Will Turkey become the "second Iran" and what does NATO think about it?

Patrycja Wieczorkiewicz: When discussing a potential war between a nuclear superpower and NATO, we usually look towards Russia with concern. Recently, however, the media landscape increasingly features a scenario with Israel and Turkey in leading roles. How likely is its realization?

Karol Wasilewski: If we assume that Israel and Turkey are rational actors, a full-scale war seems very unlikely – the consequences would be very severe for both sides. Moreover, the United States would do everything in their power to prevent such a war, as it would put them in an extremely difficult position, torn between loyalty to Israel and membership in NATO, which Turkey belongs to.

However, there is a certain unknown here: the USA seem to be losing interest in the security of the Middle East and are increasingly less willing to act as mediators between the conflicting parties. At this moment, it appears that if further escalation occurs between Israel and Turkey, the scene for armed actions will remain Syria.

On August 18, Israel bombed the Abu al-Duhur Syrian base, claiming that Syria intended to permanently station Turkish troops there. What actually happened?

Israel claimed to have intelligence indicating Turkish military movements towards the base in the Syrian province of Idlib. The base is located about 70-80 kilometers from the border with Turkey.

From what we know, Israel did not inform the Turks about the planned airstrikes. As a result, it was a very dangerous situation. Turkish military saw Israeli fighters flying towards their border and did not know their purpose or destination. They could only hope that the aircraft would end their flight over Syria. I would say that Israel was somewhat provocative here.

Turkey denied that it was preparing to deploy its troops at this base, and Syrian authorities also assured that they had no such plans. Interestingly, Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, essentially confirmed the Turkish version of events. He said that Americans checked Israeli intelligence and found no credible evidence that Turkey was actually transferring troops there. He also emphasized that the situation was extremely dangerous and praised the Turks for their calmness.

Why did Israel do this?

Israel argued that it was about setting red lines, implying that it would not accept the strengthening of Turkish military presence in Syria, especially if it moved further south.

What is more interesting is how the Turks interpreted this situation. Their way of de-escalating tension was to portray the Israeli attack primarily as a move for Netanyahu’s election campaign. In this interpretation, the Israeli Prime Minister tries to strengthen his image as Mr. Security – a person ensuring Israeli safety – and aims to make Turkey another enemy to fight during the campaign.

Even within Israel, there are voices that partly share the Turkish perspective: that the problem lies with Netanyahu and that antagonizing Turkey is extremely irrational. However, I would not assume that if Netanyahu lost power, it would lead to a fundamental breakthrough in Israeli-Turkish relations. The roots of the conflict are deeper than personal relations between leaders.

The situation would probably be easier to manage. In a less confrontational atmosphere, mechanisms for conflict de-escalation, such as those proposed by Americans, could be more effectively implemented. Tom Barrack spoke about the need to create a permanent communication channel between Israel, Turkey, and Syria to prevent similar crises.

On the Turkish side, there are voices suggesting that the Israeli attack on August 18 was a response to the signing of the so-called Mekki Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and nuclear Pakistan. Does this agreement really matter so much for Israel?

I do not think that the Mekki Agreement was a significant factor in Israel’s decision to attack Abu al-Duhur.

Firstly, the agreement is still at a very early stage of institutionalization – it is not yet clear how the alliance of these countries would function, in what situations they would assist each other, and by what means. Secondly, the three signatories have different relations with Israel and pursue different policies towards it. Currently, they do not form a unified bloc that Israel would perceive as an immediate threat.

At the same time, the Turkish narrative around the agreement fits into a broader vision of the Middle East presented by Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. For some time, he has spoken about the need to create a regional collective security mechanism – one that would allow Middle Eastern countries to be more autonomous in ensuring their own security.

Turks do not hide that one of the threats such a system should protect the region from is, in their view, Israel. In the longer term, Fidan envisions a much more ambitious scenario: if Europeans managed to build durable cooperation and security mechanisms, why couldn’t the Middle East create a similar architecture?

So, regardless of how immature the Mekki Agreement is today, in Turkish eyes, it serves a much broader strategic goal: the reconstruction of the regional security order.

On February 17, 2026, Naftali Bennett, former Prime Minister of Israel and currently one of Netanyahu’s main rivals, stated: “Turkey is the new Iran,” also speaking of a rising “hostile Sunni axis” involving nuclear Pakistan. What has Ankara done to deserve this title?

This is definitely an exaggeration. After the Arab Spring, Turkey was portrayed as a model to emulate in the region. Much was said about the so-called Turkish model: an attempt to combine political Islam, democracy, a market economy, and close relations with the West. In some Arab countries, Turkey was indeed seen as a potential example, and Ankara itself adopted this narrative and believed in its soft power.

Turkey was also, of course, a state ready to use force in international relations – just think of its actions in Syria and Iraq. To be blunt, it often operated in a gray area of international law. However, it did not export its political model through an extensive network of armed organizations comparable to Iran’s. Tehran built a whole system of allied groups and formations – from Hezbollah to Shia militias in Iraq and Houthi rebels in Yemen – which served to expand its influence in the region. Turkey’s approach was much more direct: it used its own armed forces, supported friendly groups, and patronized certain political circles, but did not create an Iranian-style “Axis of Resistance.”

The most problematic issue in these relations remains Turkey’s contacts with Hamas. Turks emphasize that maintaining relations with Hamas allows them to act as intermediaries and participate in talks on ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and the release of Israeli hostages. From their perspective, maintaining a communication channel with Hamas does not necessarily mean support for all actions of this organization, but can also bring results aligned with Israel’s interests.

Tel Aviv sees this completely differently. It portrays Ankara’s relations with Hamas as part of a broader Turkish policy of supporting regional movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, thus as one of the manifestations of regional rivalry with Israel.

After the fall of Assad, Ankara became one of the main patrons of the new government of Ahmad al-Sharq, while Israel demanded demilitarization of southern Syria, took positions on the Syrian side of the buffer zone, and regularly strikes Syrian targets. Are we still dealing with a policy towards Syria, or is it now a Turkish-Israeli struggle over what order will prevail on its territory?

Syria has become a kind of laboratory where Turkish and Israeli visions of the future order in the Middle East clash.

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024, power was taken over by Ahmad al-Sharq. Turkey played a significant role in creating conditions that enabled his camp’s success, and from Ankara’s perspective, the ideal scenario today would be the emergence of a united, stable Syria under al-Sharq’s rule. Turkey hopes that as one of the main patrons of the new authorities, it can reap political and economic dividends for its earlier support. This includes trade routes, infrastructure, and pipelines.

Israel, on the other hand, perceives the existence of a strong and stable Syria as a potential threat – similar to its view of the functioning of strong Middle Eastern states in general. After 2023, there was also a significant shift in Israeli security thinking, moving towards so-called preemptive actions. From this perspective, Israel cannot allow neighboring states to develop in ways that could threaten its security in the future. And this is a very broad category, under which almost everything can be included.

Here lies a paradox: policies aimed at eliminating potential future threats can themselves produce new opponents. Some critics of this doctrine would even say it condemns Israel to endless wars. There will always be someone who might become a threat in the future.

Does Turkey already feel a real threat from Israel?

Until recently, Turkey did not perceive Israel as a direct threat to its own security. That is beginning to change. In response to rhetoric from Israel and Israeli actions in the region, Turkish voices increasingly state that Israel also poses a threat to Turkey’s security. I believe this goes beyond propaganda. Ankara officially describes Israel’s policies as aggressive and expansionist, and Israel as a destabilizing factor in the region.

Turks are starting to consider that, by observing Israel’s actions, they must include it in their calculations as a risk to prepare for. They believe Israel uses its technological and military advantage to build a regional hegemon position, which Turkey cannot afford.

This is a rather remarkable evolution, considering the history of Turkish-Israeli relations. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, and in the 1990s, the two countries established very close military cooperation. What went wrong?

It is true that at the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey and Israel maintained good relations. These relations began to significantly deteriorate around 2010, especially after the Mavi Marmara incident [the ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza – IDF soldiers shot and killed 10 Turkish activists – ed.]. Since then, relations have fluctuated, with attempts at normalization, but the long-term trend remains downward. In 2016, Turkey and Israel signed a normalization agreement, and in 2022, they restored full diplomatic relations, but subsequent crises quickly undermined these rapprochement efforts.

An increasingly common scenario – often cited as one of many possibilities – is that Syria will survive on the map but will effectively cease to function as a sovereign state: a Turkish security zone in the north, an Israeli one in the south, with Damascus in the middle. Is this a realistic vision of de facto partition of Syria?

Ten or fifteen years ago, similar scenarios were envisioned for Iraq and Syria. We spoke of state disintegration, new borders, and lasting influence zones. Most of these scenarios did not materialize, so today I would be more cautious.

Ahmad al-Sharq proved to be a very capable politician. He can adapt to changing conditions and, albeit slowly, consolidates power. A good example is relations with Kurdish forces. Negotiations and clashes lasted long, but ultimately, the situation began to develop in a way much more favorable to Damascus.

Of course, this does not mean that al-Sharq’s success is guaranteed. Syria faces enormous problems. Subordinating additional parts of the country to central authority is just one of them. There is also a need for capital to rebuild the state, and for investors to start pouring money, stability is essential. It is difficult to carry out large infrastructure projects in a country where a new conflict could erupt at any moment.

However, I would point out one thing: the main actors in the region have an interest in Syria’s reconstruction and its functioning as an independent state. Israel is a notable exception, as it is much more skeptical about the consolidation of Syria and strengthening of authority in Damascus.

That does not mean Israel is in a hopeless position. Its technological and military advantage is enormous. For now, I do not see reasons to consider the scenario of a lasting division of Syria into a Turkish north, an Israeli south, and a truncated state with Damascus in the middle as the most probable.

Israel justifies part of its aggressive policy in southern Syria with protection of the Druze; Ankara has long regarded autonomous Kurdish structures in the north as a threat related to the PKK (Partiya Karkê Kurdistanê). How do Syrian minorities fit into the Israel-Turkey conflict?

Druze and Kurds are two very different cases. Regarding the former, we have already seen bloody clashes, and Israel used their situation as a justification for its intervention in southern Syria. Protecting the Druze became one of the arguments Israel uses to legitimize its policy towards Damascus.

As for the Kurds, the situation has fundamentally changed in recent months. An agreement was reached on integrating Kurdish structures with the Syrian state, and in August 2026, the Syrian Democratic Forces formally ceased to operate as an independent military formation, although this was not without tensions, including immense pressure from Turkey, which has repeatedly threatened further intervention in Syria. Not all issues are resolved; questions of Kurdish political representation, autonomy, and the role of various formations in new security structures remain. But from Turkey’s perspective, the main goal has been largely achieved.

Therefore, Ankara now has much fewer reasons for concern on this matter. Previously, it mainly feared two things: that the Kurds would refuse reintegration with Syria, and that Israel would try to exploit any conflicts between them and Damascus.

In this entire geopolitical story, it is easy to lose sight of the Syrians themselves. Damascus demands Israel’s return to pre-December 2024 positions and rejects restrictions on its right to rebuild its army and choose alliances. But does the new Syria even have space to conduct independent policy, or will its future be negotiated by Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Washington?

Syria indeed has very limited room for maneuver. On one hand, there is Turkey’s significant contribution to the success of al-Sharq’s camp and the fact that Turkish troops still remain on Syrian territory. On the other, Israel acts quite freely in the country and, to put it mildly, has a rather flexible approach to its territorial integrity. Additionally, the United States’ presence is crucial, as it is hard to imagine a stable relationship among these actors without it.

Nevertheless, I would be cautious in attributing agency to Syria. al-Sharq can maximize even small opportunities. From the beginning, there was a tendency to portray Syrian-Turkish relations almost as a vassal-suzerain relationship. al-Sharq was sometimes depicted as entirely dependent on Ankara, and his victory was attributed to Turkey’s facilitation.

However, his subsequent actions show that he is well aware of the extent of his dependence on Turkey, and that is precisely why he is trying to expand his own maneuvering space. A good example is developing relations with wealthy Gulf monarchies.

Here, Turkey faces a problem it does not quite know how to solve. Ankara may have very ambitious ideas for Syria’s future but lacks the capital needed for its reconstruction. That capital is mainly in the Gulf states. al-Sharq can thus leverage relations with them to reduce dependence on a single patron.

This is a good example of how a weaker actor can use open doors to gradually open them wider. Of course, Syria remains a very weak state, caught in a kind of “elephant dance”: it must move between much more powerful players and be careful not to be trampled by any of them.

Asli Aydintaşbaş, a Turkish journalist and foreign policy analyst currently associated with the Brookings Institution, recently said that the conflict between Turkey and Israel is also expanding into the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, Israel’s relations with Greece, Lebanon, and even the Horn of Africa. Should we now think not just about the “Syrian conflict,” but about the emergence of two competing regional alliance systems – Israeli and Turkish?

We have spoken relatively recently about Syria as a direct arena of Israeli-Turkish rivalry, but in the eastern Mediterranean, this conflict of interests has been growing since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century.

One of its sources was the discovery of large gas fields off the coast of Israel. Two visions of the region’s energy infrastructure clashed at that time. Turkey has long wanted to use its position as a bridge between the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Europe. In Ankara’s ideal world, as many pipelines and energy routes as possible should pass through Turkish territory.

Meanwhile, the EastMed pipeline project was proposed, which would run from Israeli fields through Cyprus and Greece towards Italy, completely bypassing Turkey. The project was later practically frozen, but it was politically very significant because it showed that energy infrastructure could be built in the region without Turkey’s participation.

Similarly, Turkey viewed the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, Palestine, and France, but not Turkey. Ankara perceived the development of this format as another piece of the regional puzzle being assembled above its head.

Additionally, there is increasingly intense cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – energy, political, and military cooperation.

This trilateral cooperation is one of the most important elements of Israel’s strategy in the eastern Mediterranean.

From Turkey’s perspective, all these issues are interconnected. If Ankara wants to be a regional energy hub, it needs a stable environment. Meanwhile, the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved, as do the Turkish-Greek disputes over maritime borders, continental shelf, exclusive economic zones, and airspace.

At the turn of the previous and current decades, another element emerged. Turkey’s relations with the United States entered a deep crisis, partly due to Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system, and simultaneously, Washington significantly deepened military cooperation with Greece. From Turkey’s point of view, the balance of power was becoming increasingly unfavorable.

Later, Greece signed a cooperation agreement on foreign policy and defense with the United Arab Emirates, including a mutual assistance mechanism. For Turkish strategists, this was yet another sign of a network of states whose shared interests in many issues conflicted with Ankara’s interests.

Therefore, I would say that the eastern Mediterranean was the first laboratory of the conflict we now observe in a new phase in Syria. The mechanism is similar: Turkey and Israel have different visions of regional order, different partner arrangements are forming around both states, US involvement is growing, and as a result, local conflicts are overlapping with broader regional rivalry over the shape of the region.

Is the Palestinian issue still the main source of the Turkey-Israel conflict, or has it become more of a catalyst for something much deeper – a dispute over who will be the regional superpower after Iran weakens? How much of Turkey’s current conflict with Tel Aviv would disappear if an independent Palestinian state was established tomorrow?

Palestine is an extremely important element of both Turkish foreign policy and internal politics. After 2023, Erdoğan became one of the most vocal critics of Israel among world leaders and directly accused it of genocide in Gaza, comparing Netanyahu to Hitler. The Palestinian cause resonates very strongly in Turkish society. Erdoğan must reckon with this and can politically exploit these sentiments.

But there is also an international dimension. Over more than two decades of his rule, Erdoğan has consistently built an image of Turkey as a state defending the oppressed and trying to take the lead in the Muslim world. Palestinians occupy a special place in this narrative.

This was especially important for Ankara as more Arab states moved closer to Israel. Particularly after the Abraham Accords in 2020, Erdoğan could present Turkey as a country that – unlike some Arab monarchies – did not abandon its Muslim brothers.

Therefore, I cannot imagine a serious and lasting improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations without some resolution of this issue, but even the creation of some form of Palestinian state – which currently remains a fantasy – would not eliminate all conflicts. Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, cooperation between Israel and Greece, Turkey’s regional ambitions, and finally the question of who will play the most important role in the Middle East after Iran’s decline would still remain.

Palestine is thus more than just a pretext; it is also a very strong catalyst for the conflict, which today has much broader foundations.

For decades, Israel has been an almost irreplaceable partner for Washington in the Middle East, but Turkey now seems to believe that with the change in regional power dynamics, it can take its place or at least weaken its privileged position. How realistic are these hopes?

When I observe Turkish policy towards the United States and Israel, I see a certain sinusoid. There are moments when Ankara believes it is in the lead. I think that for most of 2025, Turks believed they could even surpass Israel in the competition for US favor.

After the Israeli-American attack on Iran at the end of February 2026, this confidence clearly waned. Turks were reminded of Israel’s enormous influence in Washington. Now, the pendulum might swing back the other way. The negative consequences of the war with Iran for the US could reinforce Ankara’s belief that Turkey again has a chance to become a more important partner for Washington in the Middle East.

I would advise caution regarding Turkish optimism. Israel is deeply embedded in American politics – and I deliberately speak broadly, not only about foreign or security policy. The attitude towards Israel is also a component of domestic politics in the US and election campaigns. This sets a very clear boundary for the most optimistic Turkish visions.

Will fears of further escalation from Israel bring Turkey even closer to NATO?

Turkey is already increasingly turning to NATO, but for reasons that do not directly stem from fears of Israel. Mainly, it relates to the transformation of the international order, the reduction of US engagement in the Middle East, and an attempt to show Washington that Ankara can be a credible ally. This also includes the ongoing normalization of Turkish-American relations since the second Trump term began.

There is also a change in the security situation in Europe, which Turkey perceives both as a threat and an opportunity. The threat is that it does not want to be left alone in a world where the existing security guarantees become less clear. The opportunity is that if Europe rearms, it can buy more Turkish arms and engage Turkish companies in industrial projects. This, in turn, will allow Ankara to further develop its own defense industry.

Turkey is thus increasingly involved in NATO and is returning to a long-standing demand: to have a role in the Alliance commensurate with its military contribution. I imagine, however, that it will also increasingly raise the issue of Israel within NATO forums.

A good example is the reaction to events after August 18, when Israel conducted an attack in Syria, and to the deepening military cooperation between Greece and Israel. Questions have started to appear in Turkish debates: if we talk about “NATO 3.0,” strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and European defense industry, then why are NATO countries like Greece spending billions on Israeli weapon systems?

I would expect Ankara to increasingly use such arguments, especially if Israel’s military cooperation with European NATO members continues to grow.

To sum up – can we currently exclude an Israeli attack on Turkish territory, the activation of Article 5, and an open conflict between Israel and NATO?

I think that if Israel attacked Turkey and there was a real risk of confrontation with NATO, the United States would do everything to stop escalation. Such a crisis would immediately absorb a huge part of Washington’s attention and place it in an extremely difficult position between two very important partners.

European NATO members would also quickly get involved, as they too have a strong interest in preventing an open clash. Such a conflict would mean not only a Middle East crisis but also a test of the entire Alliance’s credibility – Turkey would undoubtedly expect a response from NATO partners, strongly criticize those who, in their view, provided insufficient support, which would fuel anti-NATO propaganda exploited by adversaries like Russia and China.

There are also other states maintaining friendly relations with both Turkey and Israel. An example is Azerbaijan, which maintains a close alliance with Ankara and also has very good relations with Israel, having previously tried to act as an intermediary between the two countries. The United States would likely act similarly.

Therefore, I still consider such a scenario very difficult to imagine. In case of a serious escalation, a whole network of de-escalation and mediation mechanisms would be activated immediately.

However, if an open conflict were to occur despite everything, it would place many European countries in an extremely difficult position. Especially Germany, which is a NATO member and is obliged to show solidarity with Turkey as an ally, yet also maintains “special relations” with Israel.

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Karol Wasilewski – head of the Turkey, Caucasus, and Central Asia Team since January 2025. Previously worked as an analyst on Turkey and as head of the Middle East and Africa program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Former editor-in-chief of the Polish Foreign Policy Yearbook (2016–2019 volumes). Graduate of international relations and Turkology at the University of Warsaw, PhD in social sciences in political science, co-founder of the Turkey Research Institute, member of the international research network Centre for Applied Turkey Studies.  

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