A two-way road to Ukraine's EU integration

Ukraine's European integration is shrouded in numerous myths, both in the European Union and Ukraine. For many years, Ukrainians saw the EU as a space of comfort, rule of law, social protection, but also excessive regulation and bureaucratic rigidity. At the same time, for many Europeans, Ukraine seemed distant, poor, wild, and unpredictable – a kind of “Wild East”, sometimes attractive, occasionally exotic and fascinating, associated with Chornobyl, football stars, and Eurovision winners.

The full-scale war changed everything. Ukraine demonstrated exceptional resilience, innovation, and heroism, successfully holding back the second-largest army in the world while remaining a democracy. Europe, despite Vladimir Putin's expectations, turned out to be a powerful, united continent, a reliable and responsible ally for Ukraine. Mutual trust grew through a brotherhood in arms. Practical steps towards European integration also started to take shape as an irreversible political process. The central question now is when the status quo will be restored so that the EU integration processes can be fully completed.  The unpleasant truth is that the old status quo will never be restored.

The changing world order, the American-European cooling, the emergence of new centres of power and the decline of old ones, force us to recognize that a return to the old point of equilibrium is impossible. This is further reinforced by profound changes in military and civilian technologies, the growth of numerous global challenges, and the systemic crisis of ageing international organizations. Moreover, that old equilibrium did not prevent the multi-crisis that we are experiencing today – in many ways, it produced it. This raises a more demanding question: what do the prospects of the European Union, Ukraine, and their mutual rapprochement, up to complete integration, look like in a world where Europe can no longer rely on yesterday’s assumptions? It is a strategic test of whether the European Union can renew itself as a geopolitical, democratic, and civilizational project.

A new brave bipolar world without a strong Europe?

The US-China summit that took place in May 2026 once again confirmed that Washington and Beijing are moving towards a bipolar international order based on the rule of force and designated spheres of strategic influence. Europe seems to be left out of this equation. Many European politicians still hesitate to recognize this new reality, although key tendencies in American foreign policy, Chinese strategic ambition, and Russian revisionism all point in the same direction.

The EU, the second largest economy with the third largest population in world politics, can remain outside the global game in this bipolar world if it remains politically fragmented and security dependent. That is why the United States and Russia (with Moscow acting as a Chinese proxy) support all Eurosceptics (whether radically left or right) in all countries of the European continent to weaken its cohesion. Whether through disinformation, political influence, energy dependence, or security blackmail, cybersecurity attacks and propaganda, the goal is the same: to prevent Europe from remaining a fully sovereign geopolitical actor.

Europe's direct interest lies in thwarting these plans for a bipolar world and a disunited and therefore marginalized group of smaller economies. Moreover, its deeper interest is to return the world to the rule of law in international relations, as a condition to its own security. To do so, it is necessary to strengthen European political unity and security self-sufficiency, as well as close gaps in innovation, productivity, and technological independence. These issues were clearly analysed in Mario Draghi's report on European Competitiveness.

For Ukraine, a bipolar world without a strong Europe is totally unacceptable. In such a world, Ukraine would not be recognized as a sovereign democracy and would be thrown into the hands of Russia. We have already lived under such conditions, and we will not return to them. Ukrainians are the strongest “Euro-optimists” not only because of shared values. During the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-14, blood was shed for these values ​​for the first time in Europe, not only under the national flag, but also the European flag. For society, European integration has long been a point of reference. Ukraine’s national interest is a united, strong, and self-confident Europe with Ukraine as a full member.

What can the EU and Ukraine gain through integration?

Ukraine already benefits from European integration, including institutional reforms, stronger rule of law, and the modernization of its public administration. After accession, it will gain access to the EU single market, including capital markets, which will provide long-term growth for a chronically underinvested country. Yet Ukraine will gain something even more fundamental: geopolitical certainty. The Revolution of Dignity broke with the long and ultimately false tradition of Ukrainian "multi-vectorism", which in practice meant remaining in a geopolitical grey zone between European order and Russian coercion.

Europe, however, is not merely absorbing a beneficiary. It is gaining a strategic partner with the most experienced armed forces on the continent, tested in the most advanced forms of multi-domain warfare. Ukraine is a society that has demonstrated extraordinary democratic resilience and unity under existential pressure. Ukraine gives Europe strategic depth on its Eastern Flank, without which the European economy, culture, and way of life will remain dangerously fragile. Moreover, Ukraine, as one of the architects of the new European security framework, will significantly reduce the gap between challenges and capabilities and accelerate Europe's strategic defence capacity. We do not yet know what threats will define the mid-21st century, but a wealthy yet defenceless Europe will undoubtedly attract predators.

Ukraine’s accession procedures will also oblige the EU to adapt. While remaining faithful to the EU fundamentals, this means rethinking certain regulatory practices, administrative procedures, and economic assumptions in line with Europe's need for greater competitiveness and strategic agility. The single market, once imagined as the most competitive economic space in the world, has been too often burdened by duplicative, outdated, and lobby-driven rules. At the same time, European funds are often spent on outdated, inefficient business models rather than on innovative development. The EU must review what is undermining its own competitiveness and open up space for Schumpeterian “creative destruction”. Ukraine's accession could accelerate this overdue reckoning. Without it, Europe risks missing a rare chance to recover its competitive and innovative edge and re-establish itself as the key player.

Foresight research on Ukraine’s integration scenarios identified mass private initiative as a key success factor, alongside capable state institutions, and fair justice. In practical terms, this means preserving and multiplying small and medium-sized businesses in Ukraine through smarter, more proportionate, and more enabling regulation. Transitional periods or suspensive conditions may be necessary in some cases. Obviously, compliance with European requirements opens up new opportunities for Ukrainian business. But first, there needs to be a focus on European fundamentals and quality of bureaucracy, and only then European regulatory norms. Otherwise, there is a clear risk of falling into an institutional trap.

Win-win scenario

Ukraine also brings a rare and proven capacity for technological acceleration, not only in military technology but also in the civilian sector (for example, in digital public services). Under unprecedented existential pressure, Ukraine leapfrogged intermediate stages and implemented the most innovative solutions now tested and adapted in real combat conditions. These successes are now recognized on a global scale.

Ukraine’s integration into the EU would create a range of tangible and positive opportunities across several key sectors. In energy, Ukraine is already physically connected to the European grid, contributing not only additional production capacity that can strengthen Europe’s energy independence, but also invaluable experience in rapid repair, decentralized adaptation, and resilience under sustained attacks. These lessons could serve as an important model for building genuine European energy sovereignty.

In agriculture, Ukraine already helps the EU address its structural food production deficit while progressively implementing European standards. Contrary to common fears, Ukrainian agriculture is unlikely to compete directly with European farmers for support. Instead, Ukraine’s accession would expand the EU’s arable land by roughly one-third, including access to some of the world’s most fertile soils.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defence sector offers not only battlefield experience, but also a highly adaptive system of rapid innovation, scaling, and continuous adjustment. Its shortened feedback cycles; diversified supply chains; close integration of research, development and production within the armed forces; and high level of interoperability together form a unique defence ecosystem. The real value Ukraine brings is therefore not simply military products but participation in this ecosystem itself – a capability Europe cannot simply purchase on the market but must actively become a part of in this overall process.

Ukrainian civil society offers Europeans a powerful model of resilience, self-organization, and public responsibility in today's unstable world. It shows how democratic agency can survive under pressure; how communities can mobilize without an overreliance on institutions when statehood itself is under attack; and how freedom can be defended not only by governments, but by society itself.

In a more predictable world, some Ukrainian peculiarities would be seen as a weakness that complicates European integration. However, in the new geopolitical, technological, and social reality, they increasingly look like strategic and unique assets. A society accustomed to uncertainty, improvisation, resource scarcity, and permanent security pressure has developed forms of adaptability that Europe could learn from.

Not a grey zone

The decisive question is whether Europe perceives Ukraine as a problem to solve or as an opportunity to seize. Ukraine’s path to the EU is therefore a two-way street. The EU should recognize and articulate the value that Ukraine’s accession creates for Europe itself. It should not behave like a mentor waiting for Ukraine to complete its “homework”. Rather, the EU and Ukraine should move in step towards a new political and institutional reality shaped by mutual learning, shared security, and strategic renewal. This is ambitious, but necessary to remain a subject of history rather than an object of geopolitical bargaining.

Avoiding the pitfalls on this common path becomes critical. The first is to confuse a staged accession pathway with a second-tier destination. Any permanent “special status”, “membership minus”, or surrogate formula for keeping Ukraine close but not inside would become a ticking time bomb. It would preserve the grey zone, weaken reform incentives, and signal to Russia that Europe still hesitates to recognize Ukraine’s agency. A clearly staged road is acceptable; a second-class destination is not.

Nor should membership be framed as a symbolic reward for suffering or a prize for victory: full adherence to membership criteria has to be demanded, no “easier procedures” should apply. Yet the reverse is also true: the EU cannot hide behind procedure, enlargement fatigue, or national vetoes to postpone a strategic decision.

A realistic horizon for accession is obviously not immediate, but neither should it be pushed into an indefinite future. The year 2031 is not a utopian slogan, but a serious working guideline. As the analysis of the accession roadmap proves, this is technically realistic, provided that political will is maintained on all sides. Ukraine has already covered a significant part of the path that other candidates took years to complete: candidate status was obtained in 2022; accession negotiations were formally opened in June 2024; and the screening of all legislation was completed in September 2025. As of spring 2026, Ukraine is technically ready to open all six negotiation clusters (as of June 15th the EU and Ukraine opened the first cluster -- editor's note). The slowest preparatory phase is effectively behind us. If Ukraine reforms quickly, the negotiations can be completed by the end of 2028. This is not rhetorical optimism: the European Commission noted in November 2025 that Ukraine is among the countries making the fastest progress in reforms. It will take about a year from the end of negotiations to the accession treaty. Ratification by all EU countries will take about another one to two years.

No excuses

By the time EU accession reaches its decisive phase, the war will have undoubtedly ended. But the war should neither halt Ukraine’s reforms, nor become an excuse for the EU to delay Ukrainian membership. The war makes this process more urgent, not less. The longer Ukraine’s membership is postponed, the more lives are lost, cities ruined, and potential depleted. Europe simply cannot afford to let Ukraine become occupied by Russia and then be deployed as a weapon against Europe. Also, the current political scandals in Ukraine cannot be a reason to stop integration. After all, these are part of a normal process of cleansing from corruption and transforming political culture.

Hence, the question is not only whether Ukraine can be made ready for the EU. Instead, it is whether Europe can be made ready for the bipolar century now emerging. The old enlargement logic, in which the Union teaches, evaluates, and finally absorbs a candidate, is outdated, insufficient, and patronizing. Ukraine’s accession calls for another logic: political honesty, institutional co-adaptation, and a realistic and clearly protected horizon of full membership.

The formula is demanding but clear: strict criteria, no shortcuts, no undeserved rewards, no surrogate membership, no patronizing tone, no indefinite postponement, and no more grey zones. The endpoint is a stronger, more innovative, more independent, and united Europe that can act as a leading global player.

 

Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council.

Yuliya Shtaltovna is a professor of intercultural and international management at HS Fresenius, Germany and a research professor at the Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine.