Murat Kaan YILDIZ: Georgians have never been distant to Turks

Caucasian Journal
Murat Kaan YILDIZ: Georgians have never been distant to Turks

Een speciaal interview onderzoekt eeuwenoude banden tussen Georgië en Anatolië, van middeleeuwse handel op de Zwarte Zee en dynastieke verbindingen tot gedeelde architectuur en migratie. Ook wordt besproken hoe de verdragen van 1921 gemeenschappen, familiebanden en handel opnieuw vormgaven — en wat ervoor heeft gezorgd dat menselijke contacten over veranderende grenzen heen zijn blijven bestaan.

Murat Kaan Yıldız 22.11.2026 (Caucasian Journal). As we mark 105 years since the signing of the 1921 treaties that established the modern border between Turkey and Georgia, the Caucasian Journal presents a special interview with Turkish historian Dr. Murat Kaan YILDIZ.

Beyond the lines drawn on maps lies a much older story of people, trade and cultural exchange. From royal exiles and dynastic marriages to migration, architecture and shared traditions, we explore the centuries-old ties that have connected Georgia and Anatolia. A shared past, different memories?Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: How would you describe the historical ties between Georgia and Anatolia? Have they mostly been relations between neighbouring societies, or were the two regions part of a wider, interconnected world?

Murat Kaan YILDIZ: I think we should look at this question from a geographical and economic perspective rather than simply focusing on religion or language. Georgia and Anatolia have certainly been connected for centuries through trade, migration, and political relations. However, I would argue that these connections never developed into the kind of deep integration we might expect between two neighbouring societies.

One of the main reasons was geography. The mountainous landscape of the ancient Colchis region and the eastern Black Sea coast made communication and transportation extremely difficult. In many ways, the mountains acted as natural barriers between communities.

This is precisely why the Black Sea ports were so important. Trabzon, Bulancak, and Piraziz, for example, played different roles in connecting coastal settlements with wider commercial networks. Yet, as traditional trading routes changed and these ports gradually lost some of their former importance, especially during the late Ottoman and Republican periods, opportunities for economic and social interaction became more limited.

Georgia and Anatolia have been connected for centuries, but these connections never developed into deep integration we might expect between two neighbouring societies... They shared centuries of history, but sharing a history does not necessarily mean becoming fully integrated.

Even today, I believe that Trabzon's potential as a major commercial gateway between Anatolia and the Caucasus has not been fully realised. So, in my opinion, we should not explain the historical distance between Turks and Georgians primarily through differences in religion or language. Geography, transportation difficulties, and the weakening of regional maritime trade were at least as important, and perhaps even more decisive.

The two societies shared centuries of history, but sharing a history does not necessarily mean becoming fully integrated. That is an important distinction I would like to emphasise.

AK: Your research focused on Black Sea trade between 1261 and 1402. What role did Georgian ports play in this trade? What goods and merchants connected the Georgian coast with Anatolia and other Black Sea regions?

MKY: I believe that Georgian ports played a much more important role in medieval Black Sea commerce than is generally recognised. However, to understand their significance, we need to look at the wider commercial system that developed after 1261. The Treaty of Nymphaeum, signed between Genoa and the Byzantine Empire in 1261, marked a turning point in Black Sea history. It opened the way for Genoese commercial expansion, and within a few decades, the Black Sea became one of the most important trading regions connecting Europe, Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Asia.

In my research, I particularly emphasise that the Black Sea was not simply a maritime route. It was an economic system connecting inland production centres, caravan routes, and coastal markets. Within this system, three Georgian ports deserve particular attention: Sebastopolis, corresponding to present-day Sukhumi, Poti, known in Italian sources as Fasso, and Batumi, which appears as Lo Vato or Vati.

Sebastopolis was especially important. By the late thirteenth century, Genoese merchants were already conducting business there. We have a particularly interesting document dated 27 April 1289, recording the purchase of a ship called “Mugetto” by Guglielmo Vezano from Andreolo Barlaria. The transaction was recorded by a Genoese notary in Sebastopolis. For a historian, such a document is extremely valuable because it demonstrates that commercial activity was already sufficiently developed to involve formal maritime transactions.

During the fourteenth century, Sebastopolis became an important Genoese trading station. In 1354, a formal Genoese commercial establishment was organised there with the consent of the local authorities. The settlement was connected to Caffa in Crimea, which functioned as the principal centre of Genoese commercial activity in the Black Sea.

Poti was another important point of contact. Located near the mouth of the Rioni River, it offered access to western Georgia and its hinterland. Evidence from the late thirteenth century suggests that the region attracted foreign merchants and hosted commercial gatherings. A notarial document dated 30 June 1290 records a Venetian merchant obtaining a loan of 1,500 aspers to conduct business in Georgia. This is particularly interesting because it shows that Venetian merchants, despite Genoese competition, were also actively interested in Georgian markets.

As for the commodities, Georgian ports exported several products that were valuable in Mediterranean and Black Sea markets. These included beeswax, honey, timber, and linen. Beeswax was particularly important because it was widely used in candle production, especially for religious institutions. Timber was another valuable resource, while linen and other locally produced goods connected Georgian communities with larger commercial markets. In return, merchants brought European textiles, salt, wine, and preserved fish into the region. Some of these products arrived through Trabzon and Caffa.

We also have to acknowledge a darker aspect of this commercial system: the slave trade. Enslaved people from the Caucasus were transported through Black Sea trading networks to markets in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Genoese merchants played an important role in this traffic. It would be historically misleading to discuss medieval Black Sea prosperity without acknowledging the exploitation of human beings that accompanied it.

Another important question concerns the merchants themselves. The Genoese were particularly influential because they developed an extensive network of trading stations, warehouses, and commercial representatives. Venetian merchants also participated, although their presence along the Georgian coast was generally less extensive.

However, commerce was certainly not conducted by Italians alone. Local Georgian and other Caucasian traders, together with merchants belonging to Greek and Armenian commercial communities, participated in the wider exchange networks. Commercial activity depended on local producers, intermediaries, sailors, and transport workers as much as on the wealthy merchants who financed long-distance voyages.

Trabzon also deserves special attention. It was one of the principal gateways connecting the Black Sea with Persia, particularly through the commercial routes leading towards Tabriz. Silk, spices, and other valuable eastern commodities reached the Black Sea through these larger networks. We should distinguish, however, between the products exported directly from Georgian ports and the luxury goods circulating through the wider Black Sea commercial system. Georgian ports were important regional links, but they did not perform exactly the same function as Trabzon or Caffa.

Finally, I would emphasise the importance of geography. The mountainous terrain of western Georgia and northeastern Anatolia made overland transportation difficult. Maritime commerce therefore offered a practical means of connecting communities that were geographically close but often separated by natural barriers.

For me, this is perhaps the most interesting aspect of medieval Georgian trade. These ports were not simply places where ships loaded and unloaded merchandise. They were points of contact between different economic systems, political authorities, and cultural communities. And I think this also helps us understand the broader history of Turkish–Georgian relations. Trade created opportunities for interaction across the Black Sea, even when geographical and political circumstances prevented the two societies from becoming more closely integrated.

AK: Medieval Georgia and Anatolia experienced many political changes and conflicts. How much did these affect trade and everyday contacts? Did merchants and local communities manage to maintain their links even when rulers and borders changed?

MKY: Political conflicts certainly affected trade, but they rarely brought commercial relations to a complete stop. Between 1261 and 1402, the Black Sea region experienced frequent political changes, wars, and struggles for territorial control. However, merchants were often more interested in economic opportunities than political rivalries. For example, Genoese and Venetian merchants continued to operate across territories controlled by different rulers. Georgian ports, Trabzon, and Caffa remained connected through commercial networks despite political instability.

I believe we should also remember that trade was not conducted only by powerful merchants. Local fishermen, sailors, craftsmen, and small traders depended on these connections for their livelihoods. In my view, political borders could change relatively quickly, but economic relationships developed over generations. This is why commercial connections between Georgia and Anatolia often proved more enduring than the political arrangements surrounding them.

AK: Your work introduces some fascinating figures, from Georgian princesses at the Seljuk court to people of Georgian origin who rose to prominence in the Ottoman Empire. Which stories best illustrate the close historical ties between Georgian and Anatolian societies?

MKY: I think some of the most fascinating examples of Turkish–Georgian historical relations are found in the lives of individuals who belonged to more than one political or cultural world. Let me begin with Gürcü Hatun, or Tamara, one of the most remarkable women in thirteenth-century Anatolian history. She was the daughter of Queen Rusudan of Georgia and a prince from the Seljuk ruling family of Erzurum. During the 1230s, she married the Seljuk Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw II and moved to Konya.

Gürcü Hatun for Caucasian JournalWhat makes her story particularly interesting is that she was not simply a Georgian princess married to a Turkish ruler. She became an influential figure in the political and cultural environment of the Seljuk court. She originally came from a Christian background, and Georgian sources indicate that the protection of her religious beliefs was discussed during the marriage negotiations. Later, she became associated with the spiritual world of Jalal al-Din Rumi, better known in Turkey as Mevlana.

But there is another aspect of her life that I find even more interesting. Historian David Durand-Guédy has identified a remarkable document concerning a caravanserai [a historic roadside inn - CJ] established under her patronage around 1238, probably near Antalya, along the commercial route connecting the Mediterranean coast with Konya. This was not simply an act of charity. The foundation also served her political ambitions, particularly her efforts to strengthen the position of her son, Alaeddin Kayqubad II, as heir to the Seljuk throne. I think this example is especially important because it demonstrates how a Georgian princess could participate directly in the political, economic, and cultural institutions of medieval Anatolia.

We can also look at an earlier example involving Queen Tamar of Georgia herself. In 1204, she supported Alexios and David Komnenos in establishing their authority along the southern Black Sea coast, contributing to the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond. This reminds us that Georgia was not an isolated kingdom beyond the Caucasus. Its rulers were actively involved in the political affairs of Anatolia and the wider Black Sea.

Moving forward to the Ottoman period, we encounter equally interesting individuals. One example is Gürcü Hadım Mehmed Pasha, a statesman of Georgian origin who rose through the Ottoman palace system and became Grand Vizier in 1622. His career demonstrates the possibilities of advancement within the Ottoman administrative system, although we should not forget that such careers could also begin through forms of enslavement and dependency.

Another particularly significant example comes from Akhaltsikhe, known in Ottoman sources as Ahıska. The region had long been governed by the Georgian Jaqeli dynasty. Over time, members of this aristocratic family entered the Ottoman administrative system and adopted Islam. What I find interesting is that this political and religious transformation did not completely erase the family's earlier regional identity. During the eighteenth century, Hacı Ahmed Pasha, a descendant of the Jaqeli family, sponsored the Ahmediye Mosque and madrasa within the Rabati fortress complex. These buildings became important centres of religious and educational life. For me, they represent something particularly meaningful: a Georgian aristocratic legacy expressed through the institutions and architectural traditions of the Ottoman Empire.

Portrait of a king of Imereti
 Solomon II

Finally, I would like to mention a much more personal and tragic story. In 1815, Solomon II, the last reigning king of Imereti, died in Trabzon after seeking refuge in Ottoman territory following the Russian annexation of his kingdom. Imagine the historical significance of this moment. A Georgian king, who had struggled to preserve his country's independence, spent his final years in an Ottoman city on the Black Sea. He was buried in Trabzon, and his remains were not returned to Georgia until 1990, when they were reinterred at Gelati Monastery. His story demonstrates that the history connecting Georgia and Anatolia was not always shaped by peaceful cultural exchange. Political defeat, exile, and displacement also brought people across borders.

However, I would not want to limit this history to princesses, kings, and grand viziers. Ordinary people were equally important. Georgian families who settled in Anatolia, craftsmen who carried architectural traditions across the eastern Black Sea, and local communities who preserved their languages and customs all contributed to these historical connections. In fact, I believe their experiences are sometimes even more revealing than the biographies of political leaders.

These stories do not prove that Turkish and Georgian societies became fully integrated. Geography, political conflict, and religious differences continued to create barriers. What they demonstrate is something more complex and, perhaps, more historically interesting: even when societies remained separate, individuals could cross those boundaries and create relationships whose cultural consequences lasted for centuries.

AK: Historic Georgian monasteries in present-day Turkey and traditional wooden mosques in Adjara are striking examples of the region's cultural heritage. What do these buildings tell us about the interaction of Georgian, Anatolian and Ottoman traditions?

MKY: I believe these buildings are among the best examples of our shared cultural heritage. Medieval Georgian monasteries such as Oshki, Ishkhani, and Tbeti, located in present-day northeastern Turkey, demonstrate the rich architectural and religious traditions of medieval Georgia.

Tomb of Solomon II and Georgians in Trabzon, 1916 Tomb of Solomon II and Georgians in Trabzon, 1916

On the other hand, the wooden mosques of Adjara show how local Georgian craftsmanship adapted to Islamic and Ottoman architectural traditions. The Ghorjomi Mosque is a particularly interesting example. Its richly decorated wooden interior reflects regional building techniques and the work of craftsmen from different cultural backgrounds.

What I find especially important is that religious change did not necessarily mean the disappearance of local cultural traditions. Georgian communities adopted Islam while preserving elements of their language, artistic identity, and craftsmanship. In my opinion, these monuments remind us that cultural heritage cannot always be understood through modern national borders. They also offer an excellent opportunity for Turkish–Georgian cooperation in historical preservation and restoration.

AK: How are figures such as King Solomon II, Georgian princesses at the Seljuk court and Georgian-descended communities in Anatolia remembered today? Are these stories equally familiar in Turkey and Georgia? What parts of this shared history deserve more attention?

MKY: I believe that Turkey and Georgia remember their shared history from somewhat different perspectives. Figures such as King Solomon II are naturally better known in Georgia, while Georgian princesses at the Seljuk court are more familiar to specialists in Turkish medieval history. However, many of these stories remain relatively unknown to the general public in both countries.

In my opinion, we should pay greater attention to the experiences of ordinary people, particularly merchants, craftsmen, and migrant families who connected the two societies over centuries. Our shared history should not be limited to wars, political relations, or royal marriages. Cultural exchange, everyday life, and common traditions are equally important.

How the 1921 treaties changed the region

AK: The Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921 established the modern Turkish–Georgian border. How did the new border affect communities with long-standing family, trade and cultural ties across the region? What changed in their everyday lives?

MKY: I believe the Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921 represent one of the most important turning points in the modern history of Turkish–Georgian relations. The treaties of 1921 established a new international frontier, but the communities living along that frontier had not suddenly become strangers to one another.

The Treaty of Moscow, signed on 16 March 1921 between the Ankara government and Soviet Russia, established the main principles of the northeastern frontier. These arrangements were subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Kars on 13 October 1921, signed between the Ankara government and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Under these agreements, Batumi remained within Georgia, while Artvin and Ardahan remained on the Turkish side.

What I find particularly interesting is that the negotiators were already aware of the problems that a new international border could create for local communities. For example, Article 6 of the Treaty of Kars addressed the status of Batumi. It provided for local administrative autonomy and the protection of cultural and religious rights. It also established provisions for the transit of Turkish goods through the port of Batumi. This demonstrates that the economic importance of Batumi was recognised by both sides. The port was not simply a territorial question; it was a commercial gateway connecting Anatolia with the Caucasus.

Even more interesting are Articles 7 and 8. Article 7 provided for arrangements facilitating border crossings by inhabitants of frontier districts, while Article 8 addressed the traditional use of summer and winter pastures on opposite sides of the border. Why would an international treaty need to discuss shepherds and their animals? Because for local communities, the border was not merely a political line. It crossed landscapes that people had used for generations. A family might live on one side of the frontier while maintaining agricultural or economic connections on the other. Shepherds might depend on seasonal pastures that suddenly belonged to another state. Merchants who had previously travelled between neighbouring settlements now faced customs regulations and administrative restrictions. In other words, the new political geography did not correspond perfectly to the existing social and economic geography.

Article 13 is also revealing because it addressed the right of certain inhabitants of the transferred territories to leave with their property if they did not wish to retain the nationality associated with their new state. This shows that the treaties affected not only territory but also citizenship, property, and the personal decisions of families.

However, we should make an important distinction. The creation of the border in 1921 did not immediately eliminate every form of communication. The process of separation developed over time, particularly as the Soviet authorities imposed increasingly strict frontier controls during the following decades.

Perhaps the clearest example is the village of Sarp, known as Sarpi on the Georgian side. Before 1921, it was essentially a single settlement whose inhabitants shared family relationships, local traditions, and everyday economic activities. The new border divided the village into two parts, separated by a small stream. Relatives who had previously belonged to the same village suddenly found themselves living under different political administrations. Their daily lives gradually became subject to different laws, institutions, and political expectations.

Initially, some communication remained possible. But during the 1930s, the Soviet border regime became much more restrictive, eventually preventing ordinary cross-border movement for decades. There is a particularly moving example recorded in anthropological research on Sarpi. When someone died on one side of the border, relatives living on the opposite side could sometimes hear the mourning but could not attend the funeral. According to local recollections, family members occasionally gathered on their own side of the frontier and accompanied the funeral procession from a distance.

Another important consequence was the gradual development of different social and cultural identities. Communities on the Turkish side became part of the institutions of the Turkish Republic, while those on the Georgian side experienced Soviet administration, education, and political ideology. In Sarpi, where many inhabitants spoke Laz, the Soviet period also influenced the public expression of language, religion, and family identity. Research on local cemeteries has even demonstrated how changes in surnames, alphabets, and religious symbols reflected these transformations.

The economic consequences were equally important. The historical relationship between Batumi and northeastern Anatolia was affected by the division of the region into different political and economic systems. The treaties had recognised the importance of maintaining commercial connections, but the practical possibilities for trade increasingly depended on state policies, customs controls, and relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Over time, the frontier became much more than a customs boundary. It separated two very different political and economic systems.

This development was particularly significant for the eastern Black Sea region, where difficult mountainous terrain had already limited communication. As I mentioned earlier, geography had long been one of the greatest obstacles to deeper integration between Georgian and Anatolian communities. The establishment of a heavily controlled political frontier added another obstacle to an already challenging geographical environment.

Nevertheless, I would be careful not to suggest that every historical connection disappeared. Family memories survived. Cultural traditions continued. People remembered relatives, villages, and places that had become inaccessible.

And this brings us to another turning point: the reopening of the Sarp border crossing in 1988 and Georgia's independence in 1991. For many families, the reopening of the frontier created opportunities to reconnect after decades of separation. Commercial activity also gradually expanded, and the eastern Black Sea once again became an important corridor connecting Turkey with Georgia and the wider Caucasus.

A century ago, political agreements transformed an interconnected regional landscape into separate state territories. Today, the same frontier has become an important point of contact for trade, tourism, and family visits.

A further symbolic step came in December 2011, when Turkish and Georgian citizens gained the ability to travel between the two countries using their national identity documents. I find the contrast between 1921 and the present particularly interesting. A century ago, political agreements transformed an interconnected regional landscape into separate state territories. Today, the same frontier has become an important point of contact for trade, tourism, and family visits.

The agreements established a political framework that has endured for more than a century. Yet their social consequences developed gradually and often extended far beyond what the original negotiators could have anticipated. For me, the most important lesson is that political borders and cultural boundaries are not necessarily the same thing.

And perhaps this is the most meaningful way to understand Turkish–Georgian relations today: not as a history without divisions, but as a history in which human connections have repeatedly survived, adapted, and sometimes re-emerged despite those divisions.

AK: Looking back over the centuries, what has kept Georgia and Turkey connected despite political changes and conflicts? And what can this shared history teach us about the relationship between the two countries today?

MKY: I believe history teaches us that the relationship between Turkey and Georgia is much deeper than diplomatic agreements or political borders. We should remember that the Turks and Russians fought numerous wars over several centuries. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, known in Turkey as the "93 Harbi", had particularly devastating consequences for the Ottoman population. Territorial losses, mass migration, and human suffering left lasting scars on communities across Anatolia and the Caucasus.

In this historical context, Georgia has always occupied an important geographical position. Particularly since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has provided an important independent political and geographical space between Turkey and Russia. From Turkey's perspective, Georgia's sovereignty and stability are therefore extremely important.

There is another interesting point. While Turkey's relations with Armenia have experienced considerable political difficulties in modern times, relations with independent Georgia have generally developed in a more stable and constructive direction.

However, I would like to emphasise something beyond politics. Georgians have never been a distant or unfamiliar people to us. Throughout Ottoman history, many individuals of Georgian origin served in the imperial administration, the army, and the palace. Some reached the highest positions of government.

Others settled in Anatolia, established villages, married into Turkish families, and gradually became part of the country's social and cultural life. Today, many Turkish citizens have Georgian ancestors, sometimes without even being fully aware of their family's historical origins.

Of course, we speak different languages, and our religious traditions have often been different. Our history also includes wars, political rivalries, and painful experiences. I certainly do not want to romanticise the past. But I believe that cultural closeness cannot be measured simply through language, religion, or political history. When we look at family traditions, hospitality, food, music, and everyday social relationships, we discover that Turks and Georgians are not nearly as distant from one another as political maps might suggest.

And I believe that this is precisely where the future of Turkish–Georgian friendship should begin: with a better understanding of the human history we already share.

AK: Thank you for sharing your insights with the Caucasian Journal!

Follow the Caucasian Journal: