Defending Europe Without Losing What It Stands For 

As the foundations of the transatlantic alliance strain under the weight of the US’s growing unilateralism, Europe is being forced to imagine a defence of its own. But what would that defence look like – and what would it cost, financially and politically? Green leaders Franziska Brantner and Rui Tavares talk to Edouard Gaudot about how Europe can protect itself without losing sight of why it’s worth protecting.

Edouard Gaudot: Amid heightened geopolitical tension and the growing prevalence of military conflict, can you briefly describe the state of Europe and the world today? 

Rui Tavares: I’d say there’s a general crisis of imagination. Usually, imagination comes after war. But today, the challenge is finding imagination before conflict. 

Franziska Brantner: For me, it’s confusion and a lack of courage from Europeans, and from the Americans and the rest of the world, it’s the return of madness and “might makes right.” 

Rui Tavares: Exactly. There’s a form of madness that comes with this absence of imagination, as if we’re living in a parallel reality. 

What does green leadership look like in a world plunged into chaos and conflict? 

Rui Tavares: We need to educate people but stay calm at the same time. We must avoid scaring them and instead prepare them for political debates and tough choices. Public opinion matures: 10 years ago, it would have been impossible to talk realistically about a European defence community. Now, with Trump, everyone can see that if the Europeans don’t create one, they’ll be defenceless at the decisive moment. 

Franziska Brantner: I’m rather proud to have seen this debate taking shape in a country like Germany. Previously, everyone would say to me, “You’re just an anti-Atlanticist,” even as I explained that my emphasis on defence autonomy had nothing to do with the United States but was about our responsibility. Now, it’s become very clear that the Americans won’t always be there for us. The task for Europe, then, is to step up and take responsibility for its own defence and security.  

For the Greens, defending Europe means safeguarding peace and freedom. Therefore, Europe’s defence can only be European. I note that many German Green party members (of whom there are over 180,000 today) have far fewer reservations than the party’s leaders do about the need for a stronger military capability.  

That’s surprising for a party that was founded in the 1970s on, among other things, pacifism and non-violence. 

Franziska Brantner: There’s a profound difference between pacifism and non-violence. Of course, we must promote non-violent education and a non-violent society, but that isn’t pacifism. In our party, it was Joschka Fischer [German foreign minister from 1998 to 2005] who started this cultural shift at the time of the Kosovo conflict. But with Ukraine, everything changed. Today I find myself in the party’s centre, because some Greens have gone so far that they need reminding that weapons are not necessarily the only answer, nor the best. 

For the Greens, defending Europe means safeguarding peace and freedom. Therefore, Europe’s defence can only be European.

Rui Tavares: Ideally, we would be having this debate on a European army after making sure that we really have a European democracy, with full tax-raising powers and a parliament that could oversee this army. But the war in Ukraine has brought urgency and upended priorities. I sense it in my voters [in Portugal], too: when I suggest moving cautiously, they reply that Putin is at the gates and that Trump could threaten to annex the Azores – where there is already an American base – just as he threatened Greenland. This question was even put to the prime minister, whose answer was: “It’s best we don’t talk about it.” 

So, to those who want to accelerate Europe’s militarisation, we must point out that Europe is not yet ready because it lacks the mechanisms for oversight and funding. 

Franziska Brantner: Among German Greens, there’s a debate about funding at the European level. Some insist that European treaties prohibit military spending. And even if the resources were there, they would rather defend the institutional framework than find ways to move ahead on funding and democratic oversight. This is a problem, because once we find the path forward, it would be better if all this remained under parliamentary oversight. 

What about the “alliance of middle powers” proposed by Mark Carney, the global security architecture, and the French nuclear umbrella? How should European defence fit into the current geopolitical landscape?  

Franziska Brantner: We need a European budget for common defence, with common goals. I’d rather this were created within the institutions, but if it’s impossible for reasons of legality or majority, let’s devise ad hoc institutions. As for alliances, it’s absolutely essential to include the United Kingdom, and maybe Norway. Turkey and Canada also have roles to play, but on a broader level. 

When it comes to nuclear weapons, let’s be clear-eyed: neither the United States – especially today – nor France nor the United Kingdom will agree to sharing responsibility, in the sense of sharing the power to press the “red button”. That said, Europeans must talk to each other, to France and the United Kingdom, about a European nuclear doctrine. In return, we will obviously have to increase funding for conventional weapons. 

A nuclear guarantee would entail a sort of strategic leadership from France that its partners may not be willing to allow, and that Paris may not be willing to accept.  

Franziska Brantner: That’s possible, but we don’t have a choice. Putin’s threat is real, and so is Trump’s retreat. I really wish we lived in a better world, but we don’t. If Europe can’t do it, there are already German conservatives proposing a German nuclear deterrent. I think this is a very bad idea, even if Germany has the capability. It would violate both our constitution and international treaties. 

Rui Tavares: On the French nuclear guarantee, the speed of the debate is astonishing. These things usually move forward at a glacial pace, but this is now actually being considered. I think we need to do something very simple, but very visible: expand French nuclear doctrine to include Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union. It talks about coming to the aid of threatened member states with all available resources. That would mean nuclear weapons, too. 

As for this alliance of middle powers, it always bothers me a bit that we stop at Canada. What about Brazil, Mexico, and other countries? There’s some strategic partners for you. 

Franziska Brantner: I think that our approach to them is primarily driven by economic and political interests. 

Rui Tavares: True, but Europeans also ignore what these countries say about the state of the world, about development and UN reforms. They don’t want to listen to what Brazil might also have to say about the remembrance of slavery, for example. If Europe wants to counter authoritarian powers by courting middle powers that are not particularly invested in the UN-led rules-based international order, we need to listen to them. These potential partners are fed up with European arrogance, and that’s why we failed to secure their full backing for Ukraine. Europe must challenge its assumptions and get out of its comfort zone. 

Franziska Brantner: I still think there’s a distinction to be made between economic ties – political and strategic ties even – and defence ties. I completely agree with you on the first three, but when it comes to European defence, I’m less convinced. 

Rui Tavares: But to fight drug trafficking in the South Atlantic, for example, you’ll have to speak to the South Americans. 

Alliances aside, a European defence of Europe means grappling with questions of industrial policy. A military budget is all well and good, but what for? 

Rui Tavares: When the Americans built up their military power after the [Second World] War, they made colossal public investments in research through the likes of MIT and special programmes. As we all know, the Internet was a direct result of this type of research. So I find it worrying that the revolution in artificial intelligence, fundamental in the realm of defence, is completely driven, shaped, and dominated by the private sector, with no public involvement. Here, Europe has an enormous historic opportunity to make massive public investments – especially in research, science, and technology – with ambitious goals. 

If we show that military research produces civilian advances, we can escape this pernicious trap that forces voters to choose between funding a welfare state and funding its defence.

Franziska Brantner: In Europe, it’s the Ukrainians who are doing this. They are the most creative and innovative. Even more so than the Americans. 

And how should we respond to those who claim social spending is being sacrificed on the altar of military expenditure? 

Franziska Brantner:  First of all, we need a single, integrated defence market with economies of scale and the capacity to develop our own technological sovereignty, in AI for example. This must be done in a way that delivers technological and economic benefits – “defence dividends” for European industrial productivity and sovereignty.  

But it’s obvious that in the long run we can’t fund defence through borrowing. Germany already spends 80 billion euros a year on servicing debt. An extra 40 billion euros of debt is expected to be added just for defence. For younger generations, it’s unsustainable. And there’s also the risk that unsustainable borrowing could cost us dearly, both economically and socially. So at some point, we must either increase resources or make cuts somewhere.  

We also have to become more economically efficient. If productivity stops growing, it will put more pressure on the budget. We got lucky for 80 years, but the peace dividend is gone. 

That said, there will be dividends from public spending on defence, though we’ll have to make sure that they’re not pocketed by the richest. That’s another way of asking how we draw the line between public and private.  

Let’s be clear about this: we need a European defence industry to protect our peace and our way of life – and in the long run, this will pay fresh dividends from a new and sovereign peace.  

Rui Tavares: This is where I disagree with you. I don’t want to reopen arguments from the Eurozone crisis, which was extremely painful. But there’s a difference, perhaps cultural, between north and south on the question of debt. When I’m told that we must invest in defence spending to meet global challenges and that doing so without cutting social spending is unrealistic, my response is that investing in defence without borrowing is what’s unrealistic. Military investment has always been expensive. If we take an existential threat seriously, we don’t fret about debt. Especially given that, in the past, military investment has always been accompanied or followed by new social investment. 

Just take into account the fact that there’s a housing crisis in Europe, an issue that’s very real for many people. If we developed construction technologies, with new materials invented through research and development, and if we had a European housing agency, we could build on this progress. And since armies have always been full of engineers, this might be another benefit of military spending – a war dividend. 

If we show that military research produces civilian advances, we can escape this pernicious trap that forces voters to choose between funding a welfare state and funding its defence. This is where Germany has a key role to play: Germans must understand that Europe is willing to invest in safe debt. Now that American debt is no longer safe, if Europeans were to finally opt for the famous Eurobonds, there would be billions of euros ready to invest. 

Franziska Brantner: So long as these are really investments. Otherwise, they’re a waste of resources, and future generations will have to pay for them. We’ve taken on almost 100 billion euros in defence debt, and 99 per cent of this money has gone into stuff that’s obsolete. 

So, we need to develop a European military-industrial complex, one that builds for the future, not the past. 

Franziska Brantner: Exactly. We must break free from past inertias. It’s also the case for our welfare state in Germany: there are reforms that will improve the quality of services while also making savings, and they have to be implemented. We can’t just refuse to make savings. It’s impossible, especially with an ageing society. We can’t hide behind false pretexts. I think we have to invest in defence while also reforming the economy and public services.  

How do we prepare people for the reality of the security threats facing Europe and the responses they require? 

Rui Tavares: I loved the Niinistö report [drawn up by Sauli Niinistö, former president of Finland and special adviser to the president of the European Commission] because it shares with the rest of Europe Nordic know-how on defence, which is based around society, families, and bonds. Some materials – like booklets on preparedness and local defence – can be reproduced, printed, and distributed to all European households. But it’s important to take into account cultural and social realities: you’re supposed to have two weeks’ supplies in the house to be prepared, but in Portugal, where wages are often spent by the 10th of the month, I’m sure the survival kit won’t last. 

So, we should perhaps think about distribution networks, mobilise local councils, and even involve the fire service. These are also opportunities to make Europe tangible. When devastating fires or floods break out, people expect a European response. With a European war and disaster survival kit that could be distributed to citizens, Europe’s role in helping people would be clearer to see. 

Franziska Brantner: I fear that it won’t work – that without a sense of urgency, people won’t be ready. 

Besides the European defence technological and industrial base, what industrial policy should be implemented at the EU level? 

Franziska Brantner: I believe European competitiveness rests on three pillars. First, resilience, which requires a reduction in our dependencies, especially on China and the United States. Next, innovation. Not just in defence, but in tech, medicine, the bioeconomy. And the third is sustainability, which is a necessary response to climate change and inequality.  

To succeed, we need education that develops our young people’s skills and capacity for innovation. It’s competitiveness in the service of social wellbeing and a better quality of life.  

Going forward, what objectives do you think Europe should prioritise? How can the European project gain more relevance and foster cohesion?  

Franziska Brantner: I think the question we must ask ourselves first is: “Why do we want peace, freedom, and democracy?” For us Europeans, the challenge is to give a meaning to freedom that isn’t JD Vance’s, and a substance to peace that isn’t Putin’s. It’s up to us to do this, because it’s Europe that upholds these values. And without them, the European project is hollow. 

Rui Tavares: I couldn’t agree more, and I’d like to add another idea: quality of life. Seen from the outside, Europe is defined by a way of life and a standard of living. Our notion of freedom is built on a universal right to this quality of life. It doesn’t mean that everybody is rich, but it does mean that nobody is poor. When we put this idea at the core of European policies, we soon see that it touches on everything: the economy, social policy, the environment, culture, security, and defence. 

What worries me is a sense that the quality of life has stopped being a goal of politics. We keep hearing calls to sacrifice this or that service to save money. But I think that saving for saving’s sake doesn’t appeal to Europeans. Nobody wants to stay competitive just to win an economic war they don’t see any benefits in. Europeans are proud of their quality of life and are deeply attached to it – and for good reason. If we manage to convince them that the policies that affect them take this quality of life seriously, I think people will be more willing to make sacrifices.