Time to rethink sanctions against Russia: a realistic way ahead

Since Russia’s first phase of aggression against Ukraine in 2014, sanctions have been one of the West’s key instruments for responding to Moscow’s aggressive policy. The recent US decision to allow Russian diesel onto the market ahead of the midterms has reopened the debate about the purpose of these restrictions. From a Ukrainian perspective, it looks as if those who imposed the sanctions have forgotten why they did so, and are now trading them away.

Formally, as of late 2026, more than 28,000 international sanctions have been imposed on Russia since 2014, making it one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world. The most significant restrictions came after the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Yet one question remains unanswered: can sanctions truly work when the states imposing them take months to decide, while the state they target uses those same months to prepare?

The problem is not only whether sanctions work

The Russian case shows that the key issue is not only whether sanctions are effective, but how quickly they are implemented. The process differs depending on who makes the decision. The European Union adopts restrictions in “sanctions packages” that often take months to prepare and negotiate. Internal disagreements add further delays. Because EU sanctions require unanimity, any member state can veto, delay or block new measures. The 18th package, adopted in July 2025, is a clear example: Slovakia held up its approval for weeks. The package lowered the price cap on Russian oil from 60 to 47.60 US dollars per barrel, banned transactions with 22 more Russian banks, and added 14 individuals and 41 entities to the sanctions list. Unanimity is meant to keep member states together, but it also slows down the very foreign policy measures designed to protect the Union.

The United States, by contrast, has two main mechanisms for imposing sanctions. The first is presidential authority. The president has broad powers to impose sanctions and these are based on laws enacted by Congress. Acting through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the State Department, the executive branch can impose sanctions swiftly and increase pressure on an aggressor state. One example is Executive Order 14114, “Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities”, which was signed by President Joe Biden on December 22nd 2023. It expanded the authority to sanction foreign financial institutions that support Russia’s military-industrial base. This showed that the executive branch can rapidly widen the tools of pressure, including against entities outside Russia.

The second is the legislative process. A bill must be introduced in the House of Representatives or the Senate, go through hearings and amendments, and pass both chambers. Negotiations between the chambers and the administration can prolong the process. The advantage is that legislation can set sanctions policy for the long term and define the conditions under which restrictions may be tightened or eased. The REPO for Ukrainians Act, signed into law on April 24th 2024, is an example. It established a legal framework for confiscating certain Russian sovereign assets held in US jurisdiction and using them for Ukraine’s benefit.

Overall, the United States leads in the number of sanctions imposed. From 2014 through to autumn 2026, OFAC and other US agencies issued roughly 7,500 to 8,000 designations, which covered individuals, entities and sectoral restrictions. Yet volume alone does not solve the core problem. Lengthy decision-making gives the targeted state time to prepare for new restrictions, soften their economic impact and, above all, develop ways to bypass them.

Lengthy decision-making creates time for adaptation

Adopting new sanctions often takes weeks or even months. While governments negotiate, Russia has both the time and the opportunity to adapt. This means not only changing trade routes but also building mechanisms to evade future restrictions.

The 2022 EU oil embargo is a case in point. On May 4th, the European Commission proposed the sixth package of sanctions, which envisaged a gradual phase-out of Russian oil imports. Because of disagreements among member states, particularly Hungary’s opposition, the package was not formally adopted until June 3rd. It allowed six months to phase out crude oil and eight months for petroleum products. The ban on seaborne imports of Russian crude came into effect on December 5th 2022, and the ban on petroleum products only became active in February 2023. While the EU was trying to restrict Russia’s oil trade, Moscow had the better part of a year to reroute it.

Months of negotiation open a window before sanctions take effect. During this time, it often becomes clear which sector will face the greatest pressure, whether it is economic, military or industrial. As a result, circumvention has become an integral part of the sanctions system.

Sanctions evasion is now part of the system

It is no secret that Russia operates a “shadow fleet” of ageing tankers that frequently change or conceal their flags to evade international sanctions. Despite efforts since 2022 to curb this problem, it has still not been solved. Russia has also turned to third countries, which help it obtain dual-use goods that should be restricted. Three countries play a particularly significant role: China, India and North Korea. Despite the restrictions, China remains Russia’s largest trading partner. India has become one of the largest buyers of Russian oil since 2022. North Korea, itself under international sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s military-industrial partner. For this reason, the effectiveness of sanctions today depends not only on their substance, but also on the ability to identify and block evasion schemes before they become entrenched.

A new paradigm of sanctions should prioritize speed

Sanctions policy requires a fundamental rethink. The key question is no longer how comprehensive the next package will be, but how quickly it can be adopted and how hard it will be to get around. Uncertainty about implementation further weakens the practical impact of restrictions. Ukraine, meanwhile, is often forced to raise the issue publicly, as diplomatic appeals behind closed doors rarely result in a timely response. Public statements become a way to keep international attention on sanctions and to press partners to act.

Sanctions should not be a political instrument adjusted to short-term economic pressures or shifting political priorities. Yet this is exactly what happened in October 2026, when the United States temporarily authorized certain transactions involving Russian diesel fuel until April 7th 2027. The decision exposes the tension between the strategic goals of sanctions and short-term economic needs. Temporary exemptions may serve legitimate purposes. Without clear strategic criteria, however, they undermine the coherence of the whole regime. Sanctions should therefore be embedded in a long-term policy framework with transparent conditions for both tightening and easing them. A modernized sanctions framework should rest on three priorities. First, the time between political agreement and implementation must be shortened. Second, enforcement must be strengthened by monitoring the actors and networks that facilitate evasion. Third, sanctions regimes must be updated as international circumstances change, rather than left static.

Ukraine’s partners should be aware of the right tools and not send the wrong signals

The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which was named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham and signed into law on September 18th, points in this direction. It combines primary sanctions against Russia with secondary measures against third countries that keep buying Russian energy or help Russia evade restrictions. Secondary tariffs on those buyers may prove more effective than adding names to designation lists. This combination could become a model for sanctions policy, one that leaves Russia less room to adapt and raises the cost for those who help it.

That is precisely why Ukrainians and Europeans are so frustrated by President Donald Trump’s decision on Russian diesel. Coming just weeks after the new law, it sends the opposite signal. The West must apply sanctions quicker than Russia can adapt if it wants to shorten the war rather than merely document it. The West must also stop trading sanctions away whenever the political moment seems to demand it. Otherwise, sanctions will keep losing the race against time, while Ukraine continues to pay the price in lives.

Alina Krasnovyd is a Ukrainian political expert.

Vladyslav Faraponov is President of the Kyiv-based Institute of American Studies and a media analyst at Truman.