How Germany Can Fight the AfD

The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a party with openly anti-democratic positions, has become the strongest force in nationwide polls, particularly in eastern Germany. Jana Hensel, author of Es war einmal ein Land (“Once There Was a Country”), argues that although the AfD’s rise fits a broader European trend, it can be truly understood and defeated only by grasping the experience of East Germans and responding to their grievances. To mount a successful challenge, pro-democratic parties cannot carry on with business as usual.

Konrad Bleyer-Simon: In the international press, East Germany is often portrayed as the problematic part of the country. Earlier, it was described as being stuck in the past; now, as driving the shift to the far right. What does East Germany mean to you?

Jana Hensel: I have been studying East Germany for over 20 years. I have published many books on the subject and, of course, the East is my home. I come from Leipzig and participated in the Monday demonstrations with my mother in 1989. For me, that remains one of the most significant experiences of my life. So, East Germany means a great deal to me. It is my social, personal and political home. I feel a strong connection to the people of East Germany and am, of course, very saddened by what has become of the East.

But you say that there is no such thing as an East German identity.

I no longer work with the concept of identity. The word does not appear in my new book, because identities are fluid and change depending on who you are dealing with. I am from Leipzig, but I am now also a Berliner. I am German and occasionally become an East German, but I can also adopt a West German perspective. So, the concept of identity cannot get us anywhere; instead, I am concerned with the question of experience. In the book, I attempt to recount a political history of East German society from 1990 to the present day and to answer the question of how it came about that significant sections of East German society – as I believe – have turned their backs on democracy.

When did it dawn on you that German reunification might not, after all, be an unambiguous success story?

That is a difficult question, because I have always tried to describe, from an East German perspective, the things that, in my view, did not go well. We have a wide economic and social divide, high levels of emigration, and a truly inadequate representation of East Germans in leadership positions. So, we have many problems. I have always tried to talk about them, in the hope that we would resolve these issues democratically. But now we find ourselves in a situation where many of these unresolved socio-political problems are translating into support for the AfD and leading not to the improvement of our shared democratic system, but to its destruction. I find this deeply tragic, because I can see that the AfD is seizing upon many of the issues raised by myself and others, and is using them to justify its destructive policies. When the AfD’s lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, Ulrich Siegmund, says “We are taking our country back”, the feeling of being second-class citizens naturally resonates.

We have a wide economic and social divide, high levels of emigration and a truly inadequate representation of East Germans in leadership positions.

The Monday demonstrations of 1989 were a sign of East Germans’ quest for freedom and democracy. What exactly did the citizens of East Germany mean by democracy back then?

There were two aspects to this. People took to the streets to demand civil liberties. They also achieved successes in this regard, for example, in the freedom to vote, freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and, of course, freedom of movement. These were very important, central demands in 1989. However, looking at the post-war history of the German Federal Republic [West Germany], democracy naturally also appeared as a promise of growing prosperity.

And this is precisely where the experiences of East and West diverge. Democracy was fought for by the East Germans themselves and, from the very beginning, led to major social and economic upheavals for many of them. By the end of 1991, for instance, three million East Germans had already lost their jobs, and 85 per cent of them changed jobs during this process of transformation. These are experiences that West German society is unfamiliar with.

I believe East Germans were holding out for a long time, but at some point, because prosperity was not materialising to the same extent, they began to turn away from democracy.

People rally behind the AfD to create a moment of disruption – to undermine a system in which they no longer place much hope

The AfD started out as a neoliberal party and remains the antithesis of a welfare party. So why do many people think it can be an answer to citizens’ economic concerns?

That is truly contradictory. Let’s just look at Saxony-Anhalt, which is currently the most concrete example. If we examine the election, we see that the vast majority of people who voted for the AfD did so because of social, economic, and financial problems. It is clear that people on low incomes in rural areas, in particular, no longer have any confidence in democratic parties.

But does the AfD solve these problems? Of course not. It is a highly ideologically driven party that is becoming increasingly radicalised and advocates extreme approaches to education, culture, migration, and media policy. We can already see that there is a wide gulf between the motivations of voters in eastern Germany and the AfD’s promises. That is precisely where the opportunity lies to defeat the AfD, because it is the political centre that must resolve the real problems faced by a large proportion of the people in Saxony-Anhalt. People rally behind the AfD to create a moment of disruption – to undermine a system in which they no longer place much hope.

You write that Hartz IV, a social reform introduced by the red-green coalition government in 2005 which tightened the conditions for receiving welfare payouts, marked a decisive turning point in East Germans’ loss of trust. Could you explain why?

Up until 2013, East Germans voted more heavily for left-wing parties than West Germans in every federal election. This means we are dealing with a society that still carries a certain post-socialist legacy. This was not immediately obvious, because in 1990 they had voted for [Christian-democratic leader] Helmut Kohl, who promised rapid reunification.

East German society is characterised by its working-class roots. This is actually a typical voter base for left-wing parties – for the Social Democrats, for Die Linke, and perhaps to some extent for the Greens as well. Furthermore, up until 2013, East Germans consistently voted for the Greens in significant numbers.

Most commentators assume East Germans began to turn their back on democracy in 2015, with Merkel’s refugee policy and the rise of the extreme-right Pegida movement and the AfD. However, if one looks very closely at the figures, it becomes clear that the first major turning point coincided with the introduction of Hartz IV – the biggest reform of the social security system in the history of the Federal Republic. Hartz IV was ill-suited to the East German labour market, which was already characterised by extreme unemployment at the time. Nevertheless, it was pushed through by the red-green coalition. We can clearly see that voter turnout in the East declined significantly afterwards.

Meanwhile, the AfD is trying to give the impression that it stands for true democracy or a genuine desire for freedom. Yes, that is what its voters believe. They do that the same way as other groups want to believe that we are a resilient democracy – although I am no longer at all sure whether we still are. For years, we have been debating proceedings to ban the AfD, but we are getting nowhere. The result is that people in Germany can currently, through free democratic elections, vote for an anti-democratic, racist, and extreme-right party, which then enters parliament. We have now seen this in Saxony-Anhalt: whilst this party was legitimised through democratic means, it does not stand for democratic politics. We are, however, familiar with this experience from many other countries – be it Hungary or the US. It is an experience that is now also becoming a reality in Germany, or rather in eastern Germany.

Does that mean the AfD is not an East German or German phenomenon? After all, the rise of the far right is a trend we are seeing across Europe and worldwide.

It is certainly part of a global trend, but it has an East German DNA. I believe that in every country, we need to look closely to understand what has happened there. Orbán’s rise in Hungary must be explained from a Hungarian perspective, and Trump is also part of American history.

The AfD is certainly part of a global trend, but it has an East German DNA

I am not turning this into an East German problem, but I am trying to explain it from an East German perspective. After all, we must acknowledge that the AfD is twice as strong across the board in the East as it is in western Germany. A week after the election in Saxony-Anhalt, in which the AfD received 43.6 per cent of the vote, local elections took place in Lower Saxony (one of the Western states), where the AfD achieved 15.9 per cent. We must explain this enormous gap, as this is the only way we can bridge it. I am firmly convinced of this. If we look at the AfD as a pan-German phenomenon, we are failing to tackle its various roots.

What about the AfD’s growing strength across Germany, though? Can we still say its DNA is East German?

I do not believe that the party itself has East German roots, but rather that its success in East Germany stems from East German factors. In the West, we can see that the party has only recently begun to grow and has, above all, gained a lot of ground under the current Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. However, this massive growth in the West simply comes on top of many years of gradual growth in the East. That is why we now find ourselves at one of the darkest moments in Germany’s post-war and reunification history. And yet I have the feeling that the more closely we look, the more precisely we can identify solutions. I am not at all sceptical on that point.

The results in Saxony-Anhalt in particular provide us with a clear roadmap for action, including how we can combat the AfD. However, this is the exact opposite of what Friedrich Merz and certain sections of the CDU are doing, as they are adopting the AfD’s policies as their own. Instead, we need concrete policies for the ageing, depopulated, and in many respects less prosperous East, which holds different views from the West on many socio-political issues. This was the case during the migration crisis, with the Covid-19 pandemic, and also with regard to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

As a society, we have drastically narrowed the scope of public debate. This makes it difficult for me to adopt the perspectives of those who do not support Angela Merkel’s refugee policy. I do not share the views of anti-vaxxers. But we must clearly admit that, in Germany, over the last ten years, we have primarily turned material issues into matters of principle. We have made decisions largely on that basis, rather than recognising that there are sections of the population who view migration and even war through a material lens.

Does this also have to do with the fact that, apart from the leftist party Die Linke, the main forces standing for election over the last three decades were those that originated in the former GDR?

For a long time, Die Linke’s predecessor, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), was the party of the East. And you can see very clearly that the moment it tried to become a pan-German party – namely in the years after 2007 – it ceased to be successful in the East. In 2007, it merged with the Labour & Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG) party to form Die Linke. The AfD has, to some extent, taken its place.

So, can we say that the AfD is currently the only “East German party”?

You could say that the AfD is the only East German party with the strength of a mainstream party, because it now achieves poll ratings of 35 to 40 per cent in all the East German federal states. But at the same time, we naturally have strong Minister-Presidents in all the East German federal states. Michael Kretschmer (CDU, Saxony) defeated the AfD. Manuela Schwesig (SPD, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and Dietmar Woidke (SPD, Brandenburg) have also managed to do so. These individuals are each propelling their respective parties forward. Sometimes it’s the SPD, sometimes the CDU/CSU. However, if we look at which party still enjoys widespread support across the board, it is the AfD.

Does that make it an East German party? I am not so sure about that. It may well be that the AfD is repeating the same mistakes in the East as the other parties. It is possible that the AfD is merely using East Germans to roll out its radical, racist, and nationalist agenda, without paying any heed to the interests of the voters.

It will take a few more years to see whether these voters actually remain with the AfD or whether they have formed a coalition of convenience in the election to disrupt the system and will subsequently fall apart again.

Die Linke successfully increased its appeal to voters in Berlin. But even there, many complain that it is an anti-democratic and antisemitic party. Should we be concerned about this?

This is one of the most absurd debates we are currently witnessing in Germany. I am stunned by how many people think it is a good idea to equate Die Linke with the AfD. Not so long ago, the Minister-President of Rhineland-Palatinate, Gordon Schnieder (CDU), called for a ban on Die Linke to be considered. We are heading down a spiral of escalation here.

It is true that the Left Party does have a problem with antisemitism in some quarters, and it must resolve this. But we can see very clearly that the majority of voters – especially young people in Berlin – voted for the party for social reasons. I think it would be disastrous to now lump all these people together with an extremist faction. Friedrich Merz is fuelling this trend.

It will take a few more years to see whether these voters actually remain with the AfD or whether they have formed a coalition of convenience in the election to disrupt the system

The Greens have managed to stay relevant in East German state elections this year, in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. What would it take for them to become stronger in East Germany as well?

Socio-economically and demographically, the East remains a tough nut to crack for the Greens. Rural areas in particular lack academic communities and higher-income earners [among whom the Greens typically enjoy strong support]. However, we have seen in every election that the Greens can be successful in urban areas where, like in the West, the socio-economic structure, the average age, and the density of institutions are high. This was the case in Dresden, Leipzig, Potsdam, Greifswald, and other cities.

People rally behind the AfD to create a moment of disruption – to undermine a system in which they no longer place much hope.

It is also interesting that the Greens achieved a strong result in Saxony-Anhalt – with a very strong lead candidate, Susan Sziborra-Seidlitz. In terms of her background, she is not a typical Green. She is a trained nurse, has worked in the care sector for many years, and originally comes from the Left. With just under 9 per cent, she naturally also benefited from a massive second-vote campaign. However, I believe she also won people over as a person. This shows that the Greens can be surprisingly strong when they field compelling figures who do not primarily represent the academic milieu.

I have never been one of those people who make sweeping claims that the Greens do not understand the East. That is simply not true, because there have always been very committed Greens in the eastern German states. The Greens have their roots in East Germany, as is reflected in their name, Alliance 90/The Greens [Alliance 90 was an alliance of opposition groups in the GDR], and for a long time I haven’t felt that they are unaware of these roots. Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock, for instance, travelled throughout the East during their time in office and tried to see things from that perspective. As a party that draws on the revolutionary legacy of 1989, it plays a very important role in the East. This remains true even if they only achieve 6 per cent of the vote in the East, and it holds all the more true the more successful they are.

In 2027, five state elections will take place in West German states. What are your expectations?

I am already looking at North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) with great concern. There is a stable red-green coalition there, but we can see that the AfD is very strong in the regions affected by economic transitions. One can only hope that the AfD does not achieve a significant symbolic success in NRW now, and will not exceed 15 per cent in the West.

What would be a good strategy to defeat the AfD, beyond banning it or erecting a firewall against it?

In Saxony-Anhalt, the Gordian knot has been cut, as Sahra Wagenknecht’s BSW has emerged as a second political player on the scene that also wants to pursue disruptive politics.1 Nevertheless, I believe the firewall policy could succeed if it involved more than symbolic distancing from a very radical party. That is what we have seen over the last ten years. All of us – myself included – have erected this firewall whilst at the same time clinging to the status quo. But we have done far too little to understand what these voters actually want.

Fortunately, it is clear that we are finally beginning to do so. Following last year’s local elections in NRW, we saw that the proportion of blue-collar workers amongst AfD voters is very high. Suddenly, we have linked the social issue to the AfD. In the East, we have seen over the past ten years that the proportion of workers voting for the AfD has been rising steadily, and yet we have failed to address the social issue. This is the crucial issue, because 36 years after reunification, the East has still not reached the standard of living enjoyed in West Germany – neither in terms of wages, nor in terms of income or economic strength. We must begin to tackle the differing levels of prosperity between the two societies politically as well. Every chancellor since Helmut Kohl has failed in this regard, because the East has always been co-administered from a West German perspective.

We need a policy that actively works with these differences and examines them closely; one that scrutinises every measure and every law carefully to see how they affect East and West German states. The prosperity gap between East and West is structural. It will not disappear on its own and remains clearly visible. That is why different approaches are needed.