Deter, start small and monitor domestic policy

 This means that part of Ukraine remains de facto under Russian control. Given this starting point, those in power in Russia will continue to espouse imperialist attitudes and goals and to respect only force. For this reason, and because Europe has long neglected its security needs (or rather outsourced them to the United States), a sustained defence build-up of, and ongoing attention to, European security should occupy the highest priority.

Thus, the containment and deterrence of Russia need to become the main building block in Europe’s relationship with Moscow. This applies not only to hard security, including the strength of the armed forces and the stockpiles of available relevant equipment and munitions, but also to so-called hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, sabotage of physical infrastructure, and disinformation. While awareness of these threats has risen and the repertoire to deal with them is expanding, mechanisms must be developed to respond to them consistently and proportionally, thus conveying the message that they are unacceptable and will be countered in ways that damage Russia.

As a background condition for dealing with Russia, Europe (both on the level of individual states and as a continent) needs to work on preserving its economic strength, as well as its values in the legal sphere. This includes those established by international law and those implied by the application of the rule of law in domestic state contexts. This will not only make Europe attractive to potential partners, but also emphasize its difference from Russia and its capacity to develop a positive narrative for its population.

Another precondition for a Russia strategy is the clear articulation of European interests with regards to Moscow. These should serve as a basis for action, and any eventual cooperation with Russia ought to stem from these interests and be in line with them. Given the performance of Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression, these interests should include the ever closer integration of Kyiv into European security and defence structures.

When devising and implementing a long-term approach to Russia, the assumptions made should be based on solid analysis about Russian behaviour and interests. Sufficient resources should be made available to keep this analysis ongoing. Voices of analysts from countries neighbouring Russia, as well as those of Russian exiles, need to be taken into account. The past mistake of dismissing pessimistic assessments because they are unpleasant or seen as exaggerated must be corrected. Analysis should cover not only Russian foreign and security policy, but also domestic developments. Above all, it is important to realistically evaluate whether Moscow is interested in stabilizing the situation in Europe, or rather in destabilizing it, as is currently the case. The level of ambition set for the relationship will largely depend on the response to this question. Since Moscow’s preferences regarding this and other issues may change over time, continuous analysis is all the more important.

In addition to pursuing containment and deterrence, and to strengthening Europe as an actor, it will be necessary to establish channels of communication with Russia. Moscow is not inclined to take the EU seriously as a foreign and security policy actor, and indeed Brussels has struggled to come up with unified positions in these areas. It would therefore be better to go beyond the EU framework and rely on a mini-lateral grouping, such as the E5 (France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the United Kingdom), to agree on key European interests and on which line to take with Moscow at any given time. The group should also designate one country to take on the role of spokesperson, in order to avoid giving Russia the chance to play one state off another. It is essential for the other capitals to adhere to this agreement and to refer Moscow to the spokesperson when inevitable Russian attempts to offer attractive side deals to individual states occur. Here again, states neighbouring Russia (in addition to Poland) should periodically be consulted as they have the most experience in dealing with Moscow and are likely to be the most affected by Russian actions.

Communication should be used to transmit specific, concrete messages and to receive them from the other side. Regular dialogue formats can be postponed to a time when the relationship has stabilized and broader discussions make sense. To reach this point, small steps should be taken to begin to establish a minimum level of trust between the sides and to explore whether common interests can be found. Small steps proposed by the Russian side should be evaluated in terms of previously defined European interests. Those suggestions running counter to or failing to advance any of these interests should be refused, possibly by providing an alternative that would be acceptable to the European side. Russian demands for more radical steps as proof of European goodwill should be interpreted as a lack of serious interest in stabilizing the relationship by taking both parties’ concerns into account. The lesson provided by Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe should be learned: admitting Moscow into regional or international formats and organizations before it fulfils the necessary criteria allows Russia to hollow out such organizations from the inside and should be avoided.

When devising small steps, it is essential to take into account that the energy realm is fraught with tension and has been a source of serious division on the European side. On the other hand, it is a realm in which Moscow has great interest. It would be best to build up trust by engaging in small cooperative steps in other areas first, in order to avoid European discord. If cooperation on energy is to be contemplated, it should be paired with steps in another area that is more challenging for Russia and important to Europe, such as the treatment of neighbouring states (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia). Positive changes by Moscow in this sphere can serve as initial indications that Russia is potentially amenable to altering aspects of its imperialist approach, but this must be carefully monitored.

Major improvements in relations should not be expected. Even after a ceasefire or more long-term agreement the window of opportunity with Russia will be much more limited than in the early 1990s due to the developments of past decades and the current geopolitical environment. There should be a consistent focus on Russia’s actions rather than its words. It is not unlikely that proposals for small steps palatable to Europe will be either rejected by Moscow or accepted and then not acted upon. Deadlines for pursuing a certain course of action should therefore be set. If an attempt to take a small joint step fails to yield results within a reasonable timeframe, Europe should abandon it and move on, drawing the conclusion that Russia is not interested in cooperation in this field – or possibly in general, if the pattern manifests itself in multiple areas. Europe should not become a supplicant; the point is to locate areas of mutual interest, not to get Moscow to pretend to cooperate.

In the field of economic cooperation, much will depend on the agreements reached about sanctions in the context of the ceasefire. In the new environment, European companies may decide to initiate, reactivate or intensify ties with Russia. It would be preferable to allow them to take their own risks. The sort of significant political flanking that often took place in the past is not advisable. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that Europe has to engage with Russia economically simply because the US does (assuming that it does). The serious negative consequences of previous involvement ought to be kept in mind, as they could easily repeat themselves. The attempts at diversification and reorientation away from Russia undertaken by European businesses due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine should thus be supported and expanded.

Finally, and crucially, domestic developments in Russia must not be ignored. A genuine willingness by the Russian elite to alter their attitudes and policies will necessarily be reflected in their domestic approaches. It will be important to follow internal messaging, the treatment of the media, possibilities for bottom-up initiatives to emerge and function, and how history is addressed. In particular, the discourse on Ukraine should be monitored. Allowing Memorial to resume its activities without constraints would be a positive step. The preparation of the population for a different relationship with Europe will be necessary for sustainable change to occur.

Here again, quick results are not to be expected, even less so than on the elite level. Decades, even centuries, of repression and paternalism have taken their toll on Russian society. Significant change is thus likely to be a question of generations. Exchange programmes on various levels (students, teachers, professors, administrators, sister city frameworks, etc.) could form part of the small steps mentioned above. Russian permission for these to take place would be a positive indicator.

Overall, it is highly likely that the relationship will remain fraught and confrontational for the foreseeable future. It will be important for Europe to learn to live with this fact and to embed its other foreign and security policy actions in this reality. The general steps proposed above (strengthening security and defence, defining interests, fighting hybrid threats) will help Europe to hold its own against other actors as well.

 

Susan Stewart is a senior fellow of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin specializing in Russia and Ukraine.