What does the AfD sell and why is it a problem for the left?

There is something almost absurd in all this: a person watches the election night, listens to politicians from CDU, SPD, Greens, and Left on public television, and learns from almost all of them why the situation is difficult, what cannot be done, where there is no money, and why AfD is dangerous. And then comes AfD – a party that itself feeds on fear – and as one of the few, tells voters: relax, everything can be done.

On Sunday in Saxony-Anhalt, this offer received 43.8% of the votes. CDU gained 17.2%, Die Linke (The Left) 8.6%, and the pro-Russian left-wing BSW Sahra Wagenknecht 5.3%. AfD not only won the elections – it also approached a result where discussing it as a “protest” party begins to be absurd. Because what exactly is almost half of the voters protesting against?

Germany getting more expensive, but not better

People in Saxony-Anhalt knew who they were voting for. They knew that AfD could win, they knew the party is classified as far-right, they also knew that its candidate Ulrich Siegmund might have a real chance at power. Still – or partly because of that – they put a cross next to AfD.

Of course, one could say: eastern Germany, transformation, feelings of humiliation after reunification, weaker attachment to traditional parties, distrust of institutions. All of this matters. But after a result of 43.8%, such an explanation is no longer enough. A more interesting question is: why can the enormous social dissatisfaction, which at least partly has very material sources, be primarily exploited by the right?

The simplest answer is, of course: migration. And it would be a mistake to pretend that this issue is not important. It is important, especially for AfD voters. However, the story titled “people are afraid of migrants, so they vote for AfD” is simply too short. 

Moreover, Saxony-Anhalt is the oldest demographic state in Germany. For a large part of the residents, questions about pensions, healthcare, a doctor in a small town, or functioning buses are not a debate from a TV studio. That is their everyday reality. Add to that the economy, which for years has not given Germans many reasons for optimism, industrial problems, energy prices, and the general feeling that the state is becoming more expensive but not necessarily functioning better.

The pro-social electorate exists, but does not choose the Left

Die Linke, the German Left, received 8.6%. Of course, this must be supplemented by 5.3% for BSW, because Sahra Wagenknecht’s party is also a project originating from the left, though quite specific and still little known in Poland. BSW tries to be something like the old left: populist, socially oriented economically, much more restrictive on migration, critical of armament and support for Ukraine, and at the same time much more sympathetic to Russia. Despite all differences, one can find some similarities here with the Polish left during Leszek Miller’s era: less interested in progressive identity politics, more focused on social issues, but also carrying a baggage of nostalgia for the previous system.

In Wagenknecht’s case, this East German element is very important. She was born in East Germany, grew up there, and for years has spoken in a language that resonates with some people feeling alien in the political and cultural world of West Berlin, Hamburg, or Munich. Currently, BSW is in crisis, so its 5.3% is not a bad result. But if we compare BSW and Die Linke, something important becomes clear: there is an electorate for social and simultaneously anti-establishment politics. Only AfD received three times more votes than both these parties combined.

Why is that? Perhaps the best illustration of the problem was the scene from the election night in ARD on Sunday, on public television. Luigi Pantisano, co-leader of Die Linke, clashed with Tino Chrupalla, one of the leaders of AfD. At one point, he called him “Flachzange.”

Literally, it is a kind of flat pliers, colloquially roughly: idiot, cretin, loser. The problem was that Chrupalla is actually a person who probably knows quite well what Flachzange is used for. He is a painter and varnisher by profession, passed a master’s exam, and later ran his own craft business. In the TV studio, he responded roughly along the lines: I worked for 25 years, I know what work is, I paid more taxes and contributions than you will in your entire life.

Many could criticize Chrupalla, but in this particular scene, he could look like a normal guy to the average viewer, while the Left politician appeared as someone who ran out of arguments and resorted to insults. For AfD, it was probably the best possible situation.

The party has been telling its voters this story for years: elites in Berlin look down on you, consider you stupid, mock your language and your life, and we are the only ones listening to you. If, after elections where AfD gains almost 44%, the response from the Left is mainly: fascists, extremists, idiots – then the AfD voter might hear something else. That he himself is also an idiot. Why would he then vote for the Left?

Mamdani’s lesson

And here I keep thinking of Zohran Mamdani. Not because Magdeburg is about to turn into New York. It’s about the way politics is done. Mamdani did a simple thing that surprisingly often politicians do not do. He went out onto the street, took a microphone, and started asking people about their lives. What is too expensive for you? What makes your life hardest? What should be changed? Then he made short films from these conversations. The focus was not always on the candidate. Sometimes it was a person talking about rent, childcare costs, transportation, or shopping prices. It’s a small difference, but politically very significant. I don’t start a conversation with: why do you vote badly? I start with: what can I do to make your life better? Only then does politics come into play.

This also shows why I wouldn’t assume that a Trump voter in the US or an AfD voter in Germany is forever attached to the radical right. There are people who mainly want to break with the establishment and find solutions to material problems. If they receive a credible offer from the left, they might also vote for the left. And these are exactly the people the German left should try to regain, instead of explaining to them why their previous choice reflects moral decline.

For this, the left would need to be much more concrete. I would like to hear from a leftist candidate: starting January 1, five things will change for you. Do you have a housing problem? We will build public housing. Not five hundred in ten years, but this many apartments, in these cities, for this much money. The state can afford to go into debt for this. If someone is losing their home, we don’t first give them twenty forms to fill out and a list of conditions they must meet to qualify for help. We look at Finland’s experience and Housing First: first a stable home, then we solve the rest of the problems. Can’t afford a warm meal? Why not have cheap, publicly supported cafeterias in Magdeburg, Halle, or Cottbus, similar to Warsaw’s milk bars? The idea would sell well. Do you have children? The nursery is free. Then we finally argue about something concrete. And the voter knows what they will get.

The same applies to migration. The Left makes a mistake if it thinks that simply asking about migration problems already means taking over AfD’s language. People want answers here too. You can defend the right to asylum. You can support legal migration and oppose racism. And at the same time, you can say that the state should know who is coming, make decisions faster, integrate those who stay more effectively, and enforce the law even when a foreigner commits a serious crime. This doesn’t have to be a right-wing answer. It can simply be a left answer, which believes that a well-functioning state is a good thing.

BSW understood this problem earlier than Die Linke. Wagenknecht sometimes goes much further on this issue than I would, but at least she recognized that moralizing does not replace politics. At the same time, data from Saxony-Anhalt show why you cannot make the opposite mistake and explain the entire result with migration. People also fear losing their status, a weaker economy, pensions, living costs, lack of doctors, and what will become of their town in ten or twenty years. These are classic left issues. And yet, AfD is gaining votes.

Where to start?

One could answer that AfD’s program will not improve the economic situation of many of its own voters. One can point out contradictions in its economic program. That must be done. But simply telling a person they were deceived rarely makes them vote differently. You need your own offer.

Therefore, the biggest lesson from Mamdani for me is not that the left should be more “radical.” It’s rather about something simpler: it should learn again to be curious about people. Go out onto the street. Ask. What annoys you? What do you lack? What can’t you afford? What could the state do to make your life a little better in a year? And then – and this is the most important – genuinely turn these answers into policy, not start with a big lecture about democracy.

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