Engagement without illusions

This is due to the fact that tensions would remain high. In this case, a suspension of hostilities would allow Russia to regroup and launch a new offensive in the near future. At the same time, sanctions and related economic and financial measures should remain in force until a genuine peace agreement is reached. This is because only such an agreement can create the conditions for a broader form of engagement.

As the long Middle Eastern experience teaches us, a credible agreement cannot exclude any of the parties involved and must bring Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the European Union to the negotiating table. Such an agreement should then guarantee Ukraine two essential elements: continued military support from NATO and a clear pathway towards EU membership.

These two elements are crucial and, in their absence, Russia should not receive any assurances regarding Kyiv’s non‑accession to NATO. The frontline – except for minimal technical adjustments – should be frozen, and a broad demilitarization of the area should follow. In this context, it is possible to envisage a role for the United Nations, whose involvement would help restore its international standing after a period of diminished credibility and influence.

Alternatively, the deployment of European troops, although difficult to envisage at present and not without risks, would represent an historic step towards the EU’s strategic autonomy and common defence. At the same time, such a move would strengthen the Union’s ability to negotiate with Russia on overall continental security architecture and prevent the opening of additional fronts in the short and medium term. Finally, negotiations should avoid the voluntary cession of territory by Ukraine, as it would amount to rewarding the aggressor. In turn, sanctions against Russia could be suspended with an automatic annulment clause in the event of renewed hostilities.

Once hostilities have ended, the EU should focus on adopting a balanced approach that combines containment with calibrated engagement. This primarily implies avoiding any return to business as usual. Instead, it would help establish a targeted and conditional framework for interaction between the EU and Russia. Dialogue should focus on technical aspects and specific dossiers, such as energy and nuclear security, and be tied to strict conditions covering the full spectrum of threats, including those that are hybrid in nature. Diplomatic channels should be reopened gradually with significant political investment, while cooperation in the short and medium term should concentrate exclusively on areas where the EU holds a strategic advantage.

This approach responds to two fundamental dynamics. First, the ongoing conflict and the wider global geopolitical realignment demonstrate that a significant degree of structural rivalry between the EU and Russia is unavoidable. This rules out, at least in the short term, a full reopening and the restoration of genuinely friendly relations. Such structural rivalry can be managed, but it requires a solid degree of containment across all dimensions, namely political, economic, and military. Second, an appropriate level of engagement is necessary to pursue a medium to long‑term political solution to the protracted conflict and to reduce tensions along the many “cold fronts” currently open between the EU and Russia.

Thus, the EU should avoid both a posture of total containment and isolation, and a broad, unconditional re-engagement. The first approach would prolong tensions along the entire shared border and beyond, hinder Ukraine’s political and economic recovery (as no one invests in high‑tension environments), and could create the conditions for renewed escalation. The second, by contrast, would signal weakness, undermine the coherence of the Union’s global narrative, and expose the Union to external pressure, all while internally strengthening the propaganda of Europe’s far right.

In this context, a European security architecture explicitly built in an anti‑Russian key would require a level of US commitment that the current administration does not appear willing to provide. Although the EU has prioritized ambitious defence plans, it will take years before Europe can develop an autonomous military structure – in terms of industry, equipment, and personnel – that is capable of effectively deterring Russia. Moreover, even in the presence of a common European army, the 27 member states do not share the same level of threat perception vis‑à‑vis Russia, and do not agree on a security system built entirely around the priorities of the eastern frontline states. All this makes the option of excluding cooperation in the design of a European security system appear unworkable.

Finally, the strategy the EU adopts towards Russia will inevitably influence its relations with the United States and will, in turn, be shaped by the stance of the administration in Washington. The stark contrast between Joe Biden and Donald Trump on Russia illustrates how the US itself holds two different visions of how to deal with Moscow.

Regarding the so-called Global South – often neutral or even sympathetic to Russia on the Ukraine dossier – the EU also faces a challenge of coherence between its narrative and its concrete actions. Therefore, the EU’s strategic approach towards Russia must also reflect the image the Union seeks to project in the Global South, and cannot be driven solely by economic or commercial interests. Instead, it must be anchored in the EU’s core values and in the need to respond to the blatant violation of international law committed by Russia since 2022.

 

Tiziano Marino is part of the Geopolitics Advisory & Policy Intelligence team at Deloitte Legal in Rome, Italy and an associate at the India Observatory of CeSPI - Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, in Rome.