Russia struggling for influence in the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus is frequently described as a geopolitical space situated “between” larger powers, a formulation that reduces it to a passive object of external competition and obscures its enduring structural role within broader trans-regional dynamics. In reality, the region has long functioned as a strategic corridor linking Europe to the Caspian basin, Central Asia, and the wider Eurasian systems of exchange, energy transit, and political interaction. However, only under current geopolitical conditions is this role being operationalized in practice.

The post-2022 security environment, shaped by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the resulting push to diversify transportation routes, has reduced dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure. It has also encouraged alternative energy corridors and elevated the functional importance of the South Caucasus, allowing its hidden transit potential to be more fully realized. This process, however, remains contested, as Russia simultaneously seeks to preserve and reconstruct a buffer zone along its periphery by exploiting internal vulnerabilities and constraining external alignment. The region thus emerges as a strategic environment defined by the tension between two competing logics: one that advances connectivity and diversification, and another that reproduces dependency and limits sovereignty.

Russia’s buffer logic

Russia’s approach to the South Caucasus is best understood through a model of influence that prioritizes control without formal incorporation and overt territorial expansion. As a result, it predominantly relies on the systematic production of constrained sovereignty. This buffer logic operates by ensuring that neighbouring states remain politically fragmented, institutionally weakened, and strategically ambiguous, limiting their capacity to integrate into alternative geopolitical and institutional frameworks.

The instruments through which this logic is implemented are varied but interconnected, including the maintenance of unresolved conflicts, economic entanglement, disinformation campaigns, and the exploitation of domestic political divisions. These mechanisms usually represent a system, reinforcing one another in ways that sustain influence over time without requiring constant escalation. Their effectiveness lies precisely in their ability to operate below the threshold of open confrontation between stability and instability, where external pressure is diffused through internal processes. This model relies on shaping the conditions under which political decisions are made, limiting the range of available options for neighbouring states. The outcome is a form of indirect control in which sovereignty is formally maintained but substantively constrained, allowing Russia to preserve strategic depth while avoiding the costs associated with direct domination. Importantly, buffer conditions are not imposed unilaterally but emerge through interaction between external pressure and internal vulnerability. Where governance is weak and political fragmentation is pronounced, external influence becomes more effective and less visible. In this sense, Russia’s strategy is not only about exerting pressure, but about amplifying existing structural weaknesses in ways that align with its broader objectives.

The growing strategic importance of the South Caucasus is closely tied to international efforts to expand transport, trade, and energy connections that bypass Russian-controlled routes and reduce Europe’s dependence on Moscow. Central to this process is the so-called Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. This project links China and Central Asia to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, all before continuing toward Turkey and European markets. At the same time, initiatives such as the Trans-Regional Infrastructure and Peace Platform seek to institutionalize regional cooperation by connecting transport infrastructure, energy networks, and political stabilization efforts across the South Caucasus, potentially including Armenia alongside Azerbaijan and Georgia. Together, these projects illustrate how the region is being integrated into alternative Eurasian connectivity networks that serve not only economic purposes, but also broader geopolitical goals. In this framework, connectivity has become a mechanism of strategic diversification, allowing European and regional actors to reduce reliance on Russian transit corridors while strengthening the South Caucasus as a critical link between Europe and Asia.

Strategic consequences

Yet, the implementation of such projects depends on political and institutional conditions that remain uneven across the region. Infrastructure alone cannot guarantee functionality, as effective corridors require governance stability, regulatory coherence, and security arrangements that ensure predictability and continuity. Without these conditions, connectivity remains vulnerable to disruption, not necessarily through direct intervention but through the gradual erosion of the systems that sustain it.

Within this context, Georgia occupies a central and structurally indispensable position. Its geography makes it the primary land bridge connecting the Black Sea to the South Caucasus and onward to Central Asia while bypassing Russian and Iranian territory. As such, its internal political trajectory has direct and far-reaching implications for the viability of regional connectivity and the broader strategic balance. The ongoing democratic crisis in the country, characterized by the consolidation of power within the ruling elite, the diminishing autonomy of independent institutions, and the suppression of dissent, is increasingly eroding Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic trajectory and weakening its overall alignment with the West.

This shift has direct strategic consequences, as declining trust and reduced political alignment constrain the depth of cooperation and weaken Georgia’s role as a credible partner within the existing or emerging transit frameworks. Thus, regional implications are systemic since a politically unstable or externally influenced Georgia introduces structural vulnerabilities into corridor systems, affecting regulatory predictability, investment confidence, and the overall reliability of transit routes. Under such conditions, the corridor is not dismantled but functionally degraded, as infrastructure remains intact while its strategic utility becomes progressively constrained through the gradual erosion of the political and institutional conditions necessary for sustained connectivity.

Armenia’s trajectory adds another layer of complexity to the region. In recent years, Yerevan has sought to strengthen relations with the West and reduce its dependence on Russia, particularly after the deterioration of its security ties with Moscow. Yet this shift remains fragile and only weakly institutionalized. It is driven mainly by the current leadership’s political orientation and by short-term security concerns, rather than by a broad strategic consensus supported by state institutions, economic structures, or long-term security arrangements. As a result, Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation lacks the structural foundations needed to endure domestic political change, external pressure, or shifts in the regional balance of power. This makes the process highly vulnerable to reversal.

At the same time, western engagement has not kept pace with the strategic implications of this shift. Although political dialogue and support have increased, western involvement remains largely reactive, responding to developments rather than shaping them. It has not translated into a comprehensive framework that would secure Armenia within a stable alternative order through sustained economic integration, long-term investment, or credible security guarantees. This gap between political signalling and structural commitment limits the effectiveness of western engagement and reinforces Armenia’s strategic uncertainty. Thus, Armenia’s role within the emerging corridor remains constrained, as its capacity to contribute to regional connectivity is undermined by the absence of stable alignment and predictable external support.

Taken together, these dynamics demonstrate that the functioning of the South Caucasus as an effective corridor is constrained not by geography, but by the interaction between internal governance and external engagement, meaning that where resilience is weak and alignment is ambiguous, corridor potential remains underutilized and vulnerable to reversal.

Fragmented engagement

The West’s approach to the South Caucasus has expanded in recent years, but it remains fragmented and strategically inconsistent. The European Union has increased its engagement through initiatives such as the Global Gateway, a large-scale connectivity strategy designed to finance transport, energy, and digital infrastructure linking Europe with neighbouring regions. It has also promoted the Economic and Investment Plan, which supports regional development projects and infrastructure investment across the Eastern Partnership states. Alongside these initiatives, the West has played a more active diplomatic role by mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This has been done through linking political cooperation to governance and reform standards.

NATO, meanwhile, continues to rely on existing partnership mechanisms such as the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and Individual Partnership Action Plans. These frameworks encourage defence reforms, joint training, and political cooperation, but they do not provide a credible path towards deeper integration or membership. The US has also remained involved, particularly through diplomatic mediation and support for regional connectivity initiatives, including projects linked to the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). However, American engagement has been intermittent and largely diplomacy-driven, rather than part of a long-term and comprehensive regional strategy.

This pattern reveals a gap between strategic recognition and practical implementation. Although the growing importance of the South Caucasus is widely acknowledged, fragmented western policies are often directed at individual states or sectors rather than the region as a whole. Connectivity projects are rarely coordinated with governance reforms, while security cooperation remains detached from broader economic integration efforts.

The consequences are significant. Isolated conditionality weakens incentives for reform when it is not backed by credible long-term commitments, while selective engagement creates asymmetries that competing powers can exploit. This contributes to uneven institutional resilience, inconsistent investment frameworks, and limited security guarantees across the region. Most importantly, the absence of a sustained strategic framework undermines western credibility, leaving regional actors uncertain about the depth and durability of western engagement.

This strategic incoherence creates a permissive environment in which buffer logic can persist and adapt. By failing to integrate connectivity, governance, and security into a unified approach, western policy does not counterbalance structural vulnerabilities but, in effect, allows them to proliferate. This dynamic is directly relevant to the broader question of whether a return to business as usual in the South Caucasus with Russia is feasible. After all, it demonstrates that current challenges are rooted not in temporary disruptions but in enduring systemic gaps within the existing policy framework.

Systemic test

The idea that the West can return to pre-2022 patterns of engagement with Russia in the South Caucasus rests on a fundamental misreading of how Russia exercises influence in its neighbourhood. Russia’s approach is not reactive or situational but structured around a durable model that seeks to prevent the consolidation of alternative regional orders by maintaining neighbouring states in conditions of limited sovereignty. Instead of depending on large-scale military presence, this model operates through a combination of political leverage, economic dependency, manipulation of unresolved conflicts, and the promotion of institutional fragility. The persistence of Russian influence in regional states and the broader reliance on ambiguity to shape regional alignments illustrate that this strategy remains operational even under the constraints imposed by the war in Ukraine. Under these conditions, any attempt to “normalize” relations without addressing these mechanisms would not stabilize the region but would effectively legitimize their continued use.

The strategic implications of this model are amplified by the evolving role of the South Caucasus within wider European and Eurasian systems. Emerging regional projects are instruments of geopolitical diversification. If the South Caucasus is reconfigured into a buffer space characterized by political uncertainty and constrained alignment, these initiatives become structurally vulnerable, reintroducing dependencies that recent western policies have sought to reduce. The consequences of such a shift would extend beyond infrastructure.

A “bufferized” South Caucasus would fragment the Black Sea security environment by weakening the link between maritime and land-based connectivity, reducing coherence in regional deterrence, and complicating coordination among western and partner states. At the same time, it would signal that indirect forms of influence are sufficient in preventing the consolidation of alternative regional orders, encouraging the replication of similar strategies in other regions. In this sense, the South Caucasus is not only a regional case but a systemic test of whether the West can effectively counter models of influence based on ambiguity and indirect control.

Preventing this trajectory requires a shift from fragmented engagement to a structured regional strategy that directly targets the mechanisms through which buffer conditions are produced. First, the West should treat connectivity as a strategic system and not a set of infrastructure projects. This means integrating transport, energy, and digital corridors into a coherent framework that is supported by regulatory harmonization, financial instruments, and long-term investment commitments. Second, governance and institutional resilience must be elevated from a normative objective to a strategic priority. Support for judicial independence, anti-corruption frameworks, and regulatory capacity should be directly linked to the functioning of corridor systems, recognizing that infrastructure without governance cannot deliver strategic outcomes.

Third, western security engagement in the South Caucasus needs to be adjusted to reflect the region’s growing strategic importance. Existing partnership frameworks should be reassessed to ensure that efforts to strengthen deterrence and defence cooperation remain consistent with democratic principles. Otherwise, continued security cooperation with states experiencing democratic backsliding may unintentionally legitimize authoritarian governance instead of promoting long-term strategic alignment. Fourth, western actors need to reduce policy fragmentation by improving coordination across institutions. EU, NATO and US initiatives should be integrated into a common strategic framework rather than continuing as parallel and sometimes disconnected efforts.

Finally, western policy must explicitly reject the re-emergence of buffer logic as an acceptable organizing principle in the region. This requires moving beyond reactive crisis management towards the proactive shaping of the strategic environment, ensuring that no part of the South Caucasus is left in a condition of managed ambiguity or limited sovereignty. The objective is not only to prevent the re-emergence of Cold War-style dividing lines, but to ensure that they are not reconstituted in more diffuse and indirect forms under contemporary conditions.

The central implication is clear. A return to business as usual would not restore stability but would instead encourage the reconfiguration of the South Caucasus into a constrained geopolitical space defined by dependency and fragmentation. Preventing this outcome requires sustained, coordinated, and strategically integrated engagement that addresses both the visible manifestations and the underlying drivers of Russian influence. The question is no longer whether the South Caucasus matters, but whether the West is prepared to act in a manner consistent with its strategic significance. Without such an approach, the strategic value of the region will remain only partially realized. The choice, therefore, is not between engagement and disengagement, but between shaping the region’s trajectory as a functioning corridor or allowing it to revert to a constrained buffer, with consequences that will extend far beyond the region itself.

 

Megi Benia is a contributing editor of New Eastern Europe as well as the founder and director of the Strategic Security Initiative, specializing in international security, Russia’s destabilizing operations, cybersecurity and resilience, NATO adaptation, Euro-Atlantic security, and US-Russia strategic competition.