Moldova’s unique back door into Europe

After years of balancing between East and West, Moldova has finally committed to securing a European future, applying to join the bloc in 2022, and becoming a candidate in 2024. It hopes to join the European Union by 2030, with the ruling PAS party winning a decisive majority last year on this promise. But is it all too late, given the EU could well see the rise of governments that do not wish to pursue enlargement?

This possibility gives way to an idea that has dominated Moldovan politics from its very independence in 1991 – reunifying with neighbouring Romania, already an EU member. And this is not without precedent – East Germany reunified with the West in 1990, and by extension its territory became part of the EU overnight. Reunification could offer a unique solution to a possible impasse arising from a standstill in EU integration.

However, as of today, this remains a distant prospect. Even though the Moldovan President Maia Sandu, along with much of her government, made headlines early this year by saying that she would vote in favour of uniting with Romania, and thus relinquish her country’s sovereignty, neither Bucharest nor Chisinau is making any strides towards it. Indeed, President Sandu herself said that there have been no serious talks with world leaders about this possible union.

The majority of Moldovans too oppose this idea and would rather see their country join the EU separately. Romania is also in no shape economically to even think about absorbing poorer Moldova. But simply dismissing this discussion here would be to forego just how much this can all change in the near future. The political status quo across the West is shattering – all it takes is one Eurosceptic government to block EU enlargement, which has not even occurred since 2013. This would put Moldova, already constitutionally neutral, defenceless, and with territory occupied by Russian-backed separatists, in a difficult position: join the EU through Romania, or retain its sovereignty outside the western world?

Moldova’s promised path into the EU is far from guaranteed.

The country has begun the long process of EU integration – bringing its laws and institutions in line with EU standards, and negotiating with EU institutions and individual member states, who all need to approve its accession. But Moldova remains far from becoming a fully-fledged member of the bloc. It only just opened seven out of its 33 accession chapters, has closed none, and faces significant internal judiciary, economic and institutional hurdles. 2030 is getting ever closer, and there are far better-prepared countries, like Montenegro, which still have not joined the bloc.

Assuming these hurdles are overcome within reasonable time, Moldova then faces arguably an even greater challenge that it can hardly control – who will head the governments with which it will negotiate? Eurosceptic parties, both on the right and left, are rapidly gaining popularity. In France, where presidential elections are due next year, a pro-European candidate may well miss the run-off. Centrists are struggling to agree on a united candidate, dividing up the pro-European voter base, while Le Pen and Mélenchon, both Euroscepticsgrow in the polls as riots grip the country. France also requires that its parliament or a referendum approve any EU enlargement. Germany recently saw what would have been unthinkable ten years ago – the hard-right AfD almost gaining a full majority in Saxony-Anhalt’s state parliament. The AfD, Die Linke, and BSW by themselves could secure around half of the Bundestag’s seats at the next election, forcing centrist parties into a coalition with a Eurosceptic partner. And while Fico’s days are numbered in Slovakia, the same cannot be said for Romania’s rising right-wing parties, which all ironically oppose Moldova’s EU integration.

The consequences inside Moldova could be severe. Its pro-European leaders have asked voters to accept years of difficult reforms – which severely hurt the cost of living in a country already among Europe’s poorest – on the promise that they will lead towards EU membership. If that promise begins to look impossible, parties favouring closer relations with Russia would have an obvious argument: PAS wished to pursue Europe, but it could not deliver, regardless of whether these problems appeared from within or outside the country.

In that scenario, Romania offers an alternative. This is provided of course that Romania is even able to rise to the challenge. Moldova is in an unusual position among EU candidates. Most of its population speaks Romanian – already an EU language – and the two countries share centuries of history, with more than a million Moldovans – about one in four – holding Romanian citizenship. While right-wing parties may oppose Moldova’s EU accession, very few would turn down an opportunity to go down in history as the party who re-established Greater Romania. Political support for reunification in Romania is bipartisan in nature. Given the aforementioned East Germany example, the opportunity is there legally, and practically. So why not simply unite now?

The first obstacle is the lack of a clear majority of Moldovans, making it simply too controversial for any Moldovan party to adopt as policy.

While both countries share a common history and ethnicity (as elaborated by many renowned historians), identity in Moldova has always been an incredibly divisive subject.

Moldova, or central Bessarabia, was the eastern part of the Moldavian principality that Russia annexed in 1812. While the rest of the region of Moldavia would unite with Wallachia to form modern Romania in 1859, Bessarabia would endure Russification and would largely not experience this period of Romanian nation-building centred on Bucharest – Bessarabians therefore stuck to their regional Moldavian identity over a national Romanian outlook. Despite uniting in 1918, 25 years of Romanian administration was not enough time to harmonize identity, which the Soviets, who illegally annexed Bessarabia in 1940, used to create an entirely separate “Moldovan” language (something only recently amended) and identity.

Upon gaining independence in 1991, Moldova had the political will to reunite with Romania. But it found itself with a substantial non-native Russian-speaking Slavic minority courtesy of Soviet Russification. This group opposed a political union and anything related to Romania, and were used as a pretext for the Russian Eighth Army to establish Transnistria as an unrecognized breakaway state outside of Moldova’s control. The political will for reunification was destroyed as a result of these events. All of the above led the country to remain in Russia’s continued orbit well into independence. This reality solidified cultural differences with Romanians, ensured the Russian language remained the inter-ethnic lingua franca, and explains why most Moldovans do not consider themselves Romanian. Even the Moldovan government shies away from tackling the issue of ethnic/national identity head-on.

There is also a formidable economic obstacle. Romania could not easily afford reunification.

Moldova is considerably poorer, and bringing its wages, infrastructure and living standards close to Romania’s would cost tens of billions of US dollars, or three per cent of Romania’s GDP, every year. Currently, Romania’s inflation is a staggering 9.6 per cent, the highest in the EU, and its budget deficit is also remarkable at five per cent. As such, Romania struggles to even borrow money for its basic government needs, and its credit worthiness is one step away from “Junk”. In other words, Romania cannot hope to afford Moldova’s integration until it sorts its finances out, and avoids an economic crisis. Only then can it convince creditors that it is a trustworthy borrower that follows the Maastricht criteria.

Unification is therefore difficult to imagine under present conditions. But neither condition is permanent. The key is time, which is on neither country’s side. Four years is, in theory, enough for Romania to repair its economy. However, it currently lacks a functioning government – finding a stable, pro-EU government that would also have the power to carry out painful reforms is an enormous task.

By the early 2030s, Moldova could have spent a decade reforming its institutions and orienting itself towards Europe, only to find EU membership blocked by governments elsewhere in the bloc. Or on the contrary, it could find Moldova completely unprepared on an internal basis. Public opinion could very well shift – the union of 1918 showed that pragmatic needs far outweigh ideology for Moldovans. With over 50 per cent of them working overseas, the top priority for them is to secure a high enough standard of living and political stability so as to return home, and if joining the EU independently fails for whatever reason, reunification may be their answer.

Under those circumstances, a proposition that cannot command majority support today might suddenly become much more attractive.

Sandu is therefore right not to present unification as an alternative to EU accession at the moment. Doing so could divide Moldova and undermine the accession process while there is still a realistic chance of success. But the idea should not be dismissed as historical fantasy either. Its future depends less on whether Moldovans suddenly rediscover a Romanian identity than on what happens to Europe itself.

If the EU remains open to enlargement, Moldova will have little reason to surrender its independence. If that door closes, Romania may become Moldova’s only remaining way through it.

Max Mihailovici is a Ratiu Journalism Programme Mentee and UCL History (SSEES) alumnus writing on current geopolitical issues, mostly focusing on the former Soviet sphere.