The decline of left-wing parties and the emergence of Smer

In my recent reflection, I attempted to transform the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) into a "modern left-wing party." The results achieved by KSS in the first free elections after November 1989 are often regarded as a success. However, when comparing the party's percentage gains with its membership base, the evaluation outcome differs. During normalization, more precisely until the Velvet Revolution, KSS had over half a million members. And it received exactly the same number of votes. Certainly, after the revolution and the transformation of KSS into the Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ), its membership base halved. The electoral results achieved in 1992 (14.70 percent) and 1994 (10.42 percent, with SDĽ being part of the coalition Common Choice) represented only small gains relative to its membership: approximately one voter per party member.

Leftist rhetoric without leftist politics

When in 1996 Jozef Migaš became the chairman of SDĽ, he promised a more vigorous left-wing policy. He responded to the one-time success of the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) under the leadership of the fiery worker Ján Ľupták in the early parliamentary elections of 1994. It was precisely the persuasiveness of Ľupták's new party that contributed to the weak result of the coalition of left-wing parties vying for voter support under the name Common Choice (SDĽ, Green Party, Social Democratic Party of Slovakia – SDSS, and the Farmers' Movement of the Slovak Republic) – the aforementioned 10.42 percent. Ľupták's defiant electoral rhetoric appealed mainly to factory workers – especially from the arms industry – affected by Klaus's "shock therapy" and Mečiar's chaotic economic and privatization policies. The failure of Common Choice was also influenced by the loss of part of KSS and SDĽ voters, disappointed by the absence of a clear social and economic alternative to ruthless "market liberalization." Its result was also a mass of unemployed – at the time of the elections, approaching 15 percent. This was also noted by some SDĽ politicians, including chairman Migaš.

Critical opposition politics brought SDĽ a good electoral result in 1998, at 14.66 percent. And what led to the rapid decline in popularity of Ján Ľupták's ZRS? Mainly the fact that the association entered into a coalition with HZDS and SNS and joined the mass and chaotic privatization, as well as the subjectivism and adventurism of the then Mečiar's policies. As a result, in the 1998 elections, it gained just over one percent of votes. It is clear that the original voters returned to the opposition SDĽ. The opposition stance, more vigorous leftist rhetoric, and voter disappointment with ZRS thus brought SDĽ under Migaš's leadership an electoral success. However, SDĽ entered into a quadripartite coalition with the conservative-liberal grouping consisting of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). Interestingly, SDSS, a party led by KDH politician Mikuláš Dzurinda, also became part of the conservative SDK grouping.

SDĽ in the orbit of right-wing politics

The description of the balance of power, election results, and electoral coalitions I provided merely as evidence of the simple fact that leftist politics was losing its real content and was merely adapting to power tactics – tactics associated with right-wing conservative policies and goals. During Mikuláš Dzurinda's government, SDĽ – despite some partial adjustments – fully subordinated itself to the legislative program of right-wing reforms and ultimately to ideology. The most striking example was the adoption of the Vatican Treaty, which not only definitively subordinated the Slovak episcopal structure to the Vatican but also significantly suppressed the civil character of the state. At the same time, it committed Slovakia to the ratification of implementing treaties that deepened the dominance of the Catholic Church and its doctrines. Some SDĽ MPs did not agree with this step but did not vote against. The same applies, for example, to the abolition of inheritance tax and a series of other neoliberal "reforms."

The result was a split within part of the SDĽ parliamentary club and the creation of the Social Democratic Alternative (SDA) led by Milan Ftáčnik, as well as the departure of MP Robert Fico and the founding of the Smer party (1999). It was a process of complete disintegration, which was also reflected in the election results of 2002: SDĽ received 1.36 percent, SDA 1.80 percent, and the newly formed Smer achieved 13.46 percent. In the 2002 elections, there was also a revitalization of the Communist Party, which with 6.32 percent of votes again became a parliamentary party, albeit for only one term. SDĽ and SDA merged into Smer in subsequent years, which gradually positioned itself as a social democratic party.   

Social democratization of Smer

The decline of left-wing parties, but mainly the displacement and emptying of leftist ideology and political programs, I experienced quite painfully. I never abandoned the idea of creating a broad current of social democratic orientation. When Robert Fico and I, along with a small circle of people I belonged to, founded Smer, I deliberately pushed for its social democratic transformation. Not only conceptually (I incorporated leftist ideas into the founding program), but also practically, as I brought left-leaning individuals into the party – whether individually or in groups, for example representing the more progressive part of the disintegrating ZRS. Moreover, I had no problem with politicians with liberal views. I considered it natural that they would form part of Smer, leaning towards the center. This is a common phenomenon in large social democracies. Just as more radical leftists on the opposite wing of the party.

After the 2002 elections, this process gained momentum and purposefulness. Mainly because the results of the second Dzurinda government, which implemented dogmatic neoliberal "reforms," had a disastrous impact on Slovak society. Record unemployment, stark regional disparities symbolically called "hunger valleys," a significant decline in wages, social inequality, and ruthless Miklošov-Kaníkov "deformities" led to violent social unrest unseen in Slovakia since the days of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The average inflation hovered around eight percent, and unemployment fluctuated around 17 percent. By the way, Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda understood the reality and accepted the resignation of Minister of Labour Ľudovít Kaník, whom I labeled a "social monster," and it was quite accepted. He was replaced by the qualified and humanistically-minded Ivetu Radičovú.

From the "Third Way" to the social state

The described situation opened space for center-left politics. In the early days, there were intense ideological and political debates within Smer. A group of economists around Milan Murgáš, who was then vice-chairman of Smer, held right-wing liberal views. I, on the other hand, deliberately promoted social democratic solutions. Robert Fico, coming from the leftist environment of SDĽ, opened the space precisely for this orientation. Systematically, we began developing the concept of a social state. The decision for social democracy also aimed to complete the Slovak political scene in a typically European shape. An important step towards this goal was the absorption of the "Center" parties and the Party of Civic Understanding, followed by the integration of the "residual" left-wing parties (SDSS, SDĽ, SDA) into Smer.

I still often encounter among leftists a misunderstanding of this phase of Smer's formation, as it identified with the "Third Way." This concept primarily meant positioning itself against Mečiar on one side and Dzurinda on the other. It also represented a way to avoid the historical mistakes of leftist politics (mainly rejecting the tradition, blindly adopting models, this time Western ones, resignation from the national vision, and so on).

The fact is that Smer was only moving towards, or rather forging, a social democracy. From the beginning, there were forces within the party that ideologically looked to the right. Including in leadership. I vividly remember when I became vice-chairman of the party (year 2000), the aforementioned vice-chairman Murgáš stated that he did not come to create a party with a leftist Zalo. On the other hand, "my" original SDSS was so discredited by its profile and entry into Dzurinda's right-wing SDK that we outright rejected using its name. From the very beginning, I included in the program documents some names of prominent social democratic politicians from around the world as models. And so, the brief interlude of the "Third Way" served its purpose, kept the party united, and allowed a move to the left: the need to differentiate mainly from Dzurinda's government opened space for political positioning opposite to the neoliberal concept, both in economics and social issues. The social alternative to neoliberal Mikloš's policies, the concept of a social state, and the absorption of small left-wing parties enabled Smer to add "social democracy" to its name.

Smer as a project of progressive politics

This step was neither populist nor speculative; it reflected the thinking of the majority of people who joined Smer. Yes, Smer was the hope of young, progressive, innovative people. It was meant to be and was a "successful" party. Wide expert teams were forming, professionalism was to replace massive party structures and membership: the fate of SDĽ with its sprawling structures was a cautionary example. Building a modern, progressive alternative not only to Mečiar but also to Dzurinda was the original vision of Smer and the lure that attracted a generation aged 18 to 35. An educated and ambitious generation. Topics like marijuana legalization, registered partnerships, or strict separation of church and state were not taboo.

Of course, taking on government responsibility tempered these topics, as it was necessary to confront the orthodox neoliberal policies of Ivan Mikloš: from privatization through weakened labor laws, union positions, the second pension pillar, and pluralism in health insurance, to flat tax and other dogmas of the fashionable neoconservative kitchen. For ideological reasons, I strongly supported the national program. From a social democratic perspective, the national program is based not on populist interpretations of Slovak history but on its leftist values. And the social pillar means various forms of solidarity, but modern, based on individual decision-making, not on reviving traditionalist collectivism of families, villages, parishes, or the nation. The conceptual culmination of this effort was the State Doctrine of the Slovak Republic, which I drafted at the initiative of then-President Rudolf Schuster and which Smer adopted as an official document at its Second Congress (2001).

From the perspective of this optimistic ideological and political development of Smer–Social Democracy, its current far-right rhetoric and policies may seem almost impossible. What happened that Smer embarked on a conservative path and today is anchored in the orbit of the far-right politics? A topic for a separate analysis in a future contribution.

Text created with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, representation in the Slovak Republic