Shujaat AHMADZADA: "We are witnessing the emergence of a new geopolitical axis between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye"

22.06.2026 ( Caucasian Journal ) Caucasian Journal's guest today is Shujaat AHMADZADA, an independent analyst and the editor at the Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation. Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Dear Shujaat, welcome. Azerbaijan–Armenia normalisation — and perhaps Armenia–Turkey normalisation as well — increasingly appear to be the key drivers of wider transformation in the South Caucasus. How do you assess the current dynamics? What factors are slowing progress, and what must be done now to broaden the current breakthrough? Shujaat AHMADZADA: Indeed, we are witnessing what I would call the emergence of a new geopolitical axis between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. Something unthinkable even five years ago. The axis remains in its early inception, not yet institutionalized, but at this pace we could see that change before long. Peace and reconciliation are not the same thing. Institutionalization without societal reconciliation produces a peace that is brittle and reversible. The biggest obstacle to institutionalizing peace is that the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan became so entrenched over the past three decades that deep mistrust persists. We are not dealing with an episodic dispute to be resolved overnight; we are dealing with an entire what I’d call “Architecture of Enmity” that has to be dismantled. That architecture is not only the perception of the Other, it is the whole infrastructure of rivalry built to sustain that perception. Detaching from it will take time. Here I’d draw a distinction that often gets blurred: peace and reconciliation are not the same thing. Institutionalization without societal reconciliation produces a peace that is brittle and reversible. The everyday normalization of peace we now see in both societies is the real breakthrough precisely because it begins to touch that deeper layer. To put it cynically: the wars to the north and to the south have, paradoxically, increased the agency of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The short-term goal, therefore, is twofold: to ensure we do not slip back from this normalized understanding of peace, and to convert it into durable structures before the moment passes. And the moment will pass if we let it. This window is open precisely because the regional order is unsettled, but unsettled orders do not stay open indefinitely. AK: Do you think the outcome of Armenia’s elections is likely to change the situation in the long run, or was it something that was already expected by many stakeholders? I would not frame Armenia’s elections as a choice between peace and war, but I’d agree that electoral outcomes matter a great deal for relations with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. For now, Yerevan has a government that declares itself committed to normalization with both. The opposition does not necessarily advocate for war, but it is critical of the process as it stands. The positive read, at least, is that the process has been spared an abrupt rupture. Whether it continues on its current trajectory will depend on the negotiations themselves rather than on the election alone. The result did not hand the government the full constitutional majority it would need to comfortably carry a constitutional referendum and that could prove a real complication, given that the constitutional question sits close to the center of the normalization file. But it is too early to conclude the process has stalled. So, to your question: I don't think the outcome reorders the board in the long run. It was, broadly, what most serious stakeholders anticipated. The decisive moments are still ahead, at the negotiating table. AK: We are witnessing a spiraling international attention to the region. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has become a frequent visitor, travelling recently both to Baku and Yerevan, just like Vice President JD Vance who paid unprecedented visits to both capitals earlier this year. This is placing the South Caucasus at the center of a complicated power game. What is actually happening in the regional security field? How is the "Russia factor" viewed from Baku? And what about the growing “U.S.–Iran factor,” which has become the newest complication in an already crowded theater? There is certainly increased attention from outside the region - but whether the region is a “playground” in the literal sense, I’m doubtful. To put it cynically: the wars to the north and to the south have, paradoxically, increased the agency of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The process today is less affected by great-power competition than it was a decade ago - at a time, ironically, when the international environment was far more stable and the neighborhood far more peaceful. This does not mean malicious external designs are absent; there are certainly actors with an interest in disrupting the process. My argument is that Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply more resilient to them now - and that resilience is largely a function of the conflict’s own gravity having dissipated. When there is no live territorial dispute for an outside power to exploit, there is far less for that power to pull on. Russia’s pull as the regional hegemon has clearly weakened... A hegemon consumed elsewhere is a hegemon with less to spend here. On the “Russia factor”: for Azerbaijan, Russia remains a neighbour, and venues for partnership exist. But Russia’s pull as the regional hegemon has clearly weakened - largely because the war in Ukraine has bogged Moscow down in a conflict from which exit grows harder by the month. A hegemon consumed elsewhere is a hegemon with less to spend here. AK: Speaking about the US involvement, I cannot help mentioning the TRIPP and all the broader connectivity agenda. Forgive me for placing so many issues in one interview “basket”, but that is how our regional agenda has evolved. Even a short comment on the progress with the Middle Corridor would be welcome. There are many important nuances, for example the strategic choice between the two competing rail connections from Azerbaijan to Turkey: the direct one from Nakhchivan (under construction) and the post-Soviet route through Armenia (Gyumri). Which model appears more realistic? The Middle Corridor is the mega-term of the moment. There’s a great deal of talk around it, but the most realistic economic assessments point out that its real payoff lies in inter-regional trade between the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These two markets are remarkably under-connected despite their geographic proximity - and connecting them ought to be the priority. TRIPP, a level below, is envisioned as part of this wider route, though we’ll have to see how that unfolds, since even the infrastructure there is not yet in place. As for how it develops, I don’t think Azerbaijan feels any pressure to treat this as an either/or. The investment pledge demonstrates that Baku views the Nakhchivan–Kars railway as important, but that does not make the Yeraskh option [also known as Dilucu option, see map below and article here - CJ] a non-starter. The key is to recognise that this “choice” resonates far more in geopolitical discussion than it does in operational reality. The logic by which routes are read geopolitically is distinct from the logic by which they are actually run. For trade operators, the calculus is affordability, and on that measure, other routes may well prove more competitive. If connectivity opens up regionally, operators will have a genuine menu for moving goods east to west: via Georgia, via central Armenia, via southern Armenia, and so on. Abundance of options, not a single contested artery, is the more likely - and more desirable - outcome. AK: Experts disagree on whether the South Caucasus should be viewed as a coherent region or simply as three separate political trajectories. Is a "window of opportunity" finally opening to fill the trilateral cooperation vacuum? Our Journal has long advocated projects that encourage regional cooperation, and recently has been exploring the Visegrad Group as a model. The viability of that model was confirmed by both the Central European and Georgian experts in our webinars series, while simultaneously, a similar view of V4 relevance appeared in a recent article by Rusif Huseynov. What’s you view? Do you think the idea of a South Caucasian trilateral structure is "in the air"? There is certainly more space for regionalism now that one of the great obstacles, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, is off the table. The idea is in the air. But the way it is delivered will likely differ from the Visegrád or Baltic models. Despite their close geographic proximity, the South Caucasus states do not share fully aligned foreign and security priorities. It may look that way on the surface, but deeper down those priorities diverge. For Azerbaijan, a role in inner-Eurasian politics through various institutions sits somewhat at odds with the increasingly pro-EU orientation voiced in Armenia. On one hand, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are distancing themselves from Russia; on the other, Tbilisi is seeking more pragmatic relations with Moscow - which does not, in itself, mean Yerevan or Baku reject that concept outright. The point is that threat and security perceptions genuinely differ across the three. That makes a deeply interconnected, institutionalised regionalism spanning foreign and security policy very hard to imagine. Connectivity, however, can serve as the umbrella term. A more pragmatic, economy-centric project could make the South Caucasus troika far more interconnected than a political one ever could. Most attention today falls on Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity, but in regional terms, it is the Georgia–Azerbaijan link that already matters globally, and even hypothetically, Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity will lag well behind the existing Azerbaijani–Georgian one. So for now, economy-centric regionalism is simply more feasible and more attainable than the political kind. AK: Thank you very much! Follow the Caucasian Journal :

22.06.2026 (Caucasian Journal) Caucasian Journal's guest today is Shujaat AHMADZADA, an independent analyst and the editor at the Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation.
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Dear Shujaat, welcome. Azerbaijan–Armenia normalisation — and perhaps Armenia–Turkey normalisation as well — increasingly appear to be the key drivers of wider transformation in the South Caucasus. How do you assess the current dynamics? What factors are slowing progress, and what must be done now to broaden the current breakthrough?
Shujaat AHMADZADA: Indeed, we are witnessing what I would call the emergence of a new geopolitical axis between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. Something unthinkable even five years ago. The axis remains in its early inception, not yet institutionalized, but at this pace we could see that change before long.
Peace and reconciliation are not the same thing. Institutionalization without societal reconciliation produces a peace that is brittle and reversible.
The biggest obstacle to institutionalizing peace is that the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan became so entrenched over the past three decades that deep mistrust persists. We are not dealing with an episodic dispute to be resolved overnight; we are dealing with an entire what I’d call “Architecture of Enmity” that has to be dismantled. That architecture is not only the perception of the Other, it is the whole infrastructure of rivalry built to sustain that perception. Detaching from it will take time.
Here I’d draw a distinction that often gets blurred: peace and reconciliation are not the same thing. Institutionalization without societal reconciliation produces a peace that is brittle and reversible. The everyday normalization of peace we now see in both societies is the real breakthrough precisely because it begins to touch that deeper layer.
 To put it cynically: the wars to the north and to the south have, paradoxically, increased the agency of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The short-term goal, therefore, is twofold: to ensure we do not slip back from this normalized understanding of peace, and to convert it into durable structures before the moment passes. And the moment will pass if we let it. This window is open precisely because the regional order is unsettled, but unsettled orders do not stay open indefinitely. 
AK: Do you think the outcome of Armenia’s elections is likely to change the situation in the long run, or was it something that was already expected by many stakeholders?
I would not frame Armenia’s elections as a choice between peace and war, but I’d agree that electoral outcomes matter a great deal for relations with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. For now, Yerevan has a government that declares itself committed to normalization with both. The opposition does not necessarily advocate for war, but it is critical of the process as it stands.
The positive read, at least, is that the process has been spared an abrupt rupture. Whether it continues on its current trajectory will depend on the negotiations themselves rather than on the election alone. The result did not hand the government the full constitutional majority it would need to comfortably carry a constitutional referendum and that could prove a real complication, given that the constitutional question sits close to the center of the normalization file. But it is too early to conclude the process has stalled.
So, to your question: I don't think the outcome reorders the board in the long run. It was, broadly, what most serious stakeholders anticipated. The decisive moments are still ahead, at the negotiating table.
AK: We are witnessing a spiraling international attention to the region. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has become a frequent visitor, travelling recently both to Baku and Yerevan, just like Vice President JD Vance who paid unprecedented visits to both capitals earlier this year. This is placing the South Caucasus at the center of a complicated power game. What is actually happening in the regional security field? How is the "Russia factor" viewed from Baku? And what about the growing “U.S.–Iran factor,” which has become the newest complication in an already crowded theater?
There is certainly increased attention from outside the region - but whether the region is a “playground” in the literal sense, I’m doubtful. To put it cynically: the wars to the north and to the south have, paradoxically, increased the agency of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The process today is less affected by great-power competition than it was a decade ago - at a time, ironically, when the international environment was far more stable and the neighborhood far more peaceful.
This does not mean malicious external designs are absent; there are certainly actors with an interest in disrupting the process. My argument is that Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply more resilient to them now - and that resilience is largely a function of the conflict’s own gravity having dissipated. When there is no live territorial dispute for an outside power to exploit, there is far less for that power to pull on.
Russia’s pull as the regional hegemon has clearly weakened... A hegemon consumed elsewhere is a hegemon with less to spend here.
On the “Russia factor”: for Azerbaijan, Russia remains a neighbour, and venues for partnership exist. But Russia’s pull as the regional hegemon has clearly weakened - largely because the war in Ukraine has bogged Moscow down in a conflict from which exit grows harder by the month. A hegemon consumed elsewhere is a hegemon with less to spend here.
AK: Speaking about the US involvement, I cannot help mentioning the TRIPP and all the broader connectivity agenda. Forgive me for placing so many issues in one interview “basket”, but that is how our regional agenda has evolved. Even a short comment on the progress with the Middle Corridor would be welcome. There are many important nuances, for example the strategic choice between the two competing rail connections from Azerbaijan to Turkey: the direct one from Nakhchivan (under construction) and the post-Soviet route through Armenia (Gyumri). Which model appears more realistic?
The Middle Corridor is the mega-term of the moment. There’s a great deal of talk around it, but the most realistic economic assessments point out that its real payoff lies in inter-regional trade between the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These two markets are remarkably under-connected despite their geographic proximity - and connecting them ought to be the priority. TRIPP, a level below, is envisioned as part of this wider route, though we’ll have to see how that unfolds, since even the infrastructure there is not yet in place.
As for how it develops, I don’t think Azerbaijan feels any pressure to treat this as an either/or. The investment pledge demonstrates that Baku views the Nakhchivan–Kars railway as important, but that does not make the Yeraskh option [also known as Dilucu option, see map below and article here - CJ] a non-starter. The key is to recognise that this “choice” resonates far more in geopolitical discussion than it does in operational reality. The logic by which routes are read geopolitically is distinct from the logic by which they are actually run.


For trade operators, the calculus is affordability, and on that measure, other routes may well prove more competitive. If connectivity opens up regionally, operators will have a genuine menu for moving goods east to west: via Georgia, via central Armenia, via southern Armenia, and so on. Abundance of options, not a single contested artery, is the more likely - and more desirable - outcome.
AK: Experts disagree on whether the South Caucasus should be viewed as a coherent region or simply as three separate political trajectories. Is a "window of opportunity" finally opening to fill the trilateral cooperation vacuum? Our Journal has long advocated projects that encourage regional cooperation, and recently has been exploring the Visegrad Group as a model. The viability of that model was confirmed by both the Central European and Georgian experts in our webinars series, while simultaneously, a similar view of V4 relevance appeared in a recent article by Rusif Huseynov. What’s you view? Do you think the idea of a South Caucasian trilateral structure is "in the air"?
There is certainly more space for regionalism now that one of the great obstacles, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, is off the table. The idea is in the air. But the way it is delivered will likely differ from the Visegrád or Baltic models. Despite their close geographic proximity, the South Caucasus states do not share fully aligned foreign and security priorities. It may look that way on the surface, but deeper down those priorities diverge.
For Azerbaijan, a role in inner-Eurasian politics through various institutions sits somewhat at odds with the increasingly pro-EU orientation voiced in Armenia. On one hand, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are distancing themselves from Russia; on the other, Tbilisi is seeking more pragmatic relations with Moscow - which does not, in itself, mean Yerevan or Baku reject that concept outright. The point is that threat and security perceptions genuinely differ across the three. That makes a deeply interconnected, institutionalised regionalism spanning foreign and security policy very hard to imagine.
Connectivity, however, can serve as the umbrella term. A more pragmatic, economy-centric project could make the South Caucasus troika far more interconnected than a political one ever could. Most attention today falls on Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity, but in regional terms, it is the Georgia–Azerbaijan link that already matters globally, and even hypothetically, Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity will lag well behind the existing Azerbaijani–Georgian one. So for now, economy-centric regionalism is simply more feasible and more attainable than the political kind.                AK: Thank you very much!Follow the Caucasian Journal: