Kowal: In the history of the Third Republic, women have played a big role in diplomacy

Michal Sutowski: Who will now determine Polish foreign policy? For the last eight years it was not the Foreign Ministry or the Prime Minister, the disposition center was in Nowogrodzka. Where will it move to now?

Pawel Kowal: The government is in charge of foreign policy, and it will be conducted by the foreign minister, together with the prime minister, this was clearly stated in the exposé. Minister Adam Szlapka will play an obvious role in European affairs.

The government center, also through personnel, can be coherent and share the work functionally, ok. But then there is the president. One, that he has the constitutional authority to do so, and two, that a law a few weeks ago gave him additional powers. And three – several Polish governments have had a tradition of “wars for the chair”….

The presidential law in question is, after all, unconstitutional. The president under cohabitation should cooperate with the government. On the other hand, he can perform functions specified in the Constitution, related to representation, personal persuasion in the international arena in favor of the Polish raison d’état. Sometimes it is even advisable and helpful.

For example, when?

For example, in relations with some eastern countries, where the systems of government are strongly presidential. Then the personal support of the president helps a lot – I’m not even talking about Ukraine, where the situation is more complicated, but there are such important countries for us in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, for example, where the presidential level always plays a big role. But this is always done on the basis of government policy, according to which the president presents the state position, which, however, is formulated by the government.

I understand what the constitution says, but conflicts over the chair – that is, over who is to represent Poland in the European Union – have already occurred under conditions of much less acute conflict than today.

There is no conflict over the chair, the prime minister flew to the European Council and sat in the right chair. He was there as a proper representative of Poland.

The government and the president are two players, and then there is the parliament and its Foreign Affairs Committee, which you chair. Again, for the past eight years, she didn’t seem particularly necessary….

The commission is supposed to create a parliamentary platform for a strong public justification of the government’s foreign policy. We will talk about it externally on the international stage, and now there is great interest in changes in Poland.

To speak, not to lead?

Foreign policy is conducted by the government, period. The foreign minister is key. On the other hand, as a parliamentarian and its head, I intend to ensure that the Foreign Affairs Committee – as in many mature democracies – is treated as a special parliamentary body that is specifically involved in supporting, justifying the government’s actions. The idea is to also benefit from the parliamentary support of politicians who normally oppose the government’s policies, but on security and foreign policy issues are willing to make exceptions. The Commission is a good place for such activities.

But does this “supporting, justifying the government’s actions” mean that committee members will outwardly repeat that the government is right?

No, it means that we have a vision of a social foreign policy, that is, one in which the foreign ministry itself, the prime minister and the entire government fulfill their responsibilities. In the modern world, however, international relations is also more than that: think tanks, community organizations, churches, aid organizations, honorary consuls… There is also a whole sphere of paradiplomacy – that is, international cooperation carried out by local governments. All of this can strengthen the effectiveness of our traditional foreign policy. And many of these roles fit naturally with the parliament’s mission.

On top of that, the role of MPs representing the majority is also to explain the government’s policies, to tell the public about them in an understandable way. That’s why I myself am heavily involved in social media – so that people can see that meetings with diplomats, opinion leaders, community organizations, are not coffees and chitchat, but an additional instrument of action.

And what can an MP do that the government can’t?

This, in turn, is a matter of parliamentary diplomacy. Among other things, the idea is that there can be contacts through parliament that would be awkward at the government level for various reasons – Taiwan is a good example. In addition, also here on the ground we need to reach out to the circles that deal with foreign policy in Poland. And this is a very absorbing, special task for which, by nature, a minister or prime minister does not have much time.

That’s why we’re going to do it – we’re going to invite think tanks to the Foreign Affairs Committee, for example, so that people who have a lot of knowledge and good contacts in the world know what’s going on in international policy issues in the Sejm and are themselves in touch with the Polish government. Until now, there was no such forum.

And won’t these meetings always be the same gentlemen again as before 2015?

No, because also an important element that I care about is a positive response to the demand for a greater presence of women in foreign policy, a trend that is called feminist foreign policy.

I know that in the history of the Third Republic, women have played a big role in diplomacy – just to mention the ambassador to the Vatican Hanna Suchocka, the ambassador to Spain and the Czech Republic Grażyna Bernatowicz and Barbara Tuge-Erecińska, who headed posts in Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain or Cyprus. I learned a lot from them myself. But I also know that more is needed today – that’s why the commission will start a dialogue with social organizations on this topic, we will study the experience of Sweden and Germany, as well as other countries. I am open to it.

And what do we actually want to achieve in foreign policy? In his exposé, the prime minister cited lobbying to sustain and strengthen the West’s military, political and economic assistance to Ukraine as his first goal.

This follows the main axis of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s exposé, which was security. Because it is security that is the main public emotion today, and its problem is the main political issue. Short-term, tactically, so it’s a matter of getting the Ukrainians to move on the front lines, which unfortunately has practically failed this year. But also in the medium term, where we are particularly concerned about protecting the Union’s borders to the east. And in the long term, strategically, of course, it is about putting the country back together after a period of authoritarian Pisarist rule in an environment where the main challenge is security.

Well, one by one. What can we lobby the West on the issue of security in the short term in a situation where President Zelenski himself is unable to break the internal political dispute in the US? After all, Ukraine and the 60 billion in aid to it have become hostage to the dispute between the Republicans and the Democrats, or rather Trump and the Democrats over the wall on the border with Mexico.

We should join this dispute and argue that this is not a matter of “helping Ukraine,” but a security issue for all of Central Europe and the West.

But what do Republicans care about the security of Central Europe? They care about the wall and Trump’s victory.

The argument is simple: these expenditures do not affect the equipment of the border with Mexico in any way.

That’s no argument, because for them spending on rearming Ukraine is an argumentative lever, not the source of the problem.

The more someone tells you that something can’t be done, the more in politics you have to insist that it can be done. The security arguments are on the table and are obvious. Republicans don’t have an actual problem with their voters when it comes to Ukraine – at most, they can create one. Our role is to tell them not to go that way, because it doesn’t make sense. Anyway, those Republicans I talk to mostly already know this themselves.

Isn’t it the case that since Ukraine’s success on the frontline depends so much on U.S. assistance, lobbying for it in Europe is completely secondary to what is obtained in Washington?

Once again: there is no such thing as “helping Ukraine” here, this is actually about helping yourself. If one doesn’t connect in one’s mind between the “Ukraine issue” and the security of one’s own family in two or five years, nothing will get done. Our challenge is to work on the political heads in Europe in such a way that these two cables are connected in them. If you’re talking about some abstract “aid to Ukraine,” a perfectly acceptable answer from a Danish or Dutch politician would be…

“And why not help Gaza?

Well, for example. There are many terrible conflicts in the world, aren’t there?

I understand that it’s not just about them, it’s about us, our security, the countries of the European Union. But what arguments does the new government have on this issue that the Law and Justice government did not have or did not want to use? What gives us leverage with Western partners on this issue? In what sense will this government make a difference?

He doesn’t have to do her, she already is. Because this government is stabilizing the West, and that government was destabilizing.

And is that enough? The same arguments spoken by a more credible actor will make a difference?

I guess that’s what you see with the KPO money issue – a credible political promise and a demonstrated plan to get to a solution gets the job done.

A different logic is at work in the KPO case – that government wanted to subordinate the judiciary, this one did not, and I assume it will try to rectify the situation. But why should our security position in the East now be radically strengthened? Because we are more credible on the rule of law?

The way it works is that you have to have credibility in the West to help yourself in the East – what’s controversial about that?

That the security interests of the Dutch and, even more so, the Italians and Spaniards on the issue of the East do not necessarily coincide with ours. They assume, after all, that Putin is what he is, a nutcase indeed, well, but he won’t drop bombs on Berlin or Amsterdam after all.

Their own think tanks are already writing them clearly that Putin cannot be given time to rearm or regroup. What more needs to be done, gee, to get this into closed heads? After all, it is enough for them to understand it. Again, a great deal depends on the language – there is too much of this “helping” in the narrative and it misdirects the attention of politicians.

What if the U.S. Congress doesn’t agree on aid to Ukraine?

It will get along, not least because military aid to Ukraine is in a package with aid to Israel. The problem is what happens next. One has to wonder how much more can be obtained from Congress before the US presidential campaign actually begins. In any case, what is happening now defines the possibilities on the defense front against Russia in 2024. In any scenario, it will be one more year under the old rules, even if the darkest scenario were to come true and Trump won and decided to change US policy toward Russia.

Is it that the Ukrainians have a list of expectations for specific types of support and weapons – and we should simply push for them to get them, or do we have our own additional agenda here?

We have – it’s about what can be produced from it in Poland. We should have our own industrial agenda in this context and try to ensure that some of the armaments and munitions for Ukraine are made here. That’s one part of the change in approach, because it’s clear that under Law and Justice they weren’t able to tie it together. This is because the Law and Justice party did not understand one basic fact, that almost every element of support for Ukraine can have positive effects for Polish business. That these elements can build jobs in Poland.

But it’s probably not just the Law and Justice position that, however, Polish and Ukrainian economic interests diverge on various issues.

No, it comes from a mindset.

Cereal?

There you have it: the allegedly objective “conflict of interest” was that Ukrainian grain for export, which was to be transported in transit through Poland, was sold cheaply to companies friendly to the power camp. Perhaps someone along the way caught on by accident, but as a general rule, you had to have access and knowledge of this “opportunity” and therefore participate in the procedure. In other words.

Wasn’t it “market failure”?

No, it was an oligarchic arrangement. Always in times of wars, some people want to cash in on someone else’s misfortune, and it is always the role of the state to bar their way. It is no coincidence that Robert Telus, as Minister of Agriculture in the government of Mateusz Morawiecki, never disclosed the list of companies that benefited – although he promised to do so. Meanwhile, this Ukrainian grain should have been safely transported to the Baltic Sea and made money on transit, not blocked the border. It was necessary to show that Poland had the capacity to quickly reorganize transit and make money.

And this was a situation of stupidity or sabotage?

From the series: the desire to make money. In their immediate environment, already highly polygarchized, a profit opportunity presented itself, and the state interest no longer mattered.

Grain is not the only conflicting topic – Polish carriers talk about unfair competition.

Only not from Ukraine. While licenses for Ukrainian carriers were eliminated, the Law and Justice Party issued three times as many licenses as it normally does for everyone else – e.g., the “Ukrainian” carrier. Belarusians or Russians, who must have a license to work in Poland – after which… they announced that there was a crisis in the freight market. And that is to say that the cause of the crisis was fundamentally due to the PiS policy, which was very reminiscent of the visa policy: the more they shouted that it was necessary to protect the Polish market, the more absurdly they issued licenses, significantly above what was in the annual norm.

So there was no objective conflict of interest in which cheaper Ukrainian carriers are crowding out Polish ones?

There was a problem to be solved in a simple way: it was necessary not to issue additional licenses and to carefully check transport within Poland to see if cabotage, i.e. the actual taking over of the market within the European Union, was taking place. From the effects of road inspections so far, this phenomenon was estimated at about 1 percent. transports. But the question arises as to why the Law and Justice government actually reduced inspections. After all, it was the Polish government that was supposed to take care of the interests of the smaller trucking companies in particular – but they ignored them, and then pretended to be innocent. It is not without reason that there were carriers standing on the Polish border representing 8,000 trucks, with a total of 400,000 trucks in Poland.

To block the border with Ukraine was enough.

It was enough because of the Law and Justice Party’s approach to eastern policy, which was in its last phase already based only on the desire for a quick profit or on fomenting anti-Ukrainian sentiment, but not on the country’s interests.

And how would you define those?

Go to the European Union with an initiative for additional funds to improve transport corridors, build warehouses and make money. Because otherwise others will fill the vacuum. After all, if the Black Sea is obstructed as a wheat export channel, it is logical that grain will go through the Baltic Sea.

Let’s talk about one more limit then. Because I’m very curious to know what Prime Minister Tusk meant when he said that the borders are to be tight, but that it can be done humanely. What does this mean specifically?

I have been explaining this to everyone since the beginning of the border crisis: there is no government that wants to stay in power and does not guard the border. Efficiency in its protection, especially if it is the border of the European Union, is absolutely fundamental to both the existence of the government and the functioning of the state. Failure to do so will weaken the position of the Polish authorities.

“I understand “inefficiency” to mean that people should not cross the border, yet they do. But there is another problem there, which is that people are dying on or near that border, including as a direct result of border guards.

They should not die there. That is, so much so as not to make pushbacks, while effectively guarding the border. This is no diabolical dilemma from which “it is impossible to get out.” Depending on terrain and weather conditions, using an electronic barrier and response system or a physical barrier.

And the barrier is supposed to be so effective that no one crosses it.

Yes, border security is all about making sure no one crosses the border illegally.

However, what if it exceeds? Is it back over the fence?

No, then you have to embrace the situation formally, according to the law, and check what a particular person’s status is, and decide what to do next. Of course, border guards must behave according to strict procedures, including possibly additional procedures for special situations – how to deal with a pregnant woman, how to deal with a child, how to deal with an adult male, and how to deal with an immediate threat to life, including a threat to the life of a guard. In contrast, there is no question of stopping protecting the border or turning a blind eye to the effectiveness of protection. This is always the reason for the rise of radical sentiment in society and populist victories. The mechanism is simple: whoever relativizes the issue of border protection leads to the victory in his country of populists, fascists and other such, and withdraws his country from the Schengen zone with small steps.

And what is to be the role of Frontex?

Bigger than before – one of the conclusions after the crises of recent years is that Frontex should be strengthened, but not with officials, but with border officers. Just as the result of the Covidian crisis should be the strengthening of the common European health policy, the result of the border crises should be the expansion of Frontex and its greater powers when it comes to coordinating the actions of EU countries. And what’s more, also greater rights for Frontex to protect the border on its own initiative – since it’s a common Union border.

In a recent interview with Rzeczpospolita, you spoke of an overall renewal of relations with Ukraine. What does this mean specifically?

First of all, they should be based on a completely new legal document, preferably a new treaty. Because Poland’s relations with Ukraine cannot be conducted as the Law and Justice party wanted, i.e. on the basis of ad hoc arrangements and emotions. The same people within a year almost called for a joint Polish-Ukrainian state, and then proposed a trade blockade of embattled Ukraine in April 2023. Our approach is different. Foreign policy is not a name day at your aunt’s house, there is nothing to be offended or driven by emotions. International relations must be conducted realistically: they must be based on the parties’ commitments.

But why a “new treaty” right away? And what would it contain?

So much has changed in Polish-Ukrainian relations that it is necessary. We have been writing about this for a long time with former Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. This idea is also close to Minister Sikorski. Moreover, even President Duda has declared that he intends to move in this direction. So yes – we need a treaty on the scale of the German-French one.

But what should be inside?

It is necessary to assume that Ukraine will enter the EU and NATO, and it is in this spirit to create a document open to the future. Its elements should be the establishment of joint political institutions, such as joint meetings of parliament and governments from time to time, and joint scientific institutions – such as a joint university. Further, an important element of the new treaty should be to achieve real synergy in military and economic cooperation. Also, interaction in agriculture, processing and transportation should be part of such a new regulation. After all, we are facing a lifetime opportunity of great change, which can open up great prospects for Poland and our business to create new jobs. My approach to Polish-Ukrainian relations is simple. These are very close relationships, there will be good and bad elements in them, these we must overcome. But after the misfortune that Putin has wrought, we need to open a new chapter and play with history for much more than the issues at hand today.

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Pawel Kowal – prof. ISP PAN, member of the Civic Coalition club, chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs. From 2006 to 2007, Deputy Foreign Minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government, author of books including. The end of the power system. The policy of the team of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski in 1986-1989 (2012), The Testament of Prometheus. Sources of the eastern policy of the Third Republic of Poland (2018), and most recently, with Agnieszka Lichnerowicz. It will no longer be peaceful. The end of our belle époque (2023).