The Church as an instrument of the Kremlin’s hybrid influence

Since the Soviet era, the Russian Orthodox Church has played a very specific role within the Russian state. It has ultimately functioned as an instrument of its security services and primarily the KGB.

 

Church structures were famously used to gather information on dissent, foster loyalty to the authorities, and disseminate the Communist Party’s ideological narratives.

In modern Russia, this approach has persisted but adapted to the Kremlin’s new geopolitical objectives. Now we see the Russian Orthodox Church acting as one of the Kremlin’s most covert channels of influence. This is particularly clear beyond the country’s borders – in Europe, the US and Latin America – where it maintains a network of religious and cultural hubs.

 

We increasingly see this state-linked institution being used to deploy pro-Kremlin narratives, shape a favourable information environment, and influence Russian-speaking communities. The religious factor organically complements political, media and intelligence tools, becoming part of the Russian Federation’s broader strategy of hybrid influence – particularly in Europe.

Among the Russian Orthodox Church's most significant media assets is the television channel SPAS. Since its launch in 2005, it has served as a major platform for promoting narratives of Russia's "holy struggle", "Orthodox values", and the legitimization of military aggression as a divinely sanctioned mission.

 

Patriarch Kirill – who is sanctioned by several European governments for supporting Russia's war against Ukraine – and other senior Russian religious leaders systematically combine ecclesiastical and military symbolism. They urge the faithful to support the Russian army, to make “sacrifices” for the state, and to view participation in war as a religiously sanctioned act.

 

The Russian Orthodox Church promotes the concepts of “Holy Rus” and the “Russian World”, portraying Crimea and the occupied territories as “sacred Russian land” and depicting Ukrainian resistance as a betrayal of Orthodoxy.

 

These narratives provide a pseudo-religious justification for Russia's aggression while helping to legitimize the occupation of Ukrainian territory in the eyes of domestic audiences. Ukraine has served as the primary testing ground for these methods of religiously framed information warfare.

 

The methods tested against Ukraine are being used with increasing frequency on the European continent. In Europe, the Russian Orthodox Church is becoming an instrument of hybrid influence that extends far beyond its traditional religious function.

 

European security services have long documented links between Russian Orthodox structures and influence operations, including intelligence activities. In recent years, concerns regarding cooperation between representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the security services have only intensified.

In December 2023, the Swedish Security Service confirmed that representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church had cooperated with Russian intelligence services and that Church structures had been used for espionage with direct state funding. Authorities have also expressed concern over the construction of a Russian Orthodox church in Västerås near strategic infrastructure, where the church's consecration was attended by diplomats later suspected of espionage.

That same year, Bulgarian authorities expelled the head of the Russian Orthodox Church's mission in Sofia and two other clergymen on the grounds that they posed a threat to national security.

Estonian intelligence has warned that the local Orthodox Church remains under Russian influence despite official organizational changes and that some of its leaders continue to publicly justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Estonia also expelled Metropolitan Eugene, the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, following a national security assessment. The agency has further described Russian Orthodox structures abroad as a long-established cover for Russian intelligence operations. In Norway, security experts drew attention to the Russian Orthodox Church's acquisition of property near military bases and critical infrastructure sites, raising concerns that Church infrastructure could serve as cover for intelligence activities.

Similarly, Latvia adopted legislation in 2022 requiring the Latvian Orthodox Church to sever its canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, reflecting growing concerns over the Kremlin's use of religious institutions as channels of influence. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, several Orthodox parishes have distanced themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate following Patriarch Kirill's endorsement of Russia's invasion. This move illustrates growing resistance to the Kremlin's influence within European Orthodox communities.

These cases of course show an indication that European governments are increasingly viewing certain networks of the Russian Orthodox Church through the prism national security. However, there is still work that must be done.

The Church has acted as a “spiritual façade” for the war. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, it has become even more deeply integrated into Russia's war effort.

 

Special military units and military-patriotic associations have been established across the country. At the same time, Russian priests serve alongside combat units, consecrate weapons and military equipment, and organize fundraising and aid for the armed forces. In the occupied territories, so-called "military churches" are present, while Ukrainian clergy have been replaced by Russian religious figures.

 

The Russian Orthodox Church forum held in Moscow in January 2026 effectively instructed Russian clergy to “sell the war” to their parishioners by incorporating justifications for the aggression into their sermons and everyday religious practice. This is particularly sinister given the prevalent networks that the Church has established in Europe.

 

These actions are systematic in nature and form part of Kremlin policy, rather than being isolated incidents.

 

This undoubtedly creates additional risks to the internal stability of European societies. It exacerbates polarization in particular through the exploitation of issues of faith and identity for political ends.

 

A key challenge for Europe obviously remains distinguishing between legitimate religious activity and the use of Church structures as hostile instruments of influence. In the long term, it is precisely this balance between security and religious freedom that will be the key test of European democracies’ resilience to the Kremlin’s covert influence abroad.

 

Zarmina Zarifi is Head of the Monitoring Department at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). She specializes in media monitoring and analysis with a focus on religious processes, religious propaganda, and hybrid warfare.