the Russian troops deployed against Ukraine.

In some ways, Kyiv is now implementing in Russia what Moscow has been repeatedly trying to accomplish in Ukraine since the start of the war during the annexation of Crimea in February 2014. Kyiv aims to achieve political aims not at the front, but via a systemic rupture of the rear. The principal difference between the two campaigns is that Ukraine’s current mid- and long-range strikes, as well as other actions behind the battlefields, have defensive purposes. In contrast, the aim of Moscow’s  12-year hybrid and kinetic warfare has been to undermine Ukrainian resilience in order to achieve Russia’s territorial expansion and Ukraine’s political subjugation.

Much of the high-intensity fighting between Russia and Ukraine in 2022-25 was about territorial control, gain and defence, above all in eastern and southern Ukraine. The current phase of the war instead centres, now also on the Ukrainian side, on a systemic degradation of the enemy. Rather than defeating Russian forces formation by formation, Ukraine seeks to reduce the Russian state’s capacity to sustain its so-called “special military operation”. The main aim of Ukraine’s approach to its national defense  has shifted from attrition concerning frontline troops to subversive activities against Russia’s military supply lines, as well as the country’s social, economic and political stability.

The biggest success of the current Ukrainian campaign has been the achievement of considerable damage, with long-range drones and cruise missiles, of Russia’s energy infrastructure, transportation means and routes, and factories producing key weapon components. In addition, the psychological effect of the – often, visually impressive – attacks on both Russia’s own citizens and foreign partners, is difficult to overestimate. Putin and his regime’s authority have suffered inside the Russian Federation and abroad.

Against this backdrop, the central strategic question is not any longer merely about the quantity and quality of Russia’s – narrowly understood – military resources, i.e. the number and type of troops and weapons deployed to the front. Another key issue is now whether and how Moscow will manage to withstand Ukraine’s purposeful assault on the Russian hinterland: how will Moscow react and adapt to Kyiv’s attempt to erode the Russian state’s industrial, logistic and technical base, and thereby its war-making capacity?

Russia’s response to its current destabilization by Ukraine happens along three ideal-typical pathways that Moscow is already or may, in the future, be trying to follow in parallel: (a) a gradual adaptation and eventual achievement of a re-equilibration of the soci0-economic situation, (b) a deep rethinking and subsequent reorientation towards the moderation of its aims in the war and negotiations, and, on the contrary, (c) an increase of the stakes and banking on further escalation of the war in order to eventually defeat Ukraine. While achieving re-equilibration is the Kremlin’s most obvious near-term strategy, there are already signs that Moscow is considering and testing both moderating and escalating strategies. Which of these approaches will prevail depends on the further success and pace of Ukraine’s degradation of Russia’s war-making capacity, as well as on the domestic political impulses or constraints that may result from this.

 

From territorial warfare to systemic attrition

Since late 2025, Ukrainian forces have managed to slow down the Russian army’s advance, with large amounts of FPV drones and widening “kill zones” on the front. In addition, during the last few months, new visual, audio and verbal evidence from throughout the Russian Federation is showing accumulating effects of Ukraine’s jokingly called “long-range sanctions”. Ukrainian deep strikes with drones and cruise missiles into Russia’s rear are disrupting, damaging or destroying more and more military-industrial, transportation and energy infrastructure. According to Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, the destruction inflicted in Russia’s operational and strategic depth has grown by 1,150 per cent since the beginning of 2026. Ukraine’s front strikes now reach up to 150 kilometres, middle strikes approximately to 300 kilometres, and deep strikes over 2000 kilometres.

Among the primary targets of Ukrainian drones as well as, to a lesser degree, glide bombs and missiles, are railway junctions, oil pumping stations, depots, ports, airfields and logistic hubs. Among other impressive results, Moscow has had to restrict access to gasoline and diesel throughout 60 of Russia's 83 regions while fuel prices are growing. Especially in annexed Crimea, supplies of fuel, water, electricity and food have become a major problem, and economic life has largely halted.

Not only petrol but also information about its availability has become rationed. In several Russian regions the state-backed messenger “Maks” is blocking public chats where drivers exchange information about the gasoline supply and queues at gas stations. Governmental intervention into communication such as this is only one part of a far wider effort to suppress the spread of information about the growing fuel and other shortages or prices triggered by Ukrainian strikes.

This is driving Russia into a broader socio-economic crisis. In the words of the Germany-based historian of contemporary Russia, Nikolay Mitrokhin, Ukraine’s “seizure of superiority in the most advantageous domain—right now, the air—and the subsequent destruction of [Russian] military and civilian infrastructure at the operational and strategic levels, the creation of an entirely new reality for Russia’s deep rear, and the containment of the Russian army at operational depth without the need to breach specific positions at the tactical level—all of this resembles either the sudden onset of war or its swift conclusion.”

 

The growing middle strike challenge for Russia’s frontline troops

The growing deep strikes into Russia’s far-away hinterland are not Moscow’s only problem. More and more so-called “midstrikes” on areas behind frontline troops complicate the Russian army’s supply even when sufficient fuel and other material is available. Ukraine attempts to disturb, with its growing mid-range UAV fleet, the functioning of Russia’s logistic networks connecting still operational fuel plants and storages to Russian fighting troops. To do that, Ukraine has developed and is now deploying a new generation of FPV drones optimized for near- and mid-range logistics strikes. They are currently achieving an operational depth of 40 to 44 kilometres and are designed to operate, in the future, with a reach of up to 100 kilometres.

As in other areas, Moscow scrambles to develop countermeasures. Russian anti-drone electronic warfare (EW) is well developed yet often turns out to be ineffective against the midstrikes. Ukrainian drones routinely hit Russian vehicles although these often carry onboard EW systems. Ukrainian manufacturers are, moreover, currently transitioning to new communication systems and next-generation models. Ukraine’s explicit goal is to lead in every innovation cycle, and to thereby ensure that Russia perpetually adapts to yesterday’s threat.

In June 2026, Russia’s Ministry of Defence reported that it had intercepted 8,849 Ukrainian drones in May 2026. That would seem to indicate a large success when compared to 3,676 interceptions in January 2026 and 2,504 in May of the previous year. Many military analysts, however, doubt the accuracy of the Russian government’s data and suspect that the reported interception rates are overstated. Whether that is the case or not, the growing Russian figures also indicate that the pace of Ukrainian attacks has been rising. The drones deployed by Ukraine are increasingly saturating Russian air defence and obviously are developing faster than the capabilities of Russia’s air defence.

In response, Moscow has pulled air-defence units from the front to Russian rear regions to protect strategic objects. As a result, Russia’s formerly structured and layered air-protection system has become scattered and now includes many exposed areas. Every air defence system protecting an oil refinery and supply convoys is one less servicing frontline troops. Ukraine has not only increased the number of destroyed assets, but also the costs and risks of the troops involved in Russia’s “special military operation”.

 

Russia’s insufficient drone interceptors

That is even more so the case as an entirely new type of weapon at the front, anti-drone drones, are highlighting the continued fundamental Russian equipment inadequacies. For instance, the most widely used Russian anti-aircraft system, Pantsir-S1, is designed to hit large radar-reflective targets like cruise missiles. Yet, it largely fails against low-signature drones made of plastic and plywood.

Unlike Ukraine, Russian industry has only started to develop the capability to mass-produce interceptor drones. Its new Yolka and Lys-2 anti-drone UAVs exist so far only as prototypes. Russia lacks the integrated radar and software ecosystem that lets Ukrainian interceptor operators act on real-time targeting data across an assigned sector.

Even in the event that Russia increases rapidly its anti-drone and anti-missile systems protection capacity, there remains a plain geographic difference. Ukraine only defends the interior of an arc. In contrast, Russia must secure its outer edge, plus the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and approaches toward the Caucasus. It thus has to cover a first-echelon perimeter of roughly 2,000 kilometres whereas Ukraine’s defence line is only approximately 1,100 kilometres.

Defending thousands of kilometres of critical infrastructure requires vastly more resources than attacking selected high-value targets. Every improvement in Ukrainian strike capability therefore expands Russia's defensive burden disproportionately. As a result, Russia reaching Ukraine’s current level of air-defence effectiveness is assessed, by military-industrial experts, as currently unachievable.

Contrary to Russian propaganda narratives, the interception rates against Ukrainian deep- and mid-strike drones will remain low – at least, for the foreseeable future. Russia’s main response to Ukraine’s new deep strikes is and will remain, for the time being similarly long-range attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure – in particular, with ballistic and cruise missiles. This is leading to a rat race about which side is able to inflict more economic and social pain on the enemy’s rear, especially during the winter of 2026-2027.

The factor of political time: upcoming Duma elections

Within this complicated military and economic context, Moscow now also faces a critical political constraint. In September 2026, there are regular elections to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian pseudo-parliament. Of course, these elections are neither fair and free nor open and secret. The campaigning, voting and counting process will probably be a farce.

Nevertheless, the Duma elections do play a role in the functioning of the Russian political system. As there is a formally plural party system in Russia, the highly circumscribed voting procedure still allows for a certain degree of expression of political preferences. Given accumulating societal grievances, the 2026 national elections may demand even more than usual manipulation and falsification to secure a victory for the governing “United Russia” party.

The electoral calendar does not determine Russian strategy, but it may shape its timing. Before the September elections, Putin’s administration will likely attempt to navigate the fuel and other crises with softer measures such as rationing schedules, which will be presented as temporary. After September, once electoral legitimacy is renewed and Moscow has gained new domestic licence to implement harsher measures, one can expect more severe austerity measures and a renewed military conscription drive.

None of these pressures mechanically determines a certain type of Russian behaviour. Authoritarian regimes can, in general, absorb economic losses that would be politically unacceptable in democracies. The question is less whether pressure exists or not, but how the Kremlin chooses to respond. Three obvious strategic pathways can be identified. They do not exclude each other, but rather appear in combination.

Scenario One: Re-equilibration

Either implicitly or explicitly, many commentators on Russia’s currently growing economic, social and logistical problems assume that they are temporary, moderate and/or secondary. From such a viewpoint, even if these issues may, at the moment, look grave, the Russian state will be able to adapt and preserve its political stability, integrity and course. The Kremlin will successfully neutralize social discontent with repression or compensation or – most likely – with a combination of both.

The temporary rationing of fuel, electricity, food, water etc. – as is already partly happening on Russia’s occupied Ukrainian territories – can be announced as temporarily and framed as patriotic sacrifice. Moscow will, according to this scenario, eventually find ways to partly restore the supply, transportation and distribution lines via importing, for instance, gasoline from Central Asia. Thus, the fuel shortage, alongside others, will remain acute only temporary and can be mitigated through targeted imports and rationing schemes. Military needs will continue to be met as they are accepted as superseding civilian welfare. The production of drone, missile and other key weaponry continues, perhaps backed by enhanced Chinese support for Russia’s industry.

According to such a scenario, the currently rising calamities will be either only a partial, passing crisis, or/and they will be accepted as still bearable by society. The reduction of quality of life will be insufficient to lead to major protests, constraints on foreign adventurism, and political change. Even if ordinary Russians’ standard of living sinks, a new equilibrium can be reached and sustained.

Scenario Two: Moderation

The moderation scenario assumes that Moscow’s current social challenges, as a result of Ukraine’s continuing deep strikes on Russian infrastructure and parallel economic challenges such as low oil prices, are steep and will remain rising. A cascading effect from further air-defence fragmentation, refinery damages, supply deficits, logistic bottlenecks, etc. leads to a fundamental structural shift in Russia’s economic situation, societal mood and political outlook. Recognizing this, the Russian leadership – either with or without Putin – moderates, at least, temporarily its maximalist war aims and negotiation position.

The hitherto prevailing international diplomatic theatre around peace talks may give way to a more serious process of consultations driven by Moscow’s genuine interest to pause the fighting. Social hardship alone will not force an accommodative course of action as long as the leadership is able to absorb political costs and deprioritize civilian welfare. Yet, under increasing pressure from society, the Kremlin will look, in this scenario, for an – at least, temporary – de-escalation of the conflict and a shift to low-intensity fighting. Moderation would mean, in such a turn of events, not a Russian ideological reorientation but a mere military and economic re-calculation. Serious search for compromise and interest in a ceasefire will occur only when Moscow concludes that the war is, at the moment, unwinnable – a threshold not yet visibly reached.

Scenario Three: Escalation

As in the case of the second scenario, the third ideal-typical script considered here also assumes that mounting military and economic pressure will prompt the Kremlin to radically change course yet lead Moscow to escalate rather than moderate its actions. Russian escalation is already starting today, has both political-psychological and military-material purposes, and is designed to scare or/and bomb Ukraine and its western partners into capitulation or, at least, an acceptance of Russian terms for a ceasefire – a strategic approach sometimes labelled “escalate to deescalate”. Among others, escalation  aims to disrupt Ukrainian homes’ electricity, heating and water supply, restore Russia’s initiative on the battlefield, decapitate the leadership 0f the Ukrainian state, disrupt Ukraine’s long-range drone development and production, dismantle the supply logistics of Ukrainian frontline troops, etc. Arguably, this scenario already started to materialize with Kyiv’s heavy bombardment with numerous drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles in the nights of July 1st to 2nd as well as 5th to 6th.

While being the obviously preferred course of action by the Kremlin in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian infrastructure, Moscow’s options for and benefits from escalation are today more constrained than they were when the full-scale invasion started in 2022. Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself and support from abroad has  increased compared to four years ago. At the same time, the strategic rationale for escalation is becoming weaker with every additional successful Ukrainian hit on Russia’s infrastructure.

Ruthless retaliation strikes against Ukrainian settlements may provide emotional relief for the Russian political leadership and agitated parts of society. Yet, actions of “revenge” will not help to undo the material damage done by Ukrainian deep strikes and may have only limited compensatory effects on most of Russia’s population. A repair of and prevention of further attacks on, for instance, Russian oil refineries would demand a strategy of moderation rather than escalation.

More and more, Moscow needs, at least, an interruption in the war, and in particular a halt to Ukrainian deep strikes as well as ideally a lifting of sanctions. A continuing tit for tat between the two countries will only deepen Russia’s already significant economic dislocations. Intensified strikes on Ukrainian rear areas including Kyiv will hardly resolve Russia’s core problem of technological backlog. They cannot easily break the Ukrainian innovation cycle, which continues to outpace that of Russia, which is mostly adaptative and belated.

Still, as long as Moscow is not driven only and not so much by rational motives, it has a number of options for escalation at its disposal. Internally, this can mean the start of large-scale conscription, as well as the broadening of repression against dissent in Russia. Apart from already now increasing terror against Ukrainian civilians, the Kremlin may try to force Belarus’s involvement in the war as an active co-belligerent. Even a mere threat, which is credible, from the north may force Ukraine to divert air defence and ground forces from the frontline. Moscow may also try to further expand its hybrid measures, such as cyberattacks, sabotage activity in Europe, and nuclear signalling to the West in order to deter it from supporting Ukraine.

Conclusions

Instead of focusing on immediate territorial defence and gains, Kyiv is increasingly targeting the material and social structures in Russia’s rear that enable its warfare in Ukraine and hybrid actions elsewhere. This shift creates a new strategic constellation in which defence rather than offense dominates. To be sure, Russia can still gather troops at the front and mobilize industrial resources.

Yet every additional layer of protection it has to establish in reaction to Ukraine’s rapidly growing deep and “midstrike” capabilities requires spreading limited air-defence assets further across its vast territory. Defending critical infrastructure along thousands of kilometres is harder than attacking select weak points of Ukraine. The cost of Russian defence is starting to increase more rapidly than the cost of offense.

The Ukrainian successes of striking Russia’s energy infrastructure and the military industrial complex will not produce a Russian military collapse. In principle, authoritarian regimes such as Russia can withstand, ignore or neutralize discontent emerging from civilian hardship while preserving military capacity. The decisive variable is thus not the economic pain inflicted itself. The key question is whether Ukrainian strikes with new long-range weapons can progressively reduce Russia’s ability to sustain and generate combat power faster than Moscow can itself destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure and adapt to the new innovation cycle.

For Europe, the challenge is larger than helping Ukraine to somehow prevail. It is to recognize that the future character of warfare and structure of European security are being written in Ukraine today. Against this backdrop, the EU has to ensure that the institutions and policies tasked to preserve the sovereignty of its member states and of the European project as a whole evolve as rapidly as the changes on the Ukrainian battlefield demand.

Dr. Lesia Bidochko is a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,  and a Non-Resident Researcher at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder.

Dr. Andreas Umland is a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), Associate Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.