In its ongoing hybrid war against the West, Russia’s sprawling influence operations – encompassing politics, business, NGOs, and at times coercive or violent tactics – form a complex web that is both pervasive and subtle. This March, a strand of this intricate network appeared to have been severed. Czech counterintelligence (BIS), working with European agencies, exposed the operations of the “Voice of Europe“ news network (no link whatsoever with our “Voices of Europe 2024” collaborative initiative).
Ostensibly a news outlet, it not only propagated Kremlin narratives but also allegedly funnelled funds to journalists and certain candidates in the European Parliament elections, aiming to steer political discourse in favour of Russia’s foreign policy interests.
“European politicians on Putin’s payroll. Russians attempted to influence European elections from Prague,” titles the headline from Deník N. The Prague-based liberal daily, which first flagged the suspicious news server in September 2023, describes it as one of the most significant Russian influence operations uncovered in recent years.
The Voice of Europe website, central to this scheme, has been promoting narratives suggesting that continued support for Ukraine merely extends the conflict and blocks the path to peace. The platform predominantly featured voices with marked pro-Russian stances, including European politicians.
The operation’s goal was to tilt the scales in the European Parliament elections. Reportedly, cash was transferred in Prague to anti-system European politicians, predominantly German, to secure their allegiance. The Security Information Service (BIS) has identified two Ukrainian businessmen-politicians with deep Russian connections as key figures in this network: Viktor Medvedchuk, a known confidant of Vladimir Putin, and his associate Artyom Marchevsky.
In the Czech investigative outlet Hlídací Pes Vojtěch Berger notes that despite unmasking the key figures behind Russia’s influence campaign, the actual authors of content on the Voice of Europe website remain shrouded in mystery. This opacity leaves open the possibility that these operatives might resurface in the public sphere, perhaps under a different media banner.
In his column The rise of useful idiots for Hospodářské noviny, commentator Petr Honzejk highlights the nuanced approach of Russian propaganda disseminated through the Voice of Europe platform. Unlike blatant endorsements of Putin or overt celebrations of Russian military manoeuvres, the site engages in systematic questioning – a subtler form of influence. This strategy targets not the explicitly pro-Russian segments of the European populace, but the majority, subtly eroding their resistance to Russian aggression.
Honzejk argues that Russia’s geopolitical strategy does not hinge on acquiring allies but rather on cultivating passive observers – individuals who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, might turn a blind eye to the events in Ukraine. While the Czech counterintelligence service has effectively countered direct Russian propaganda, the challenge of addressing its less overt collaborators – whom some might label “useful idiots” – remains a task for the electorate.
The German press has keenly focused on allegations of Kremlin cash funnelling to German politicians and the intimate ties between leaders of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and Kremlin go-betweens. Reporting from Hamburg, Die Zeit, leveraging insights from the Czech newspaper Deník N, reveals that Czech counterintelligence possesses audio evidence suggesting that Petr Bystron, a German politician of Czech descent, may have received payments in cash and cryptocurrencies linked to the Voice of Europe platform.
Meanwhile, on Berlin’s Tagesspiegel, Claudia von Salzen delves into the enduring connections between Maximilian Krah, a prominent AfD figure and MEP, and Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch with significant pro-Russian inclinations. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Medvedchuk was a major political player, poised to govern Kyiv as Putin’s deputy should the invasion have succeeded. In January 2020, Krah hosted a so-called ‘peace conference on Ukraine’ at the Bundestag, attended exclusively by AfD representatives, two members from the SPD, and orchestrated by Medvedchuk. Furthermore, Krah facilitated entry into the European Parliament for Janusz Niedźwiecki, a Polish national later indicted for pro-Russian espionage by Poland.
The scandal has stirred reverberations across Europe, with Maria R. Sahuquillo of Spain’s El País reporting potential involvement of politicians not only from the Czech Republic and Germany but also from France, Poland, the Netherlands, and Hungary in the Russian influence network.
There’s a possibility that legislators from other EU member states might be implicated as well. The Voice of Europe has been active, organising debates and conferences, and publishing interviews and articles featuring MEPs and candidates for the forthcoming European elections, including those from far-right factions such as Germany’s AfD, Marine Le Pen‘s National Rally in France, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary, and Italy‘s League. According to the Madrid-based daily, this controversy emerges as Russia attempts to reconstruct its intelligence network within NATO-allied nations, a network which suffered significant setbacks following widespread expulsions ordered across the EU after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In the same article, El País also connects this issue to recent espionage allegations against Latvian MEP Tatiana Zhdanok, suspected of collaborating with Russian intelligence, and the Qatargate scandal that erupted nearly a year ago. In that incident, influential figures in Brussels, including several MEPs, were accused of enhancing Qatar’s public image for a fee.
The newspaper suggests that such operations serve dual purposes for the Kremlin: they bolster Russian strategic interests when undetected, yet even when exposed, they provide Moscow with ammunition to propagate its narrative that Western democracies are fundamentally flawed and institutions inherently corrupt.
On the same topic
In a striking illustration that it is not solely adversarial states that seek to sway European opinion, it has emerged that Hungarian taxpayer funds were instrumental in securing the purchase of Euronews, a broadcaster with pan-European reach and multilingual output. Hungarian investigative journalism website Direkt36, collaborating with Portugal’s Expresso and France’s Le Monde, uncovered that Pedro Vargas Santos David, a Portuguese businessman who acquired Euronews in 2022 for €150 million, was supported by Hungarian state capital for nearly a third of the purchase price.
This capital, along with contributions from entities tied to the Hungarian government’s propaganda initiatives, underscores a concerted effort to shape media narratives. Although Euronews maintains that its editorial independence remains uncompromised, the financial entanglements with Hungarian state and government-affiliated actors provoke concerns about potential meddlesomeness and the propagation of particular political doctrines.
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Pellegrini To Become Slovakia’s New President
Daniela Hajčáková, Michal Katuška | SME | 7 April | SK
Slovakia’s parliamentary speaker and the leader of the governing Voice party, Peter Pellegrini, will be the country’s next president. An ally of the populist and pro-Russian Prime Minister Robert Fico, Pellegrini emerged victorious in the presidential runoff, securing 53% of the vote against diplomat Ivan Korčok. His election is expected to bolster the government’s position, particularly its avowed “anti-war” stance. Despite the implications of his political affiliations, Pellegrini has vowed to maintain the existing trajectory of Slovakia’s foreign policy. In keeping with tradition, he announced that his first official visit abroad as president would be to the Czech Republic.
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