Europe cannot build a Russia policy on a ceasefire alone

A credible shift in Europe’s Moscow policy would likely require the end of Putin's rule or a fundamental change in the Kremlin's strategic outlook. Attempts at a de-escalation have so far only encouraged further escalation on the Russian side. Europe must therefore preserve its leverage in order to shape the conditions for a future Russian leadership to pursue a more predictable and peaceful relationship with its European neighbours, including countries outside the European Union.

The current US dialogue with Belarus may offer one possible model for how a partial and reversible easing of sanctions could be structured. In that case, limited US sanctions relief has been linked to the release of political prisoners. At the same time, Europe has maintained a principled position regarding the crimes of the regime in Minsk and the conditions required for lifting European sanctions. Although this approach may appear contradictory, it has proven workable as long as the United States continues to coordinate closely with its European allies and the Belarusian democratic movement.

Similarly, the United States may be willing to provide carefully calibrated incentives aimed at moving Moscow towards a ceasefire and meaningful peace negotiations. Europe maintains a principled and united position, together with the bulk of its sanctions and restrictive measures.

Europe should remain committed to the core principles underpinning its response to Russia's war of aggression. Russia should not be allowed to reap the benefits of territorial conquest achieved through force. It is expected to cooperate with international investigations into war crimes and to engage in negotiations on accountability, reparations, and restitution for the destruction caused by the war. If this position is maintained, Europe will retain leverage vis-à-vis a future leadership in Moscow and strengthen the prospects for a more sustainable European security order.

 

 

A ceasefire alone would not constitute a sufficient foundation for a new European security order. If Russia's maximalist objectives and hostile policies towards Ukraine and Europe remain unchanged, a ceasefire risks becoming merely a temporary pause in the fighting. Such a pause could provide Ukraine with an opportunity to recover, reorganize, and redirect resources towards reconstruction and long-term defence planning. At the same time, however, it would also allow Russia to reallocate military, economic, and political resources towards other arenas.

Moscow could seek to restore parts of its international influence and strategic position in regions such as Africa, the South Caucasus, and elsewhere in Europe, all while intensifying efforts to shape political developments beyond Ukraine. In this sense, a ceasefire could reduce the intensity of the war in Ukraine while simultaneously increasing the broader strategic challenge facing Europe.

The requirement to deter and contain Russia’s hostile policies would therefore remain in these circumstances. Europe's security concerns would not disappear with a cessation of hostilities but rather evolve into a different and potentially more complex phase. Any discussion regarding the easing or lifting of sanctions should consequently be assessed against the wider and longer-term security interests of Europe, not solely against developments on the battlefield in Ukraine.

It is also important to note that Europe should respond more effectively to Russia's de-colonial narrative by highlighting the continued imperial and coercive characteristics of Russian policy, both domestically and towards neighbouring states. At the same time, European policymakers must recognize that for countries such as India, Indonesia, and other states across the so-called Global South, engagement with Russia may still be viewed as a pragmatic means of diversifying strategic, economic, or political dependencies, particularly where such engagement is not perceived to generate immediate security risks.

European diplomacy should therefore address not only Russia's war against Ukraine, but also Russia's broader role in undermining international cooperation and obstructing collective responses to global challenges. This includes Russian behaviour in areas such as climate diplomacy, global health governance, human rights, democratic norms, and respect for the sovereignty of smaller states.

It is also crucial that Europe challenges attempts by Moscow to derive legitimacy from anti-imperial or anti-western narratives rooted in Soviet history. This requires articulating more clearly the nature of the contemporary Russian state and the implications of Russian foreign policy for international stability, sovereignty, and multilateral cooperation.

At the same time, Europe's credibility in defending a rules based international order has been weakened by perceptions of inconsistency in the application of international law and normative standards, including in relation to conflicts involving western partners and allies. If Europe seeks to maintain broader international support for its positions, it must demonstrate greater consistency in the defence of international law, sovereignty, and civilian protection across regions and conflicts.

This underlines the need for renewed efforts to strengthen a more inclusive and internationally legitimate order, grounded not primarily in western leadership, but in widely shared principles. Such an approach should reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This should be done while drawing on the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act linking security, human rights, and political freedoms.

In the longer term, resilient societies, institutional checks and balances, and constraints on executive power remain among the most important safeguards against revisionist and aggressive state behaviour. The European Union should therefore work together with democratic and constructive international partners to strengthen international institutions and develop a renewed framework for security and cooperation capable of addressing both geopolitical competition and the defence of fundamental rights and norms.

 

Stefan Ingvarsson is an analyst and project lead for "European Expert Talks on Russia" at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) based at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).