To what extent will Brussels have to reckon with the votes of the far right?

Kaja Puto: Europe’s far right can count on success in the Euro elections. If based on the polls, the total could get more than 160 seats. Will this change the political climate in Europe?

Piotr Buras: Everything points to the fact that their growth will be relatively the largest, so in a sense they will be able to call themselves winners of these elections. However, I do not expect revolutionary changes as a result. Far from a majority, they will not be able to vote on their ideas on their own.

The question is also whether they will be able to unite. We have the more radical Identity and Democracy (ID) Eurogroup, whose leader is Marine le Pen, and the more moderate Party of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), whose members include. Italian brothers Giorgia Meloni or Law and Justice. In addition to these groups, we have Hungary’s Fidesz and Germany’s AfD, which was recently expelled from the ID ranks due to radicalization. This would indicate an increase in the field for cooperation between the two parties, but in my opinion this will not happen.

Why?

The reasons are many. The parties of the far right differ in their attitude toward Ukraine. The majority of ECRs believe it should be supported and also support sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, groups from the Identity and Democracy faction, such as Le Pen and the Austrian “libertarians,” while not supporting Russian aggression, prey on war fatigue and criticize pro-Ukrainian policies.

But perhaps more importantly, Giorgia Meloni, who plays a key role on the right today, can have a greater impact on European politics by playing the role of a moderate and serious leader, rather than choosing to formally ally with the troublemakers. That’s why her reaction to the advances of Le Pen, who would like to create a united faction of the far right without the toxic AfD, was rather chilly. Meloni prefers to stir up mainstream politics. And this can have far-reaching consequences.

More important than the numerical strengthening of the far right is the clear shift to the right of the European mainstream, especially the European People’s Party. Many center-right parties are thus trying to pave the way for themselves to cooperate with Eurosceptic parties in the next parliament. And these will have a tongue-in-cheek role in it.

Meaning?

We can expect a reversal of the primacy of human rights. Indeed, more ambitious legislative proposals on climate or migration issues may not have a majority. The opinion of the far right will have to be reckoned with, especially on the question of the head of the European Commission. In the previous term, such a tongue in cheek was the Renew group, the Liberals led by Emmanuel Macron.

Five years ago, the relative winner of the European elections was the Greens. They did great in the Northwest European countries, the same year the European Commission unveiled the European Green Deal, an ambitious project in their favor. Rather, in this election, voters are being won over by criticism of the project. Why the change?

Several factors contributed to this. First, covid and the war in Ukraine, which caused economic turmoil across Europe – recession, rising energy prices, inflation. At the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), we recently asked Europeans in a survey which of Europe’s crises has had the strongest impact on their lives. The economic crisis was indicated in most countries. This concern for the future of existence has carried over into emotions toward the Green Deal.

The regulations envisioned by this project are already becoming a reality. A huge debate has erupted in Germany over cutting diesel subsidies to farmers. Farmers have been compensated for years for oil expenses. They were taken away, and fuel prices rose, which stirred up huge emotions.

The European Union’s disastrous and heartless communications policy also played a large role. The Green Deal was presented as all sorts of bans, such as the sale of cars with internal combustion engines. It was supposed to apply to new cars and only from 2035, but many citizens perceived this as a threat lurking in the here and now. This was done differently by the United States, which sold decisions to support the energy transition to the public as an opportunity for a better future.

And does this resistance to the Green Deal also have an anti-globalist dimension? In Poland, farmers’ protests have been linked to Ukrainian produce flooding the market, in Spain to tomatoes from Morocco.

Definitely yes. Quite wrongly, because the Green Deal is overwhelmingly a project aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy. If we don’t implement it, we will drop out of the technological and economic race. Because today, both the U.S. and China are investing mightily in green technologies, renewable energy, electric cars and all those things that the far right, in particular, presents as faddishness. And this race will determine not only the future of the climate and the planet, but also whether and how we can sustain our prosperity.

In contrast, the main problem for Polish farmers is not Ukrainian goods, but rising prices for agricultural products on global markets, for which Russia is largely responsible. In both this and previous topics, confusion has been created by misinformation. As a result, the Green Deal has become a symbol of the complete failure of the European Union in the eyes of its critics.

At least we have some common ground in the Euro-election campaign, which tended to focus on domestic issues.

It continues to do so. In France, the European elections are a plebiscite on Macron’s power, in Italy – on Meloni’s power, in Poland – an extension of the fight against populists. European topics are in the background and are heating up Europeans in varying degrees of intensity. In some countries, issues of competitiveness of the European economy are more important, in others – migration, the Green Deal or security.

Ursula von der Leyen announced a few weeks ago that a priority for her next term – if it comes to it – would be to combat Russian disinformation . This is not a topic that unites Europe?

By all means it is. Many European countries are struggling with Russian aggression in this dimension, and therefore there is more consensus on this issue than on military defense. But this tough defense has also entered the agenda in many countries. In Poland, too, a huge change has taken place in this regard. Because, yes, we were always eager to talk about security in the European forum, but we were skeptical about any European initiatives in this regard.

Because it would threaten the cohesion of NATO?

Exactly. At the time, the Poles thought that European defense would be directed against the United States and that it would serve the arms industries of Western European countries. And today Poland is the country that is raising the need for joint European security efforts. We advocate a strong defense commissioner and a large European budget for this purpose. It seems to me that strengthening the role of the European Union as a geopolitical actor will become the main theme of the next commission.

What role does the Weimar Triangle play in this?

This format has its five minutes. The second half of the year will be a defining moment for Europe. We need to help Ukraine survive the war, prepare for the new U.S. president, whoever it becomes, and strengthen our own defenses. The role of France, Germany and Poland, as the countries with the largest military budgets and considerable political power in the European Union, is crucial here. Especially since their governments represent the broad political spectrum of the European center.

What if Ukraine’s aid fails? Ukrainians widely believe that Putin will move on if they lose. Is this opinion shared by the EU elite?

Don’t. There is a sense that a Russian victory would completely change the situation on the continent, but there is no conviction of an immediate threat, at least west of Poland. There is also the realization that a scenario in which Ukraine begins to clearly lose the war will be a challenge to European unity. European countries would react differently to this, with some wanting to encourage Ukraine to talk to Russia, and others wanting to double down on aid.

There is no consensus on launching a European defense fund, proposed by Donald Tusk, either, even among the Weimar Triangle countries.

The key stumbling block is Germany, which opposes increasing debt limits and establishing new funds at the EU level based on shared debt. This is strongly opposed by the Liberals, who co-found the ruling coalition, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also reluctant. This is a constitutional problem for Germany. The covid fund was supposed to be unique and special, and now there is increasing talk of the need to take on European debt for defense spending. However, Chancellor Scholz clearly signaled that if it were to be the case that there would be no other way to support Ukraine and strengthen European defenses, he would be able to consider this direction.

And are there other ways?

The Estonians have a proposal for everyone to contribute 0.25 percent. of its GDP to help Ukraine. However, many EU countries are not ready for such a solution. Another idea is to transfer frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. It’s a complicated matter, because such a move could make non-EU countries reluctant to put their money in Europe, which would destabilize the euro currency. So far, an agreement has been reached to gift Ukrainians with interest on these assets.

It’s just that the war is developing much faster than the mills of EU decisions are grinding. Plus the Union is not delivering on its promises – last year it was supposed to supply Ukraine with one million missiles, of which only a third were produced. From the Ukrainian, let alone Russian, perspective, the EU is constantly compromising in this game.

I will not agree with this opinion. We have, of course, made mistakes that can be criticized – take, for example, Germany’s restrained attitude, especially at the beginning of the war, or allowing Poland to blockade the border for months. We have not significantly increased our arms production. In financial terms, however, European Union countries have helped Ukraine more than the United States. Two years ago, no one imagined that the EU would fund arms spending, that Germany would supply arms to Ukraine, that we would train Ukrainian soldiers. In Brussels and other European capitals, the efficiency of this response is a matter of pride.

Pro-democracy Georgians also have grievances with the EU. Along with Ukraine, Georgia is one of the few countries whose citizens are ready to batter for the European flag. And yet they see no support from Brussels. Is there anything at all that can be done about it?

This is a dramatic situation, because this pro-European enthusiasm is badly needed by the Union. Unfortunately, the leverage the European Union has in Georgia is very weak. The only thing we can practically do for her is to support pro-European circles and show Georgians that the road to the Union is open. However, the calculations of the Georgian elite are different. For much more depends on Russia than Brussels can give Georgia. Therefore, I believe that the fate of Georgia will be determined by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

However, there is another problem with helping Ukraine, in my opinion a very serious one. A few months ago, we conducted a survey at ECFR, which showed that support for helping Ukraine among Europeans is still quite high, while there is almost no belief in its full victory, i.e. a return to the 1991 borders. This is how Ukraine defines the purpose of this war, while the West has not fully defined what it sees as its goals for more than two years. We say we are helping Ukraine as long as we can, leaving it to Ukraine to define the ultimate goal. This is understandable to some extent, because we don’t want to impose anything on Kiev.

This would be immoral and counterproductive. But at the same time, we are not at all doing everything to make sure that Ukraine wins this war according to the goals it has set for itself. This is increasingly becoming an issue at the level of social legitimacy of aid to Ukraine. People see this inconsistency and stop believing that all this effort makes sense. And if they don’t believe that the intended goal is achievable, they won’t want to continue helping.

Then what to do?

Perhaps we should say that from Europe’s point of view, the overriding value is for Ukraine to be rooted in Europe as a democratic country integrated into the European Union. And leave the question of borders open. This would be more in line with how European elites really view the war.

Let’s recap: on the threshold of the Euro elections, Europe is talking about protecting the interests of the lower classes, economic sovereignty, citizen security. Why is there no clear voice from the left on these topics?

Leftist parties have a big problem in this election. We observe this in Poland as well as in Germany or France. Perhaps they are too poorly distinguished from the center, a clearer left turn could help them. But somehow the wind blows differently. Economic sovereignty is spoken of most loudly by Macron, a liberal, while protecting the interests of the owners of old Volkswagens is being pursued by the far right.

The social dimension of the energy transition could be a theme for the Left, but it does not have a clear or coherent narrative on this issue. There is also no constructive idea to develop the competitiveness of the European economy. And without this, it is difficult for it to serve the poor in the future.

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