Buras: In opposition, PiS will have no brakes to reach for the anti-Ukrainian card

Jakub Majmurek: Tusk, even before he became prime minister, embarked on his first foreign trip – to Brussels – to address the KPO issue. Do you think the change of power in Poland alone will unlock EU funds?

Piotr Buras: We don’t know what exactly Tusk heard from Ursula von der Leyen, but I don’t think it was that simple. While the European Commission clearly wants to disburse KPO funds to Poland as soon as possible, the Polish government will have to present at least a plan on how to restore the rule of law and meet other milestones.

So will a statutory change be needed to reverse the PiS judicial reforms?

Yes, I expect that the new Diet will have to come up with a law that meets the Commission’s expectations and show that it is at least trying to communicate with the President on this issue. However, if the president vetoes it or sends it back to the Court again, where it will be stuck like the previous one, the Commission may consider that the Tusk government did what it could and agreed to renegotiate the milestones to unlock the funds.

So you don’t believe the NIP funds will come in this year?

Not really. What may come in this year is €5 billion from the Repower Europe fund. This is a new fund that is formally part of the KPO and does not require us to meet legislative criteria.

But here’s the problem, too: the European Commission has until November 21 to make a decision on the matter. The Morawiecki government presented its proposals to spend the funds in August, but the Commission did not like them. So it’s unclear whether the current government will submit a new version of the proposal in time. I doubt it, because the money would probably have already been collected by Tusk, Law and Justice has no reason to make the new prime minister such a gift. A new government, on the other hand, is unlikely to be in place by then. Theoretically, the president could name Donald Tusk as a candidate for prime minister as early as November 13, the Sejm could approve his government the same week, and Tusk could present a new plan by the 21st, but this is unlikely.

A sense of relief has spread in Brussels and key European capitals after the new coalition won?

Europe feared a scenario in which PiS wins for the third time, “rewarded,” as it were, for its confrontational course toward Europe. This would solidify PiS’s anti-European attitudes and further tighten its policies in its third term. A third Law and Justice government would also likely form a Eurosceptic axis together with Orbán’s Hungary, perhaps still with Fica’s Slovakia and Meloni’s Italy, which would affect not only relations with the European Commission, but also inside the European Council – that is, the assembly of heads of government that makes key decisions in the Union.

Meanwhile, now in a major European country, a government is coming to power that, even if it will not always agree with France and Germany, will have a more constructive approach and will not want to use European politics as a tool to build divisions in domestic politics. It certainly elicits a sigh of relief.

So will Poland sit at the adult table in Brussels again?

I don’t like describing politics with such metaphors. International politics doesn’t work that way. If we want to be treated as partners by either Brussels or Germany, we ourselves must start treating them as partners – whether we are listened to depends on this.

On the other hand, it is a fact that probably no Polish government had at the beginning such a credit of trust in Brussels as the new Tusk government will have. Because the contrast with the previous one is huge. But whether he is ultimately listened to depends on what he has to say. Will it join a constructive dialogue on the future of the Union, its enlargement, on the problem of migration. Which, in turn, depends on what kind of political space for such a discussion Tusk will have in the country.

While Tusk was in talks with von der Leyen, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Environment was in talks with von der Leyen. The European Parliament’s Constitutional Committee voted to refer the draft amendments to the EU treaties for further deliberation. Tusk has already said he is skeptical of them. How should his government respond to this discussion?

I think it’s worth pointing out at the outset how the constitutional process actually works in the EU, because in Poland the debate about amending the treaties is causing great excitement, heated up by the right wing.

First, the europarliament cannot vote to change the treaties. The vote in the constitutional committee sets in motion a very long process, the outcome of which is uncertain – because any changes to the treaties must ultimately be agreed to by the member states. They may be blocked by Poland, Hungary or Slovakia.

Second, these changes are not at all as revolutionary as portrayed by the Polish right.

The abolition of the veto in European Council votes is not a revolution?

This does not yet create a European superstate, as the current government threatens. Many of these changes that have been proposed make sense – such as the abolition of the veto right when opening successive chapters of accession negotiations with member countries. In this way, one country, in order to win something for itself in the Union, will not be able to block the accession process of a candidate country, which itself is exemplarily implementing the successive stages of accession. Removing the veto on foreign policy will also prevent one country from blocking sanctions.

Many of these proposals sound more revolutionary than they actually are. For example, a common defense policy. It’s really not that Europe has to leave NATO now and create a European army that will be the main security guarantor for the region. For the European Union or selected member countries to build a capability capable of replacing NATO, it would need 12-20 years of military investment.

This is why the prospect of an American withdrawal from Europe or even a reorientation of American resources toward the Indo-Pacific is so worrisome. And at the same time quite likely, if a Republican wins – because more and more politicians in that party believe that Europe should take much more responsibility for its own security. Therefore, it is important that Polish security policy also has a European dimension.

What would it consist of specifically?

The key question is: to what extent should Poland join the cooperation of the European arms industry? Because no matter how much we talk about joint European armies, headquarters, maneuvers, the basic problem today remains that Europe cannot produce enough weapons and ammunition – as can be seen, for example, in the transfer of weapons to Ukraine. This is now the primary challenge facing Europe: increasing the capabilities of our defense industry.

How can this be done?

For example, a special fund could be established to finance such expenses. But this requires greater coordination of national defense industries. The question is whether Poland will be able to join this project, as we have already made very serious commitments to purchase equipment in the States and South Korea.

We also did not join the German European Sky Shield initiative, because we are developing a similar project with the Americans, and this is rather mutually exclusive. At the same time, there is nothing to prevent us from supporting European efforts in this regard. Increasing Europe’s defense capabilities is in our interest, sooner or later Europe will have to take more active responsibility for its security, and this will not be possible without cooperation.

Returning to the proposed treaty changes – if they are not so revolutionary, why does Tusk remain skeptical?

Many European capitals are skeptical. I think that in his reservations about changing the treaties, Donald Tusk will remain as much as possible in the mainstream of European politics, together with the Scandinavian countries, the Baltics, Austria. That’s why I’m skeptical about the likelihood of deep treaty change.

Nevertheless, I believe that the Polish government should remain open to a constructive discussion on the future of Europe. Because changes can also be made in other ways than by revising treaties. In order to count in this discussion, the Polish government must first speak up, put forward some proposals of its own, and not just accuse Germany and France – who came out with their reform proposal – of trying to dominate the Union.

Wouldn’t some of the changes the EP committee adopted benefit Poland? For example, the establishment of a European energy union, or the strengthening of regulations making access to European funds conditional on adherence to the rule of law – which would be an additional policy protecting Polish citizens from the excesses of right-wing populism.

The energy union largely collects policies that Europe has been pursuing for some time. This is not some great revolution either. After all, we already have mechanisms in place to allow the EU to jointly purchase gas. Poland even before Tusk was one of the originators of this solution, it took us a long time to convince our European partners. So yes, this is definitely a solution to serve Poland.

On the issue of the rule of law, the new government will have a clear mandate to speak out strongly in favor of strengthening the mechanisms that protect the rule of law in the Union. Not only in terms of the conditionality of access to European funds, but also the judgments of the Court of Justice. It must be ensured that the Commission acts decisively whenever member states ignore CJEU rulings on the rule of law. Because he has the right tools, such as heavy financial penalties, he just doesn’t always use them.

And there can be no repetition of situations like what happened in Poland, when the PiS government, with the hands of the Przyłębska Tribunal, “invalidated” the CJEU rulings and effectively rejected the fundamental principle of the supremacy of Community law over national law. This is the road to total anarchy, wrecking the entire EU legal system. If we don’t deal with this, no enlargement of the Union, including Ukraine, which we should care about, will happen.

Why?

Because if we don’t strengthen the mechanisms of the rule of law, the countries of the Union, especially those skeptical of enlargement from the beginning, will have the argument that if the new countries refuse to comply with the rule of law, there’s basically nothing we can do about it.

If the Union doesn’t change, aren’t we in danger of a multi-speed Europe and pushing Poland further down the circle of integration? Or is it not a threat, but the optimal place for us?

The core of integration is the common market, which includes all the countries of the Union. And because of the Union’s reliance on the common market, it is difficult for any countries to recede into the background of integration or for any to begin to integrate more deeply within it. It is impossible to create a two-speed common market.

I’ll give an example: there have been claims from the Law and Justice side that Poland should sign out of the Union’s climate policy. But this cannot be done while remaining in the common market, because if Polish players were not bound by EU carbon rules, this would violate the rules of fair and equal competition. For the same reasons, selected countries cannot deepen the integration of their energy policies.

It is much easier to integrate in spheres not directly related to the common market: cooperation in defense or migration policy, for example. Here, in fact, several countries may decide that they are working more closely together.

However, there is a deeper integrated area in the common market: the eurozone.

This is true, but it includes most of the countries belonging to the common market – Poland is one of the exceptions. But I allow for a scenario in which the eurozone strengthens at the expense of other members.

Except that this scenario would be much more likely if PiS was still in power. Because such a move would then make sense, it would move countries that are politically problematic, blocking the operation of the Union, away from the problems of the Eurozone. Now this scenario will probably be shelved, there will instead be pressure on Poland to join the eurozone. I think we should be interested in this prospect.

What could be the new government’s biggest conflicts with the major European capitals, Berlin and Paris?

The problem with Morawiecki’s government was that he simply did not want to solve certain problems – such as migration – because they served as fuel for his domestic politics. This should and must change. This will not eliminate contentious topics, but it will cause us to seek agreements, and compromises will not be equated with failure. Differences of opinion and related tensions in competition policy (the issue of subsidies, for which Germany has a lot of money and we and other countries much less), the EU budget or security policy will remain.

There is bound to be a dispute over the classification of nuclear power, whether it should be supported as renewable energy. Here we have different views from Berlin, we have been working more with France and I don’t think that will change.

What about the new government’s migration policy?

I hope that the new government will restore the rule of law at the border so that migrants’ asylum applications will begin to be processed. This, however, means that we will face a similar problem that Italians, Greeks, Germans are facing today: there will be a lot of people on the ground whose asylum application will be rejected and the question will be what to do with them, whether and how to send them back to their country of origin. It cannot be solved without cooperation with the Union and its countries. Because Poland alone will not be able to negotiate readmission agreements with migrants’ countries of origin.

You have said that the new government will not use the European issue to play domestic politics. However, I guess you can’t count on Law and Justice not to do it from the opposition benches?

I will say more: the parameters of the Polish European debate will change, in fact they have already changed. We will have an opposition consisting of two or three, counting Sovereign Poland, more or less Eurosceptic parties.

PiS has radicalized its positions toward the EU. All this discussion about a European superstate, the portrayal of the future Tusk government as a threat to Polish independence – as Jaroslaw Sellin said on election night – the campaign of the right-wing media against changes to European treaties: all this, in my opinion, is a prelude to the very polarized debate around Europe that will soon be before us. Opposition right-wing parties will compete for an increasingly Eurosceptic electorate, which will fuel their radicalization.

So far, PiS has defended itself from the patch of “post-lexit” or even anti-European party, as public attitudes have remained strongly pro-European. Can this change?

That’s what I’m afraid of. Support for the EU is shallower in Poland than the poll responses to the question “do you support Poland’s presence in the EU” would indicate. A CBOS survey last year found that as many as 33 percent of the Poles, that is, one in three, recognize that being in the Union limits our sovereignty too much.

PiS can effectively mobilize similar public sentiment, especially around EU reform and the possible accession of Ukraine. Because in opposition, he will have no brakes to reach even more strongly for the anti-Ukrainian card. Similarly, anti-European sentiment could be unleashed if we become a net contributor to the EU budget.

And EU climate policy doesn’t?

Also. This can be seen well in the example of Germany. German society is generally pro-European, but when the effects of the energy transition began to affect ordinary people in real terms, the mood shifted – as the results of the far-right Alternative for Germany show. This is a cautionary tale about the consequences of a green transformation done without considering the social costs.

The Polish context is, of course, different from the German, but the combination of the costs of the green transition, black propaganda targeting EU reforms, and bilateral disputes with Ukraine – which, as we have seen, have been easily blown up in recent months – could prove explosive. The British example shows how quickly public sentiment can change. I’m not saying that Polexit will be a real prospect, but I won’t be surprised if some party throws the slogan of leaving the Union, because it is moving too much in the “federal” direction. And when a serious party officially raises such a slogan, it changes the parameters of the entire discussion about Europe.

Question: how will the new government address this? Will it succumb to the sovereignty discourse? On the contrary, will Tusk translate the question he asked in the campaign “do we want to be in or out of the Union” into a question about EU reforms, Poland’s active policy in the Union, the euro.

Are we not facing a wave of right-wing populism in the spring European elections?

We can certainly see an increase in support for the radical right in many EU countries. At the same time, in these elections they will not yet become the new European mainstream, they will strengthen themselves, but not enough to have a real impact on the parliamentary majority in the EP. But we don’t know how it will be in the next ones yet.

The new government will not wedge its foreign policy with President Duda? Will new disputes over a chair at EU summits await us, as in the days when Tusk was prime minister and Lech Kaczynski was president?

It all depends on how Andrzej Duda sees his political future. If the end of his presidency is devoted to building his position on the Polish right, cooperation with a pro-European government may prove difficult.

Certainly, problems are posed by the recently adopted law defining cooperation between the president and the government on European policy issues, which could be a source of tension and disputes over who is to properly represent Poland in Europe. And this at a time when we are about to hold the presidency of the Union.

I think that putting a stick in the spokes of the new government’s foreign policy may even have been the main purpose of the bill. Because I can’t imagine Tusk agreeing to have Duda represent Poland at EU summits.

Once Tusk and President Kaczynski went conflicted to one of the summits, the government did not want to provide the president with a plane, but the chancellery arranged a charter with LOT.

Yes, it was grotesque. Similar situations, if repeated, will certainly not serve Polish interests.

What will the new government’s relations with Kiev look like? Tusk should go there as one of the first capitals? The conflict over grain will not disappear as a result of a change in power, there are real differences of interest here.

I think Tusk should go to Kiev as prime minister immediately after his visit to Brussels. Of course, problems with Ukrainian grain will not go away, especially in the context of Ukraine’s accession to the Union. But in recent months, the problem more than the objective conflict of interest has been the way it has been presented in national politics.

PiS first ignored the problem of Ukrainian grain flooding the market for months, and did not try to seek a solution through negotiations with the European Commission and the Ukrainian side. In turn, this summer, solving the problem simply ceased to interest those in power – because playing up the issue was deemed profitable for the election campaign. So the new government will have to sit down calmly with the Ukrainians, representatives of the Commission, other interested countries and look for a solution in this triangle.

In general, we have a lot of conflicting data on Ukrainian grain on the Polish market. The European Commission says, for example, that there have been no serious market disruptions that would justify closing the market to Ukrainian grain. The Morawiecki government claims otherwise. Market analysts, on the other hand, pointed out that the biggest problem for Polish farmers this summer was low prices, but these were not caused by grain imports to Poland, but by the situation on world markets – as they also shape the price of grain in Poland.

Before the Law and Justice party quarreled with Ukraine, there were even fantasies of a Polish-Ukrainian Inter-Mediterranean, representing a new pole in Europe, balancing Germany’s influence.

These are fantasies that Ukrainians are not interested in. Kiev does not want Poland to play the role of its “advocate” in the world, as it has shown it can conduct a very assertive global policy itself. If we are an attractive partner for Ukraine somewhere, it is in the dimension of EU accession.

In the Polish public debate, everyone declares support for it, but in these declarations there is a lot of hypocrisy and little conceptual strength. Because accession means having to solve a number of problems. If only the EU budget. It may not be that there will be no money for countries like Poland due to Ukraine’s accession, but the EU budget will certainly cost more. Not only because of Ukraine, but also because of the Union’s new priorities. If only for the cost of servicing the debt incurred under the pandemic fund. The question here is whether Poland is ready for EU taxes to strengthen the budget? And if not, does he know where to get the 50 billion euros the EU has promised Ukraine?

Instead of fantasizing about the Inter-Mediterranean, we should be an active participant in the debate on this issue. Or on how Europe can realistically assist Ukraine further in terms of security – because here, too, the Americans will expect Europe to take over much of the effort from them.

Will Ukrainian politics polarize like European politics?

There is such a danger that historical issues will return, for example. PiS in February 2022 decided that no matter what, it was necessary to help Ukraine, which was struggling to survive as an independent state. I believe in the sincerity of this decision, but it also had many beneficial effects for the United Right government: it allowed Poland to emerge from international marginalization and become a serious player, at least in the first months of the war. It also enabled a rapprochement with the Biden administration.

How will she react to the change of power in Poland?

The Americans, if only because of Poland’s role as a “logistical center” for the transfer of military aid to Ukraine, mainly care about the predictability of governments in Poland. The change of power does not affect it, the strategic ties remain. However, a new factor comes into play: the Tusk government will be politically and ideologically much closer to the Biden administration than the Morawiecki cabinet. With the Biden administration now entering its final year, in November 2024 we will see if voters extend its mandate.

Biden and his administration emphasize what a threat revisionist powers such as China and Russia are to democratic states and the rules-based international order. Where does Poland stand in this global process?

I think it’s worth saying to ourselves that we are not entering a reality where the world will be divided into an American and Chinese bloc. In between are a number of middle powers such as Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Iran, Turkey, South Africa, which have influence over global markets for energy, food, which have at least locally significant military clout. And they will balance in this situation, try to play the game with both poles forming.

Poland is not a country with such potential. Where all this will go, we can only have an impact by co-shaping EU policy and its place in the new reality. The voice of the European Union should be strongly heard in a changing world. However, this is not always the case, as can be seen now that Europe’s voice is very little heard in the new installment of the Middle East conflict.

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Piotr Buras is director of the Warsaw Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

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