COP31: Resistance Against Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Greenwashing

Green European Journal

As Türkiye prepares to host the world’s largest climate summit in Antalya, official rhetoric is concealing energy policies that deepen dependence on fossil fuels. Although COP31 has become yet another display of “greenwashing,” grassroots movements in Türkiye continue to resist exploitative authoritarian repression and fight for energy democracy and ecological justice.

As Türkiye prepares to host the world’s largest climate summit in Antalya, official rhetoric is concealing energy policies that deepen dependence on fossil fuels. Although COP31 has turned into yet another “greenwashing” spectacle, grassroots movements in Türkiye continue to resist exploitative authoritarian repression and to struggle for energy democracy and ecological justice.

The 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP31) will be held in Antalya from 9 to 20 November. The summit, promoted as an “Implementation COP,” is hoped to lay the groundwork for a global consensus on emissions reductions and the gradual phase-out of fossil fuels.

It is highly uncertain whether this year’s climate summit will achieve its goals, given that it is convening under the shadow of geopolitical rivalries and tensions. On the one hand, China, the world’s leading producer of clean energy, is objecting to Western tariffs imposed on the green technologies it produces, from solar panels and wind turbines to batteries and electric vehicles; on the other, the United States under the Trump 2.0 administration has once again turned toward fossil fuels. The European Union, shaken by disruptions in oil and natural gas supply chains, is gradually narrowing its green policies on the grounds of global competitiveness, despite the intensifying climate crisis.

Within this broader picture, Türkiye is preparing to host COP31 as a country that imports almost all of the fossil fuels that meet approximately two-thirds of its energy needs. In this context, one of the summit’s most prominent agenda items is Türkiye’s “35 by 35” proposal. This proposal represents an ambitious call to increase the global share of electricity, currently around 20%, to 35% of the world’s energy demand by 2035. Under President Erdoğan, Türkiye is openly pursuing its strategic goal of becoming the main fossil-fuel transit hub between the Middle East and Europe. At the same time, it is both deepening cooperation with China on mining, critical minerals, renewables and nuclear energy, while also fueling regional tensions with Greece and the EU by increasing oil and natural gas exploration activities in the Mediterranean.

This duality suggests that the government sees COP31 as an unparalleled opportunity to cover up the prolonged economic crisis. In other words, for Erdoğan, climate diplomacy is not an ecological commitment; rather, it offers pragmatic ground for securing foreign capital flows and renewing international legitimacy in an environment where social opposition has been silenced.

Continuing the Greenwashing

In essence, just as previous host countries Egypt (COP27), the UAE (COP28) and Azerbaijan (COP29) used their summits for massive energy deals, while Brazil (COP30) continued oil auctions immediately before the summit, Türkiye is approaching COP31 through a dual strategy. At this point, the discourse of global electrification both conceals profound policy contradictions and markets Türkiye as the new destination for global clean technology.

Another manifestation of this situation can be seen in the government’s calls for Western actors to redirect their defense budgets toward climate finance while negotiating with China on battery investments. At the same time, domestically, the government is organizing high-profile events such as the state-backed “NextGenCOP30.5” youth summit on Yassıada, known as “Democracy and Freedom Island,” a symbol of the 1960 coup whose image in public memory it is attempting to erase.

The government’s dual strategy is also evident in its announcement that it will continue increasing emissions until 2035 rather than gradually phasing out coal use. Moreover, having put new natural gas agreements into effect, the government has activated urgent expropriation decrees in line with domestic exploration activities. All this confirms that COP31 is another “greenwashing” maneuver for a government that is actually increasing emissions and feeding fossil-fuel infrastructure.

Indeed, these contradictions reached a peak on 10 October, when a presidential decree was issued authorizing urgent land expropriations across Antalya and the Mediterranean coast in order to accelerate oil and natural gas exploration led by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). In fact, Türkiye’s institutional practice of “greenwashing” has already permeated its official commitments under the 2053 net-zero target. The state’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) promises a 41% reduction by 2030, but because this is based on a projection in which no measures are taken regarding fossil-fuel consumption, it effectively amounts to a commitment to increase emissions above their current level. Moreover, the policy landscape became even more complicated when Türkiye’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) came into force in August. Rather than imposing binding emissions limits on polluters, the system may serve to legitimize and perpetuate industrial pollution by providing emissions rights that can be traded.

In this context, it would not be wrong to say that absolute reduction targets have been deferred to an uncertain future in Türkiye, where emissions are projected to rise by 16% by 2035. Indeed, the European Commission’s Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) 2026 data show that Türkiye has risen two places in the global emissions ranking, becoming the world’s 14th-largest greenhouse-gas polluter, while increasing its share of global emissions to 1.13%.

Ultimately, behind the government’s climate diplomacy lies a familiar calculation aimed at preserving the regime. Just as growth in the construction and energy sectors was instrumentalized to consolidate political hegemony after the 2008 crisis, the government now regards the ESG funds and green loans that COP31 may bring as critical lifelines for stimulating economic activity during the 2028 presidential election process. These resources constitute vital sources of liquidity, particularly for managing the pressures of the macroeconomic crisis. Inflation, which reached a peak of 85% and has hardened around the 30% range, together with the Turkish lira’s loss of more than 80% of its value, is forcing the government to seek new sources of rent and capital.

Disabling Renewable Energy

On the other hand, when we examine the national grid data of the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ), it becomes clear that the structure of the energy system lies at the root of many problems related to the expansion of renewable energy. First, fossil fuels account for the largest share, making up 38% of total installed capacity, including 19% imported natural gas. Of the remaining 62% described as “renewable energy,” 40% consists of hydropower projects that disrupt river regimes, deepen regional water crises and trigger social opposition because they leave not even a drop of water for local communities. Solar accounts for 21% of installed capacity and wind for 15%.

However, this picture does not explain how Türkiye uses its renewable-energy potential. Looking at actual generation levels through Ember Climate data, it becomes clear that the fundamental problem lies in structural constraints. While solar accounted for only 6% in January 2026, even in June, one of the months with the year’s highest solar potential, its share of total electricity generation remained at 16.5%, while wind’s share stood at only 13.5%. By contrast, countries such as Portugal and Italy, which have similar solar conditions, regularly meet 20% to 30% of monthly electricity generation from solar during the summer months. In Italy, solar’s share can even exceed 40% of total demand during periods of high generation. Germany, meanwhile, despite having only one-third of Türkiye’s solar potential, can produce more than 20% of its summer electricity from solar by using its infrastructure capacity and grid flexibility efficiently.

Addressing these structural deficiencies indicates that an urgent and fundamental change of direction is essential. Yet although Türkiye has officially committed, under its 2053 net-zero targets, to bringing 120 GW of solar and wind capacity online by 2035, there is still no concrete and transparent roadmap. Not only has there been no progress toward these targets, but existing solar capacity remains trapped in a vicious cycle because of institutional and administrative barriers. The current legal framework does not encourage households and local communities to feed the electricity they generate back into the grid, while small-scale projects are condemned to struggle with chronic problems such as bureaucratic obstacles, burdensome licensing procedures and insufficient grid capacity.

What makes these problems even more complex is that, while small-scale initiatives are systematically obstructed, land allocations and financial incentives flow directly to major capital groups and international partnerships. Despite possessing a huge solar-energy potential of 185 GW and 300 sunny days a year, Türkiye has signed an intergovernmental agreement opening energy production on its territory to Saudi Arabia, just as it has done through the opaque Akkuyu partnership established with Russia for nuclear energy.

In domestic rhetoric, the government markets these international agreements as “zero-cost” investments that will bring huge facilities to Türkiye. In reality, these agreements reduce Türkiye from the owner of the energy produced in its own geography to a buyer dependent on foreign capital. In other words, through these projects, which serve as a lifeline for the government as it prepares for the presidential election, the government is pushing the country into a severe cycle of economic dependence in the long term. Moreover, when renewable-energy projects are imposed from above through the coercive apparatus of the state and centralized practices, they inevitably fuel local resistance by triggering a wave of dispossession in rural areas and on urban peripheries.

The Nuclear Gamble

The chronic external dependence in Türkiye’s energy policy has increased further through the nuclear projects the government has stubbornly pursued for years. Moreover, the government’s 2053 net-zero strategy officially includes a target of 20 GW of nuclear capacity. Accordingly, in addition to the 4.8 GW Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant currently under construction, plans call for a 5.6 GW project in Thrace, a 4.8 GW project in Sinop, and the purchase of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) for another 4.8 GW.

Yet the Akkuyu project alone is enough to show that this nuclear agenda is afflicted by extremely serious structural dead ends. Although 16 full years have passed since the intergovernmental agreement with Russia was signed, not a single reactor has yet entered commercial operation or contributed to energy production. This is nearly twice the global average construction period of seven to eight years. Moreover, contrary to the government’s claims, Akkuyu NPP, built under a “Build-Own-Operate” (BOO) financing model, does not reduce energy dependence on Russia. On the contrary, because a foreign state has been granted direct ownership and operating rights over land within Türkiye’s sovereign territory, it further deepens Türkiye’s strategic dependence on Russia. Furthermore, officials’ claim that “Akkuyu will meet 10% of electricity demand” is merely a statistical illusion. Given the political leadership’s claim that electricity consumption will approach 500 TWh by 2035, it is clear that Akkuyu’s estimated annual generation of 35 TWh could meet only 7% to 8% of total demand.

This structural mismatch becomes even more severe under worsening ecological conditions. Akkuyu nuclear plant was designed to draw cooling water from the Mediterranean, which is warming 20% faster than the global average. It is now widely understood that climate-related drought raises the risk of forced operational shutdowns for nuclear plants that draw cooling water from the sea when cooling water warms, and for facilities on rivers when warming causes water levels to fall. Yet instead of adapting the ecological measures required for Akkuyu NPP to this harsh climate reality, the government is providing project-specific legal exemptions. One of the most striking examples is the effective removal of the previously stipulated 35°C limit through a regulatory amendment made specifically for Akkuyu NPP.

The project’s waste-management framework reflects the most dangerous aspect of the structural inequality in the distribution of risk. Although official rhetoric claims that spent nuclear fuel will be managed domestically, existing legal regulations and international practice indicate that waste from Akkuyu NPP’s VVER-1200 reactors will be sent to Russia for reprocessing. One of the main reasons is that Russian federal law prohibits the permanent storage of foreign radioactive waste on Russian territory. In this respect, after strategic materials such as plutonium and uranium are separated in Russia, the return of the remaining high-level radioactive waste to Türkiye can be expected to be a legal obligation. This alone sufficiently explains that the Akkuyu NPP project allows Russia to acquire valuable materials for industrial and military purposes while leaving Türkiye with the permanent management of high-level radioactive waste that will pose a deadly threat for up to one million years.

The nuclear-waste legacy will force the government to confront a chronic long-term disposal crisis, requiring Türkiye eventually to build a deep geological repository (DGR) for managing these long-lived isotopes. This means launching a massive infrastructure project costing billions of euros, similar to Finland’s Onkalo facility, designed to isolate waste safely for 100,000 years. Yet in Türkiye, even the selection of a site for a radioactive-waste facility is being conducted from the top down because of the centralized and authoritarian administrative structure. Indeed, in 2022 it was reported that the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources had considered Polatlı, a relatively seismically stable agricultural area near the capital Ankara, as a potential location for a radioactive-waste facility without the slightest consultation with local people or any attempt to seek social consent.

In addition to its environmental and strategic risks, the Akkuyu NPP project is also incompatible with Türkiye’s labor market and technical capacity. Although official sources claimed that employment through subcontractors had at one point approached 30,000, this number has fallen to 10,000 even during the construction phase because of the economic crisis and shocks caused by the war in Ukraine. Once the plant begins operation, this figure will shrink further, leaving only around 4,000 long-term operational staff. Moreover, since the special provisions of the BOO agreement signed between Türkiye and Russia explicitly exclude technology transfer, local engineers and technical personnel will be restricted to lower- and mid-level support roles, perpetuating structural dependence on foreign expertise. This institutional inadequacy is not accidental; its roots extend to the administrative purges following the 12 September military coup. During the post-1980 neoliberal restructuring process, Türkiye’s public nuclear research memory and trained scientific personnel were dismantled and severely damaged, leaving the sector effectively under tutelage.

Resistance and Repression

The issuance of 22,855 mining licenses and receipt of 13,342 initial applications in Türkiye between 2018 and 2025 demonstrate numerically how agricultural lands and ecologically sensitive habitats are being systematically transformed into rent-generating and mining zones. On the ground, as mining concessions and large-scale energy projects expand recklessly, administrative and legal pressure on civil society and local ecological movements is escalating simultaneously. By reducing Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) processes to formalities and effectively restricting public participation in decision-making mechanisms, the central government systematically suppresses local resistance through violence, criminalizing every form of objection and opposition in the public sphere in order to force submission to state-backed capital projects.

In this respect, it has become clear in recent years that the common denominator of COP host countries is not only high carbon emissions, but also regimes that have institutionalized authoritarian rule, rejecting every mechanism for dialogue with social opposition. In Türkiye, too, popular movements rising against ecological destruction projects have faced unprecedented state violence and siege, particularly since the state of emergency declared and made permanent after the 2016 coup attempt.

Today, environmental activism in Türkiye has moved beyond narrow urban intellectual debates. As state-protected mining and energy plunder spreads into the veins of the countryside, it has become a legitimate line of self-defense in which villagers and local communities directly and fiercely defend their lands, waters and living spaces. As documented by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the regime does not hesitate to use the judicial cudgel, arbitrary waves of detention and heavy administrative fines as systematic tools of intimidation in order to break this grassroots resistance.

At the forefront of these struggles is the resistance in Akbelen Forest in Muğla, where villagers have erected barricades against the expansion of a coal mine since 2019. In this struggle, where the political leadership deployed law-enforcement forces to the site almost as the company’s private security force in order to guarantee private companies’ mining and logging activities, nonviolent protesters exercising their constitutional rights were repeatedly dispersed with water cannons, tear gas and batons. Local residents and rights defenders were subjected to arbitrary arrests, heavy administrative fines and constant identity checks around the protest sites. In essence, this is a systematic strategy of spatial surveillance and intimidation aimed at paralyzing the center of resistance through a blockade and extinguishing social opposition.

A similar wave of dispossession and repression was displayed in the Black Sea region during the resistance against a gold-mining project on the Perşembe Plateau. This high-altitude plateau, stretching between Ordu’s Korgan and Aybastı districts, is the main living space of local communities that have made their livelihoods from animal husbandry and traditional transhumance for centuries. Although the area legally holds protected pasture status, the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change approved the mining license behind closed doors in 2024 without seeking any public consent. Local people learned of the project when the first drilling operations at the site directly contaminated drinking-water and irrigation basins. In June 2026, a court-appointed panel of experts officially confirmed these concerns, explicitly reporting that gold extraction through cyanide leaching would cause irreversible ecological destruction of groundwater reserves. Despite this legal confirmation and ongoing lawsuits, law-enforcement forces once again suppressed the peaceful actions of people defending their pasture and water with pepper spray, water cannons and waves of arbitrary detention.

A similar wave of violence was exposed in all its starkness when a state-backed logistics port opened a limestone quarry in Rize’s İkizdere Valley to supply raw materials. To break popular anger against this quarry project, which would directly dry up the region’s ancient tea gardens, old-growth forests and vital water resources, the government issued urgent expropriation decrees under the guise of “public order” and imposed movement restrictions throughout the district reminiscent of a state of emergency. Despite the gendarmerie blockade and heavy administrative penalties, local residents, especially under the militant leadership of women from the area, turned resistance into a banner: they blocked construction machinery through road protests, used their bodies as shields for the trees and defended the grounds of legal legitimacy to the very end.

Authoritarian “Greenwashing” and Energy Democracy

All these examples demonstrate how Turkish state institutions and the security apparatus act as an organic and coordinated bloc to guarantee the seizure of natural resources and living spaces by capital interests. By bypassing every genuine mechanism of consultation with society, disregarding court decisions and scientific expert reports, and systematically criminalizing peaceful protests, the political leadership is effectively eliminating public participation in decision-making processes. As a result, it is clear that in Türkiye the rhetoric of “regional development” and “energy security” amounts to nothing more than capital power backed by state authority, while local communities’ lands, waters and centuries-old livelihoods are being seized through a systematic regime of dispossession.

The case of Türkiye clearly demonstrates that in authoritarian regimes where domestic opposition is systematically crushed, international climate summits offer host governments the opportunity to market a “progressive” image on the global stage and hunt for foreign capital in a sterile environment entirely free of political scrutiny. For global capital circles and international investors, this authoritarian administrative model creates maximum predictability: social objections are blocked, legal obstacles are resolved with a “single signature,” and environmental costs are rendered invisible. Thus, mega energy projects and enormous infrastructure contracts are secured in complete isolation from all mechanisms of democratic negotiation and public oversight.

Civil society, excluded from the regime’s playing field, has built grassroots networks such as the People’s Climate Summit (HİZ) in order to raise a common and constitutive voice against COP31. By embracing the local resistances that emerged in Akbelen, the Perşembe Plateau and İkizdere, these networks are building a historic bridge of solidarity among the ecology, labor and human-rights movements. Challenging projects of capital accumulation that exploit nature and people, and raising the demand for “energy democracy” by returning decision-making rights to local communities, these alliances are shaping the most vital alternative vision of a just transition and pointing to the possibility of ecological justice and democratic transformation.