Meloni assured Italians stability, but nothing more
Krytyka Polityczna
The Italian case shows that far-right demagoguery can be incompatible with actual governance, while at the same time being very effective in poisoning public debate and weakening democratic standards. The post Meloni assured Italians stability, but nothing more first appeared on Krytyka Polityczna.
At the beginning of September, the Italian government celebrated with pomp a recently broken record – the current cabinet has been in office longer than any in the history of the Republic. The Prime Minister's speech in Bari was accompanied by slogans such as "a more stable government, a stronger Italy – four years of dedication to the nation." International media picked up this narrative, praising Meloni as a person who stabilized Italy's political situation. She embarrassed countries like France and the United Kingdom, because while over the Seine and the Thames, premiers sometimes serve less time than a cabbage, Rome has maintained the same cabinet throughout the entire term. But what are the actual benefits of this for Italy? Judging by the opinions of the interested parties themselves, probably very little.
Recent polls give the right-wing coalition devastating ratings. They show that Italians are dissatisfied with literally every aspect of government policy. External policy is rated the least poorly (19% negative), while the most criticized is the inability to curb rising living costs (60% negative). Poor reviews also concern economic management, healthcare, the justice system, and migration policy. The failures of Meloni's government also negatively impact her flagship projects.
The Third Republic remains on paper
When in 2022, the coalition led by the nationalist Brothers of Italy (FdI) clearly won the elections, and Giorgia Meloni became the first far-right premier in the country's post-war history, it was announced that the foundations of the Italian Republic would be shaken. Executive power was to be drastically strengthened through constitutional changes, the migratory storm was to be stopped, and Brussels and European elites were to be forced to reckon with Italian interests.
At the beginning of this year, the government suffered a painful referendum defeat, which directly meant abandoning changes to the justice system (allegedly dominated by "red judges") and indirectly buried hopes for broader institutional reform. Instead of the promised "Third Republic", we got rather the preservation of the existing system with some peripheral changes, such as increasing the powers (and often impunity) of law enforcement agencies and restricting the right to protests or strikes. The project of direct election of the prime minister failed, regional autonomy reform was partially challenged by the Constitutional Court, and judicial independence could not be limited. The grand reconstruction of the state, which was to be a hallmark of right-wing governments, remains in the realm of unfulfilled plans.
Not only in the institutional sphere did Meloni's government fail to deliver on its promises. The entire last four years have been characterized by a growing gap between radical electoral rhetoric and much more conservative governance. This is best seen in European policy: instead of confrontation with Brussels, Meloni opted for pragmatic cooperation and building influence within EU institutions. Harsh rhetoric on migration and sovereignty did not translate into an open conflict with the European Union, which is one of the foundations of the positive image of the Italian prime minister abroad. Meloni shows her compatriots the same face.
Clash of nationalism with reality
Although the government emphasizes its successes in reducing the budget deficit and employment rates, the overall balance appears very unfavorable for Giorgia Meloni. Italy's economic growth since 2022 has clearly slowed down: after a post-pandemic rebound, a period of stagnation followed, with growth oscillating between 0.5 and 0.7 percent for three years, making it one of the slowest in Europe, as evidenced by the chaos surrounding the modernization attempts of the steelworks in Taranto. Even in this aspect, there was more noise (such as about car model names) than real reforms.
Meanwhile, the focus on "traditional values," including making access to abortion more difficult, complicating life for the LGBT+ community, and promoting conservative morality, did not fulfill its primary goal of strengthening the Italian family. Birth rates remain very low; in 2025, only 355,000 children were born in Italy, the lowest in the entire post-war period, and the fertility rate dropped to 1.14 children per woman. Among those giving up children, 62% cite economic, professional, or social obstacles.
Much of this is due to the government's considerable hypocrisy in migration policy. On one hand, it has staged actions like blocking rescue ships and sending refugees to camps in Albania; on the other, it issues record numbers of work permits for foreigners outside Europe. Between 2026 and 2028, about half a million permits are planned, with nearly 165,000 just in the current year. In this regard, the right-wing Italian government resembles Law and Justice, which, while in power, eagerly accepted foreign workers, simultaneously scaring migrants and competing with the Confederation in xenophobic agitation.
Failures of the nationalist government have not shaken faith in "remigration" or effective confrontation with Brussels
These failures have not caused everyone to lose faith in "remigration" and effective opposition to Brussels. Radical voters have simply started looking even further to the right, where currently General Roberto Vannacci is gaining ground. The former protégé of Salvini now drags Lega down, promising mass deportations, top-down restrictions on the number of foreigners to a maximum of 4% of the country's population, halting legal labor migration, and returning Italian right-wing to uncompromising nationalism. Futuro Nazionale aims to present itself as the force that will repair the disappointed right.
Is "bad but stable" enough?
Meloni has thus managed to ensure political stability for Italy, but it is difficult to build lasting political dominance solely on this fact if voters see mainly disappointment in other areas. On one hand, moderates may return to the center-left opposition. On the other, Italian radicals may view Meloni's conservatism—perceived abroad as responsible—as a sign of capitulation to the system, whatever its definition. That is why her government faces competition from Vannacci, who promises to carry out the revolution Meloni has only hinted at.
Therefore, machinations around electoral law continue. For months, the right-wing coalition has been pondering how to change it to maximize their chances of staying in power. The current proposal involves a proportional system with a majority bonus for the party or coalition exceeding 41 or 42 percent of votes (the exact threshold varies depending on current polls of right-wing parties). There is also consideration of introducing single-member districts with runoffs if no majority is achieved. This could minimize the threat from Vannacci's vote-splitting, but faces resistance from Lega. It is clear how much the politics of the ruling right has started to revolve around maintaining power. Instead of implementing the major projects from 2022, the coalition is increasingly focused on crafting rules of the game that allow it to stay in power even if part of the right-wing electorate shifts to more radical opponents.
Even if Meloni has not managed to realize even half of her plans, it does not mean her government will leave no mark. The regressive social and economic policies have worsened the situation of minorities and many workers, and budget cuts have deepened the crisis of public services. This also includes state media, which have become politicized—NGOs criticize the Italian authorities for pressuring critical journalists and limiting media pluralism. Ultimately, supporters of the Third Republic had to settle for modest victories, such as taking over "leftist" media.
Meloni has not solved any of Italy's main problems: she has not reversed demographic trends, stimulated the economy, or improved the quality of public services. Even in the key area of migration policy for the right, she had to reconcile anti-immigration rhetoric with business demands dependent on foreign workers. Radical slogans were replaced with selective repression, symbolic gestures, and managing disappointment. Worse, the disconnect between her rhetoric and actual actions did not weaken radicalism but created space for even more extremist forces. If they gain power, they may have fewer reservations about implementing what for Meloni was primarily a tool for political mobilization.
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