Tusk's visit to India: a new opening in the country's relationship with Central and Eastern Europe

On October 21st 2026, Donald Tusk arrived in New Delhi at the head of a delegation of nearly one hundred companies. It was the first visit by a Polish prime minister to India since 2010, and its timing was no accident: nine months earlier, Brussels and New Delhi concluded a free trade agreement labeled the “mother of all deals.” Negotiations began in 2007, stalled in 2013 over key economic issues, resumed in 2022 and were concluded on January 27th 2026. The agreement links two economies that together account for roughly a quarter of world GDP. The European Commission expects EU exports of goods to India to double by 2032, with tariffs eliminated or reduced on 96.6 per cent; with restrictions on services relaxed and the car market liberalized through a quota system. The process is not complete: Indian press reports point to a planned official signing of the agreement in Brussels on December 16th, and entry into force in early 2027. These dates remain targets, since the European Parliament must still vote on its consent to the agreement.

The pressure that decided why a negotiation that had stalled for years suddenly succeeded came from the outside: tariff policy in Washington and export controls in Beijing forced both sides to reconsider their dependencies. India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, speaking in Warsaw in September 2026, described his country’s engagement with Europe as a strategy of “de-risking and diversifying.” The same logic applies to CEE, where governments are very sensitive to supply-chain vulnerability and risks to security.

The economic data call for caution. Polish-Indian trade reached about 5.7 billion US dollars in 2024, which already makes Poland India’s largest trade and investment partner in the CEE, yet the figure is small beside India’s trade with Germany (17.03 billion US dollars in 2024) or France (18.05 billion US dollars in 2024). Hence, at least in the early stages, the direct effects for Poland will be limited. Tariff reductions do not create commercial relationships; they only lower the cost of strengthening them. Initial commercial pathways include Polish military drone sales to the Indian Army, while the electric bus maker Solaris, with its joint venture with India’s JBM Auto, shows what such partnerships could look like in the services sector.

India’s engagement with Europe has historically been oriented towards the west of the continent. This can be described as a neglect of CEE, despite Cold War-era ties between India and Soviet satellite countries. In the case of Poland, there were also earlier points of reference, like when the Maharaja of Nawanagar provided a safe haven for thousands of Polish families during the Second World War. There are signs of change: Prime Minister Tusk’s joint statement pointed to the first meetings of the Indian and Visegrád foreign ministers. The agreement thus poses a question to the region: will they act together, or will Poland alone try to claim the role of India’s “gateway to Europe”? The region would arguably be stronger if it acted together.

Tusk’s visit builds on the strategic partnership established in August 2024 during Narendra Modi’s trip to Warsaw, which produced a mix of concrete and symbolic results. The two sides set a target to double bilateral trade by 2030. It currently stands at about 6 billion dollars. The two agreed to launch a dialogue about their defence industry, and discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, critical minerals and space. Tusk presented Poland as a gateway for Indian businesses seeking access to the wider European market, a pitch Warsaw has already made. The most symbolic result, however, concerned the G20. Tusk said that Modi had pledged to support Poland’s pursuit of a permanent place in the group. The joint statement is more cautious, committing both sides to cooperate in the G20 tracks and workstreams in which Poland participates or may be invited to participate. In return, Poland reiterated its support for a permanent Indian seat on an expanded UN Security Council and for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for 2028–29. Such statements do not decide anything: no single member controls G20 membership, and Tusk’s invitation to the 2027 summit in Manchester would not confirm it. But the gesture carries weight. A large Asian democracy lending its voice to a middle-sized EU member that holds no seat of its own, in a forum where Europe is represented by the EU and by Germany, France and Italy.

This links directly to a point made by Shashi Tharoor, a former UN Under-Secretary-General who chairs the Indian Parliament’s Committee on External Affairs and was a guest at the European Forum Alpbach. Tharoor is among the most prominent Indian advocates of closer ties with Europe, but his support comes with a condition: European governments should respect India’s strategic autonomy and avoid a patronising tone in diplomatic exchanges. At Alpbach he framed the point in terms of Europe’s own interest, arguing that “Europe wins when it collaborates with smaller and middle powers.” The most natural reading concerns Europe’s partners abroad. Perhaps countries like India that are tired of being treated as recipients of advice. Yet the formG20ulation permits a second, internal reading, which Tharoor did not necessarily intend. "Smaller and middle" powers are not only found outside its borders, many are inside it. Poland is the EU's sixth largest economy and, as the G20 shows it remains removed from the table where global decisions are made.

The EU, to be fair, gives such states leverage they would not have alone: the India agreement was negotiated by the Commission on behalf of all twenty-seven members, opening a market that no CEE government could have opened by itself. But its headline gains, such as lower Indian tariffs on automotive sector, and agricultural products such as olive oil and wine, will arguably benefit larger Western European producers, while the region’s strengths in services and industrial niches are less prominent. A Europe that wants to be credible as a partner of "smaller and middle" powers abroad would be more convincing if it took its own more seriously. India appears to have understood this: by engaging directly with Warsaw and the Visegrád format, and not only with Brussels, Paris and Berlin, Delhi is treating CEE as a partner in its own right. For a region that knows what it is to be treated as the periphery of a western-centred debate, this is a useful reference point.

The partnership has an obvious complication. India’s relationship with Russia is a greater concern for CEE governments than for their Western European counterparts. Lately, European and Polish officials started to accept the fact that this is something they are unable to change. Instead, they emphasize that Europe can be a “trusted alternative” for India in technology and defence. The Delhi talks showed the limits of this approach. The joint statement was negotiated until the very last moment, and its language frames the war in Ukraine mainly through its repercussions for food and energy security in the Global South, rather than placing responsibility for the invasion and the damage caused by Russia in Ukraine. Warsaw’s own formulation was a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Tusk repeated his pragmatic position, first put to Modi in Warsaw in 2024, that India could play a constructive role in influencing the course of the war.

The EU–India agreement will not transform CEE economies overnight. Its significance lies elsewhere: it creates a framework in which states of the region can build ties with a rising power that is itself seeks alternatives to dependence on Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Tusk’s visit shows that Warsaw understands this, and Tharoor’s insistence on equality suggests what kind of relationship Delhi will respond to. If Europe wins by collaborating with "smaller and middle powers", the credibility of that claim will be tested at home as much as abroad. Poland’s place at the G20 table is one place where it can be tested. Whether this opportunity is taken will depend on turning symbolic visits into contracts, on coordination among CEE states, and on managing disagreements over Russia; otherwise the region will remain a market and a service base for the strategies of others. The signing in December and later implementation of the agreement in the early spring months of 2027, will be the first real test.

This material appeared in cooperation with Club Alpbach Poland – an organisation associating Polish scholarship holders of the European Forum Alpbach – a conference that has been a leading platform for discussion on the future of Europe since 1945.

Kalina Bulkowska is a researcher focused on the Asia-Pacific region, an international relations student, and a Club Alpbach Poland scholarship holder.