From a post-Soviet state to a European power

Ukraine serves as a stable and reliable outpost of NATO’s Eastern Flank defence. For the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been deterring and inflicting unprecedented damage on one of the world’s largest armies with a nuclear arsenal, stockpiles of missiles and heavy equipment, and a huge mobilization potential. The Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet has been largely defeated. Ukrainian strikes are destroying oil refineries and military facilities on Russian territory with a strike range that reaches over 3,000 kilometres.

Ukraine is developing and preparing ballistic missiles for mass production, and has already successfully produced and used other types of missile weapons. Ukrainian drones and anti-drone systems are changing the concept of modern warfare, and Ukrainian soldiers are sharing their own experience in the Middle East, developing relations with leading American and other international military-industrial companies. Ukraine has also opened the first negotiation clusters in preparation for joining the European Union. The country’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is among the most influential political figures in the world.

Could such profound changes have been imagined 15 years ago? At that time, Ukraine was still widely seen as a typical country of the “post-Soviet space”: its political elites were torn between closer integration with the European Union and rapprochement with Russia, while society itself remained divided over the country’s geopolitical direction. Few could have foreseen that, within several years, Russia would occupy Crimea and launch a war in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, it was harder to believe that, less than a decade later, Russia would also begin a full-scale invasion, plunging Ukraine into a prolonged and existential war. Not many people imagined that Europe would once again witness fighting on a scale unseen since the Second World War.

The tragedy, however, is the enormous price Ukraine has had to pay for its independence and its future. That price can already be measured in hundreds of thousands of lives lost or shattered by the war, in families mourning their loved ones, and in the millions of Ukrainians who have been forced to leave their homes, many of them still unable to return.

On the verge of geopolitical independence 

The powerful democratic impulse of the 2004 Orange Revolution, followed by the repeat presidential run-off that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power, gradually lost momentum. When Viktor Yanukovych became prime minister in 2006, he was given an opportunity to regain the political ground he had lost two years earlier. Yushchenko temporarily slowed this reversal by dissolving the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, and calling early elections in 2007. These produced a new parliamentary majority and returned Yulia Tymoshenko to the premiership. Yet the shift proved temporary. In 2010, Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the presidential election, bringing the pro-Russian Party of Regions and its allies back to the centre of political power. A new parliamentary majority was assembled, in part through pressure and corruption directed at independent deputies, while Yanukovych increasingly filled key positions with loyalists. By the time the Party of Regions emerged as the largest force in the 2012 parliamentary elections, this concentration of power had largely been consolidated.

Yet even as Ukraine appeared to be drifting back towards Russia’s sphere of influence, Yanukovych’s government still had opportunities to pursue a different course. European partners remained willing to work with the Ukrainian authorities, while European integration continued to occupy an important place on the political agenda. Negotiations with the European Union were advancing, most importantly on the Association Agreement, which offered Ukraine a framework for much closer political and economic integration with Europe.

At that time, the geopolitical concept of Ukraine looked quite realistic – as a bridge between the West and the East, a strategic centre of economic and political interaction in the region. There were some positive social projects as well, including the UEFA European Football Championship successfully held together with Poland in 2012. On all levels – economic, political, cultural and ideological – there were sufficient conditions to start a gradual and balanced process of preparation for accession to the EU, which could have radically changed the course of Ukrainian history even then.

However, the Ukrainian leadership chose the worst course. In November 2013, Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement, causing shock not only among European partners, but also among his own society. He then lost control of the situation after the start of the Revolution of Dignity, resorting to the repression and murder of the population. In the final stage, he betrayed his own country by fleeing to the Russian Federation.

During this period, Russia sought to influence Ukrainian politics through corruption, loyal political networks and agents of influence. Its broader aim was to prevent Ukraine from pursuing an independent political course and escaping Moscow’s influence. The continuation of Yanukovych’s rule might have served these objectives. Instead, the mass democratic mobilization of 2013-14 and Yanukovych’s flight from the country disrupted Moscow’s plans. Russia responded with direct military action. In March 2014, it occupied Crimea and subsequently fuelled the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, marking the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war that escalated dramatically with the full-scale invasion in 2022.

These events fundamentally transformed Ukraine’s geopolitical position. The country increasingly became a bulwark against the Russian threat on Europe’s Eastern Flank – a threat still underestimated by many European capitals and the United States at the time. A return to a pro-Russian political course became increasingly unlikely, while Ukraine embarked on a prolonged struggle to secure its geopolitical independence.

Finding a place in the new geopolitical reality 

Russia managed to occupy Crimea and establish control over part of the eastern Ukrainian territories due to various factors. First, the long-term destructive processes behind the scenes within the Ukrainian army, which were pursued by agents of Russian influence and corruption schemes, purposefully undermined the defence capabilities of the Ukrainian forces. No one was properly prepared for this scenario. Second, Ukrainian stakeholders did not expect such events and wanted to avoid escalation with Russia at any cost. There was not enough will to decisively resist the Russian actions from either the EU or the US presidential administration at this time. Who could have imagined then that in 2021 the Russian Federation would issue an ultimatum to NATO, and in 2022 it would launch a full-scale war against the Alliance on the territory of Ukraine?

That is why the new Ukrainian leadership, headed by the new president, Petro Poroshenko, faced difficult challenges: to stabilize the security situation in the east, to begin restoring the military potential of the Ukrainian armed forces, and to justify public expectations regarding the movement towards the EU. In strategic terms, it was important for Ukraine to form a clear geopolitical model to consolidate its status as a new element of the European community and find ways to coexist with a belligerent Russia.

This period became a turning point in the context of the movement towards the EU, as the Association Agreement was signed and a visa-free regime was established. There was a long journey to develop a new model for the Ukrainian army as a combat-ready unit, ready to confront the Russian Federation.

These events occurred but never resulted in a strategic solution to the situation concerning the temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory. The emergence of the so-called Minsk Agreements only froze the conflict and did not provide effective mechanisms for the reintegration of uncontrolled territories into Ukraine. The Russian leadership only used the occupied land as an instrument of influence and prepared its own troops for a large-scale military campaign. A new escalation already seemed to be only a matter of time. It was in this period that Ukraine fully established its new foreign policy outlook. Movement towards the EU and NATO became enshrined in the constitution of Ukraine.

Petro Poroshenko’s presidency, supported by a loyal parliamentary majority and government, brought both achievements and mistakes, but it did not fully meet public expectations. In the second round of the 2019 presidential election, Volodymyr Zelenskyy won an overwhelming victory. His success reflected a growing demand for national consolidation after years in which political forces had often benefitted from exploiting ideological and regional divisions. Zelenskyy presented himself as a reformer focused primarily on domestic change. Events, however, soon pushed foreign and security policy to the centre of his presidency.

Zelenskyy’s term, backed initially by a single-party majority for Servant of the People, coincided with a period of profound international upheaval, from the coronavirus pandemic to Russia’s full-scale invasion. In 2021, Moscow issued sweeping demands to NATO that would have fundamentally altered Europe’s security architecture and reduced the Alliance’s presence in Eastern Europe. When diplomatic pressure failed to secure these goals, Russia chose military escalation, seeking to reassert control over Ukraine and strengthen its position in negotiations with the West. By February 2022, it was clear that the existing European security order had been shattered. Ukrainians chose resistance rather than capitulation, while the political leadership and armed forces remained united in defence of the country.

Fundamental change

Over the past 15 years, Ukraine has come a long way from a country with a fragile perspective on European integration to a country that has become a symbol of the struggle for European unity. The last five years of this journey have been fundamental not only for Ukraine, as they have encouraged a series of structural changes within Europe.

Supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia certainly requires effort, financial support and overcoming challenges within the EU. However, it is the “Ukrainian factor” that is now the trigger that has launched a large-scale campaign to reform the EU itself – to strengthen its operational capabilities, defence capabilities, and gain subjectivity in the face of global geopolitical changes. This is happening at a time when the US is reviewing its own priorities, and in other parts of the world a new axis of influence is being formed by China.

For Ukraine, the full-scale war has brought enormous losses. Hundreds of thousands have been killed or wounded, around one-fifth of the country remains under Russian occupation, and repeated attacks on civilian infrastructure and years of warfare have severely damaged the economy. Ukraine has paid this price not only to defend its sovereignty and independence, but also to prevent a Russian victory that would have far-reaching consequences for European security. Moscow’s 2021 demands towards NATO showed that its ambitions extended well beyond Ukraine and included a fundamental revision of the post-Cold War security order in Europe.

At the same time, the war has accelerated changes already visible over the previous 15 years. Russia’s aggression has strengthened national cohesion and reduced the political importance of many of the regional and ideological divisions that earlier politicians had sought to exploit. Ukrainians continue to disagree on domestic political questions, but there is now much broader consensus over the country’s independence, its European orientation and the need to resist Russian domination. A stronger civic and political Ukrainian identity has emerged and is likely to shape the country’s reconstruction and future development.

The war has also dealt a serious blow to the idea of a coherent “post-Soviet space”, which is still present in some European and American political thinking. Ukraine’s experience has demonstrated the limits of treating former Soviet republics as belonging to a single political or cultural sphere. It has also decisively challenged the Kremlin’s claim that Ukrainians and Russians constitute “one people” and therefore share a common political destiny.

A symbol of deterrence 

The Russian-Ukrainian war has significantly weakened Russia’s international position and contributed to a broader erosion of its influence. Moscow’s long-term energy leverage over Europe has diminished substantially, reducing its ability to use oil and gas as instruments of political pressure. At the same time, governments that had maintained particularly close relations with Russia have faced growing domestic challenges. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government suffered a decisive electoral defeat in 2026, with its approach to Ukraine forming part of a wider political debate over the country’s foreign policy orientation.

For the first time in decades, Russia is also losing ground in regions it once regarded as part of its traditional sphere of influence, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Armenia offers one of the clearest examples. Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election confirmed the country’s gradual movement towards closer political and economic ties with Europe, despite Moscow’s increasingly strained relationship with his government. This shift was symbolically reinforced by Yerevan’s hosting of the European Political Community summit and by Zelenskyy’s visit to Armenia in May 2026.

A similar, though more cautious, process is visible in Central Asia. Governments across the region continue to maintain working relations with Moscow, but they are simultaneously expanding cooperation with China, the US, Turkey and other partners. This diversification is gradually reducing Russia’s once-dominant role.

Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia has been particularly important for Moldova. Chişinău has long feared that Moscow could exploit Transnistria to destabilize the country or increase its military presence there. Such risks would have been considerably greater had Russian forces succeeded in advancing along Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and capturing Odesa, thereby establishing a land corridor towards Moldova.

Ukraine has also helped revive the EU’s eastern enlargement agenda. Together with Moldova, it has advanced towards closer European integration, while the two countries have increasingly coordinated their responses to security and energy challenges originating from Russia. Moldova has maintained its pro-European course despite sustained political pressure and attempts at destabilization. These developments point to a broader transformation in Ukraine’s international role. The country is no longer merely an object of competition between larger powers, but an increasingly influential regional actor capable of challenging Russian interests and shaping the wider European agenda.

 Finally, Ukraine has strengthened its partnerships with major European states, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland and Italy, while also developing closer forms of cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic countries and deepening its strategic relationship with the US. Ukraine has thus established itself as an important European political and security actor – a position that would have been difficult to imagine 15 years ago.

A future member of the EU

In the summer of 2026, Ukraine reached another historic milestone in its European integration: the opening of the first negotiating clusters in its accession talks with the European Union. What had seemed highly improbable 15 years earlier – when parts of the political establishment sought to keep Ukraine closely tied to Russia – had become a concrete political reality and a visible path towards membership.

Of course, Ukraine’s ambitions will not be realized overnight, nor is rapid accession through a shortened procedure likely. The country still faces a long and demanding process of reforms and institutional change, made all the more difficult by the ongoing war. Nevertheless, Ukraine has already taken a fundamental step by establishing a clear and increasingly difficult-to-reverse trajectory towards European integration.

More broadly, the past 15 years have been a period of profound political and national transformation. Ukraine has faced challenges that could have destroyed its statehood or deprived it of sovereignty. Instead, it has continued to defend its independence while seeking a stronger place in the emerging European and international order. At the same time, it is laying the foundations for post-war reconstruction and the development of future generations.

Ukraine’s eventual place in the European Union now appears far more realistic than it did 15 years ago. The remaining question concerns the shape of its future security arrangements: whether these will ultimately be anchored in NATO membership or in some other strengthened European security framework. In either case, Ukraine is likely to play an important role in shaping Europe’s future security architecture.

 

Anton Naichuk is the director of the Eastern Europe Council based in Warsaw.